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Resumo 
 
Discuto três questões levantadas pela interpretação que Peter Geach faz do modelo 
funcional da complexidade frásica inventado por Gottlob Frege. 
A leitura de Geach é orientada pela construção de soluções para três problemas 
sobre complexidade frásica. O primeiro é o problema de Ramsey, de saber como é que 
uma frase pode ter análises alternativas. O segundo é o problema da unidade frásica. O 
terceiro, o da unidade do pensamento. 
O conceito fundamental da interpretação de Geach é o de uma função 
linguística. A solução do primeiro problema depende de conceber-se uma frase como o 
valor de uma função linguística; a do segundo passa por conceber um predicado como 
sendo ele próprio uma função; e a do terceiro, por conceber um pensamento como o 
valor de uma função-sentido. 
Geach encontra latente nos escritos de Frege a noção de função linguística. A 
estratégia de Geach consiste em transferir para os níveis Fregeanos da linguagem e do 
sentido o modo de combinação que Frege advoga explicitamente para o nível da 
referência, no qual conceitos são para ser entendidos como funções de objectos para 
valores de verdade. O modelo proposto por Geach parece estar assim em consonância 
com o dictum de Frege segundo o qual podemos ver uma frase como um mapa de um 
pensamento. Deste modo, Geach oferece não apenas um tratamento uniforme dos três 
problemas mencionados, mas também uma representação sistemática das ideias de 
Frege. 
Nesta investigação, pretendo testar o modelo de Geach, tanto no que toca a sua 
plausibilidade intrínseca, como relativamente à sua legitimidade exegética. Proponho 
uma modificação da solução de Geach para o problema de Ramsey; defendo a sua 
solução para o problema da unidade frásica; e afasto a unidade do pensamento como um 
mero pseudo-problema. 
 
 
Palavras-chave 
 
Funções linguísticas, decomposição e análise, relações conversas, paradoxo de Kerry, 
sentidos de expressões incompletas. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I address three questions raised by Peter Geach’s interpretation of Gottlob Frege’s 
functional model of sentential complexity. 
Geach’s reading provides a solution to three problems about sentential 
complexity. The first is Ramsey’s problem of how to make sense of a sentence’s being 
analysed in different ways. The second is the problem of sentential unity. The third, that 
of the unity of thought. 
The fundamental notion of Geach’s account is that of a linguistic function. 
Geach’s Fregean solution to the first problem depends on conceiving a sentence as the 
value of a linguistic function; to the second, on conceiving a predicate as being itself a 
function; and to the third, on conceiving a thought as the value of a sense-function. 
Geach modestly traces the notion of a linguistic function to Frege’s writings. 
Geach’s strategy consists in extending to the Fregean realms of language and sense the 
mode of combination that Frege explicitly advocates to the realm of reference, in which 
concepts are to be seen as functions from objects to truth-values. Thus the model that 
Geach propounds accords well enough with Frege’s dictum that we may regard a 
sentence as a mapping of a thought. And so Geach offers not only a unified solution to 
the three problems mentioned, but also a systematic representation of Frege’s thought. 
In this inquiry, I try Geach’s model both for its intrinsic plausibility, and for its 
exegetical legitimacy. I propose a modification of Geach’s solution to Ramsey’s 
problem; defend his solution to the problem of sentential unity; and dismiss the unity of 
thought as a pseudo-problem. 
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Resumo alargado 
 
Discuto três questões levantadas pela interpretação que Peter Geach faz do modelo 
funcional da complexidade frásica inventado por Gottlob Frege. 
A leitura de Geach é orientada pela construção de soluções para três problemas 
sobre complexidade frásica. O primeiro é o problema de Ramsey, de saber como é que 
uma frase pode ter análises alternativas. O segundo é o problema da unidade frásica. O 
terceiro, o da unidade do pensamento. 
O conceito fundamental da interpretação de Geach é o de uma função 
linguística. A solução do primeiro problema depende de conceber-se uma frase como o 
valor de uma função linguística; a do segundo passa por conceber um predicado como 
sendo ele próprio uma função; e a do terceiro, por conceber um pensamento como o 
valor de uma função-sentido. 
Geach encontra latente nos escritos de Frege a noção de função linguística. A 
estratégia de Geach consiste em transferir para os níveis Fregeanos da linguagem e do 
sentido o modo de combinação que Frege advoga explicitamente para o nível da 
referência, no qual conceitos são para ser entendidos como funções de objectos para 
valores de verdade. O modelo proposto por Geach parece estar assim em consonância 
com o dictum de Frege segundo o qual podemos ver uma frase como um mapa de um 
pensamento. Deste modo, Geach oferece não apenas um tratamento uniforme dos três 
problemas mencionados, mas também uma representação sistemática das ideias de 
Frege. 
Nesta investigação, pretendo testar o modelo de Geach, tanto no que toca à sua 
plausibilidade intrínseca, como relativamente à sua legitimidade exegética. 
No primeiro capítulo, abordo a questão de saber se uma frase pode ser 
alternativamente representada em termos de argumento e função a partir do ponto de 
vista do chamado problema de Ramsey. Ramsey coloca o problema de saber como é 
que seria inteligível a existência de análises alternativas da mesma frase. Defendo que é 
a característica de que goza a noção de função linguística de generalizar a noção 
tradicional de predicado que permite tornar inteligível o fenómeno identificado por 
Ramsey. O facto de Frege aceitar que uma frase pode ter representações alternativas em 
termos de função e argumento constitui evidência a favor da atribuição da noção de 
função linguística a Frege por parte de Geach. 
No entanto, proponho razões para crer que a concepção estrita de análise de 
Geach deve estar errada. A minha objecção ao ponto de vista de Geach pode ser 
formulada nos termos de Michael Dummett, que distingue análise de decomposição, da 
seguinte maneira: nem todos os componentes de uma frase estão imediatamente 
disponíveis por decomposição. Em geral, concordo com Dummett acerca da unicidade 
da análise. Mostro que as objecções típicas à interpretação que Dummett faz de Frege 
não são boas, e que os alegados contra-exemplos à unicidade da análise não podem 
senão ser ser entendidos, na melhor das hipóteses, como contra-exemplos a outra tese de 
Dummett, segundo a qual pensamentos Fregeanos são em geral para ser entendidos 
como o sentido linguístico de frases, i.e. à ideia de que seria em princípo possível 
estabelecer uma bijecção entre pensamentos e frases da notação conceptual de Frege. 
Por outro lado, algumas das críticas de Dummett ao ponto de vista de Geach são 
injustas. Concluo que a concepção de análise de Geach pode ser reformulada de maneira 
a incorporar o que de significativo existe na perspectiva de Dummett. Em particular, da 
unicidade da análise, ao contrário do que Dummett pensava, não se segue que 
predicados simples não sejam expressões incompletas. 
No segundo capítulo, introduzo o problema da unidade frásica. Descrevo a 
solução que Geach apresenta para o problema, baseada na noção de função linguística. 
Mostro que a maneira como Frege descreve os seus “nomes funcionais” sugere 
fortemente a interpretação que deles faz Geach, segundo a qual eles devem ser 
insaturados no mesmo sentido em que funções são insaturadas. A insaturação dos 
predicados Fregeanos seria obviamente implicada pelo facto de eles serem funções 
linguísticas. 
O paradoxo de Kerry, também conhecido como o paradoxo do conceito cavalo, 
é originado pelo facto de funções não poderem ser denotadas por nomes próprios. 
Explico por que razão é que o paradoxo de Kerry se segue da tese de que predicados são 
funções linguísticas. Por outro lado, esta mesma tese implica o reaparecimento do 
paradoxo de Kerry ao nível da linguagem. Com efeito, se funções não podem ser 
denotadas por nomes próprios, então, se predicados são funções linguísticas, então 
predicados também não podem ser denotados por nomes próprios, uma vez que funções 
linguísticas são funções. Geach argumenta que Frege foi capaz de prever este resultado. 
Alex Oliver, entre outros, discorda. Oliver tenta mostrar não só que a nota de “On 
Concept and Object” na qual Geach baseia o seu argumento é por ele mal interpretada, 
como também que Frege admite explicitamente que predicados podem ser denotados 
por nomes próprios. Admito que as críticas de Oliver à interpretação de Geach são boas 
críticas. No entanto, defendo que a conclusão mais razoável não é aquela que Oliver 
retira. Uma vez que a tese de que predicados são funções linguísticas implica o 
reaparecimento do paradoxo de Kerry ao nível da linguagem, mas que Frege não parece 
ter reconhecido tal fenómeno, Oliver conclui que, afinal, Frege não deve ter concebido 
predicados como funções linguísticas. A conclusão de Oliver é precipitada porque é 
também a tese de que predicados são funções que implica o próprio paradoxo de Kerry. 
Na sua ausência, portanto, ficamos sem uma explicação do motivo pelo qual Frege terá 
sido levado a considerar o paradoxo. Concluo assim simplesmente que a tese de que 
predicados são eles próprios funções deve ser atribuída a Frege, ainda que ele não tenha 
sido capaz de prever todas as suas consequências. 
No terceiro capítulo, apresento o problema da unidade do pensamento por 
analogia com o problema da unidade entre conceito e objecto. Tal como a doutrina da 
insaturação resolve o regresso de Bradley no nível da referência, a extensão daquela 
doutrina para o nível do sentido soluciona o problema da unidade do pensamento. É 
essencialmente esta a solução de Geach para o problema da unidade do pensamento. No 
nível do sentido, são os sentidos de predicados que são funções. As “funções-sentido”, 
como lhes chama Geach, são funções que, no caso mais simples, tomam sentidos de 
nomes como argumentos e geram sentidos de frases, i.e. pensamentos, como valores. 
Dummett mostrou que a identificação dos sentidos de predicados com funções-
sentido torna impossível a explicação do sentido de uma frase como a condição que 
deve ser satisfeita para que ela seja verdadeira. Este resultado é obviamente indesejável 
para um intérprete de Frege como Geach. Concordo com a crítica que Dummett faz a 
este aspecto do modelo de Geach. No entanto, defendo que a tese de que sentidos de 
predicados são funções-sentido não se segue da tese de que predicados são funções 
linguísticas, e que portanto da negação da primeira não se segue a negação da segunda. 
Mostro que o problema da unidade do pensamento pode ser interpretado tanto como o 
problema da unidade frásica, como como o problema da unidade entre conceito e 
objecto. De outro modo, sugiro que o problema da unidade do pensamento é gerado ou 
por um equívoco, ou pela adesão a uma concepção demasiado esquemática da relação 
entre sentido e referência. As minhas conclusões são reforçadas pela hipótese de Jan 
Dejnožka segundo a qual, para Frege, sentidos não são nem funções nem objectos. 
Finalmente, concluo que a generalização do modelo funcional da complexidade 
frásica proposta por Geach deve ser corrigida de duas maneiras. Em primeiro lugar, o 
modelo deve ser capaz de acomodar a distinção Dummettiana entre análise e 
decomposição, de acordo com a maneira entretanto descrita. Em segundo, o modelo não 
deve ser aplicado ao nível do sentido, uma vez que esta extensão é não apenas ilegítima, 
mas também desnecessária. O problema que a motiva é apenas um pseudo-problema. 
Começo por descrever o método de análise frásica inventado por Frege no 
parágrafo 9 de Begriffsschrift, e por caracterizar a noção de função linguística de Geach, 
na Introdução. 
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To perceive the words of understanding 
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Introduction 
 
When Frege asked himself what could he regard as the result of his work, this is what 
he had to say. 
 
It is almost all tied up with the concept-script, a concept construed as a function, a 
relation as a function of two arguments, the extension of a concept or class is not the 
primary thing for me. unsaturatedness both in the case of concepts and functions, the 
true nature of concept and function recognized.1 
 
Frege’s doctrine of unsaturation can be seen as an answer to Bradley’s regress.2 
The extension of this doctrine from the realm of reference to those of language and 
sense has allowed Peter Geach to answer three puzzles about sentential complexity. 
The first is “Ramsey’s problem”, of whether a single sentence may intelligibly 
be thought to have alternative analyses. The second is the old Platonic problem of 
sentential unity. The third is the problem of the unity of thought. 
Geach’s solutions rely on his notion of a linguistic function, the discovery of 
which he attributes, even if only implicitly, to Frege. Thus Geach provides not only a 
unified account of all three puzzles, but also a systematic interpretation of Frege’s 
thought, since he modestly traces his views essentially to Frege’s texts. Indeed, on the 
model propounded by Geach, Frege’s idea that sentences might serve as pictures both of 
their senses and, to a certain extent, of their referents, is admirably interpreted. 
Our task is twofold. We will try Geach’s account both for the intrinsic 
plausibility of his solutions, and for its exegetical legitimacy, eventually to conclude for 
the need of a few corrections. 
In the first chapter, we will see how the notion of a linguistic function allows us 
to interpret Frege’s function names as generalizing the traditional notion of a predicate. 
Even if analysis, as Dummett has claimed, is unique, it is still necessary to account for 
the intelligibility of there being alternative decompositions of sentences. It is the 
generality of the notion of a linguistic function that provides for the latter. 
In the second chapter, we will see that it is the fact that linguistic functions are 
themselves unsaturated that suggests a solution to the problem of sentential unity. In 
connection with Kerry’s paradox of the concept horse, we will see that, although Frege 
required his function signs to be incomplete, he did not draw the full consequences 
therefrom. 
In the third chapter, we will see that Geach’s solution to the problem of the unity 
of thought involves an implausible account of the senses of incomplete expressions. I 
will argue that the problem of the unity of thought is after all only a pseudo-problem. 
However, contra Dummett, Geach’s solution to the latter is independent from his 
general account of analysis. 
At the heart of all these matters lies of course Frege’s celebrated method of 
analysing sentences in terms of function and argument. This, he introduced in his 
Begriffsschrift. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Frege 1906b: 184. 
2
 See chapter 3. 
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0.1 Begriffsschrift §9 
 
Suppose that a simple or complex symbol occurs in one or more places in an expression 
(whose content need not be a possible content of judgment). If we imagine this symbol 
as replaceable by another (the same one each time) at one or more of its occurrences, 
then the part of the expression that shows itself invariant under such replacement is 
called the function; and the replaceable part, the argument of the function.3 
 
Frege’s procedure of function-argument analysis may be characterized in his 
later terminology as an operation to form function-names from either proper names 
(which include definite descriptions and sentences) or function-names. It basically 
corresponds to the inverse process of his “two ways to form a name” from 
Grundgesetze. Here Frege writes that there arises 
 
[A] a proper name 
[1] from a proper name and a name of a first-level function of one argument, 
       or [2] from a name of a first-level function and a name of a second-level function 
of one argument, 
       or [3] from a name of a second-level function of one argument of type 2 and the 
name […] of a third-level function; 
[B] the name of a first-level function of one argument 
 [1] from a proper name and a name of a first-level function of two arguments.4 
 
Michael Dummett called the operation described by Frege ‘extraction of 
functions’. But since it concerns the formation of function-names, i.e. what we now call 
predicates, I should rather prefer to say ‘function-name extraction’ or ‘predicate 
extraction’, after Peter Sullivan’s ‘predicate abstraction’. Sullivan’s term is unfortunate 
only because it lends itself to confusion with abstractionism – the very theory of 
concept-formation that Frege’s own came to replace. 
It may or may not be the case that function-names are themselves functions: 
linguistic functions, as Geach would claim them to be.5 Frege’s account of predicate 
extraction does imply that predicates are functions. In fact, he defines functions as 
predicates: a function just is that part of an expression that shows itself invariant under 
the replacement of some other part. But then carelessness about sign and thing signified 
abounds in Bs. For instance, when Frege introduces his notation for the expression of 
generality, he writes that the judgement-stroke, followed by a content-stroke in which a 
concavity has been inserted with a Gothic letter on top of it, followed by a function of 
the same Gothic letter, is to signify “the judgement that the function is a fact whatever 
we take its argument to be.”6 Now if a function is an expression it cannot be a fact in the 
intended sense. Frege was here guilty of the “mistake, […] that is very often met with in 
mathematical works, even those of celebrated authors”,7 which he eventually diagnosed 
as one of the causes of the malady of formalist philosophies of arithmetic. So in all 
probability he made the same mistake in Bs §9. 
                                                 
3
 Frege 1879 §9. 
4
 Frege 1893 §30. Note that the type of an argument is not its level but its arity: an argument of type 1 is 
an object; an argument of type 2 is a first-level function of one argument; of type 3 is a first-level function 
of two arguments. See Frege 1893 §23. 
5
 See chapter 2. 
6
 Frege 1879 §11. 
7
 Frege 1891: 2. 
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In any case, regardless of whether function-argument analysis is misleadingly 
so-called, predicate extraction is an operation to form function-names. That much is 
clear from Frege’s later account in Gg, which is posterior to his distinction between 
sense and reference, after which Frege became hypersensitive to the distinction between 
use and mention. In Bs Frege may have used ‘function’ where he should have ‘function-
name’, but then he should have ‘function-name’: not ‘function’, not ‘sense’. That is to 
say that function-argument analysis as introduced by Frege essentially operates on the 
realm of language. 
As Geach would say, to analyse a sentence in terms of function and argument is 
equivalent to discerning a pattern within it. It is easy to display the patterns instantiated 
by a sentence by a simple change in font style. Consider ‘Cato killed Cato’, to use 
Frege’s own example.8 
 
Cato killed Cato. 
Cato killed Cato. 
Cato killed Cato. 
 
In each token of the sentence we can now imagine as replaceable, say, the part 
written in regular font style, and as invariant the part in bold. Once the patterns are so 
recognized, it is a short step to see that each may in turn be instantiated by other 
sentences. 
 
Cato killed Cato. Cato killed Cato. Cato killed Cato. 
Brutus killed Cato. Cato killed Brutus. Brutus killed Brutus. 
Caesar killed Cato. Cato killed Caesar. Caesar killed Caesar. 
 
And so from ‘Cato killed Cato’ we can extract the names of the first-level functions: 
 
(     ) killed Cato 
Cato killed (     ) 
(     ) killed (     ) 
 
and, by imagining now the bold part as variable, the names of the second-level 
functions: 
 
Cato (     ) 
(     ) Cato 
Cato (     ) Cato. 
 
These functions may be read respectively as: the property of having killed Cato; 
the property of being such that Cato killed it; the property of killing oneself; the 
property of being a property of Cato; and the property of being a relation holding 
between Cato and himself.9 
The brackets mark the argument-places of the function-sign, thereby indicating 
where the sign for the argument must in each case be inserted in order for a proper 
name, i.e. a sentence, to be formed. Dots or dashes could have been used for the same 
purpose. Geach aptly describes the role of function-names as that of serving as 
                                                 
8
 Compare this explanation with Sullivan’s (2004: 694-6). 
9
 Frege 1879 §10. 
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“stencils” for constructing other expressions.10 However, this notation becomes 
impractical when Frege’s procedure is applied to predicates themselves. 
 
Suppose that a symbol occurring in a function has so far been imagined as not 
replaceable; if we now imagine it as replaceable at some or all of the positions where it 
occurs, this way of looking at it gives us a function with a further argument besides the 
previous one. In this way we get functions of two or more arguments.11 
 
We can indeed imagine ‘Cato’ as replaceable in ‘(     ) killed Cato’ 
 
(     ) killed Cato 
 
thus recognizing that the sentence ‘Cato killed Cato’ shares a pattern also with ‘Brutus 
killed Caesar’. The new function-name could be represented as ‘… killed ---’. 
The need to distinguish perspicuously between different argument-places led 
Frege to introduce a special notation for the purpose. He chose small-case Greek 
consonants, which do not belong to the vocabulary of his concept-script, to mark 
argument-places, so that the function-name ‘ξ killed ζ’ could now be clearly 
distinguished from ‘ξ killed ξ’. To the places occupied by, say, ‘ξ’, Frege called ‘ξ-
argument-places’. In ‘ξ killed ξ’, the ξ-argument-places are said to be related to one 
another; in ‘ξ killed ζ’, the ξ-argument-place is not related to the ζ-argument-place.12 
Related argument-places must be filled by the same arguments; unrelated argument-
places may be filled by the same or by different arguments. 
A function may have only one argument, and yet its name several argument-
places. If a function has two arguments, then its sign must have unrelated argument-
places, to indicate that once one of the argument-places is filled, we are still left with a 
function-name (of one argument-place) standing for a function of one argument. 
Functions with one argument whose values are always truth-values are called concepts, 
and their names concept-words;13 functions with two arguments whose values are 
always truth-values are relations, and their names relation-words.14 Thus ‘ξ killed Cato’ 
is a concept-word, ‘ξ killed ξ’ a concept-word with two (necessarily related) argument-
places, and ‘ξ killed ζ’ a relation-word. 
José Luis Bermúdez has accused Frege of “overlooking” the fact that the two-
place predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ could also be extracted from ‘Cato killed Cato’, and so of 
not distinguishing the former from ‘ξ killed ξ’.15 But as a matter of fact, it has been 
Bermúdez who neglected that Frege’s procedure only authorizes the extraction, from 
sentences, of names of functions of one argument (i.e. monadic predicates or predicates 
with related argument-places). Function-names with unrelated argument-places must be 
extracted from other function-names. Thus ‘ξ killed ζ’ must necessarily be obtained 
only either from ‘Cato killed ξ’ or from ‘ξ killed Cato’, after a second application of the 
operation. Indeed, as Frege had said at the beginning, the subject of predicate extraction 
“need not be a possible content of judgement”. 
Now, instead of ‘Cato’, we could have chosen to imagine as variable ‘killed’ in 
‘(     ) killed Cato’ in order to arrive at ‘… --- Cato’. But using the same notation as 
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before and writing the function-name as ‘ξ ζ Cato’ would have the undesirable result of 
allowing us to form such strings as ‘Cato Cato Cato’ or ‘Brutus Caesar Cato’, which are 
not sentences. Since ‘… --- Cato’ is the name of an unequal-level function, its 
argument-places must be filled by argument-signs for signs of different levels. Frege 
introduced a further refinement in his notation in order to indicate not only that different 
argument-places may be unrelated, but also that different argument-places may be 
places for signs of arguments of different levels. 
As a limiting case of predicate extraction, we have the case in which the whole 
sentence is imagined as variable. Thus ‘ξ’ would be the name of the function whose 
value for each sentence as argument is the sentence itself. This is indeed useful to 
identify names of truth-functions. ‘Cato killed Cato and ξ’ can be extracted from ‘Cato 
killed Cato and Brutus killed Caesar’, and then ‘ξ and ζ’ from the former. Now it is a 
shame that Frege allowed ‘ξ’ to be filled by proper names. 
Indeed Frege did not distinguish this case from that in which ‘Cato’ is imagined 
as replaceable in the expression (whose content is not a possible content of judgement) 
‘Cato’. Hence ‘ξ’ would also be the name of the function whose value for each object as 
argument is that very object. Frege distinguished neither ξ from identity, nor predicates 
from operators. As a result, Frege might have recognized ‘Cato and Brutus’ as a 
possible value for conjunction (as a propositional connective) and ‘Cato killed, Brutus 
killed Brutus’ as a possible value for ‘Cato killed ξ’. Such sentences were not nonsense 
but false. 
It is amusing that it was the fact that Frege did not distinguish the functions 
mentioned that led him not to distinguish their names, and not otherwise. Sentences 
were for Frege only a kind of complex proper names of a peculiar sort of logical 
objects, and so belonged to the same logical category as proper names. Thus ‘Cato 
killed Cato’ and ‘Cato’ could be arguments (and values) of ‘ξ’. Ironically, Frege 
believed this to be a virtue of his doctrine for technical reasons. This may have been a 
result of his confused theory of sense and reference which involves two distinct notions 
of reference: one which is based on the name/bearer relation as prototype, and one 
which coincides with the notion of semantic value. It is not yet problematic to say that 
names denote objects, and sentences truth-values, as long as the notion of reference 
involved is that of semantic value. Now, in case of proper names, the two notions 
coincide: the bearer of a proper name is its semantic value. But in the case of sentences, 
while their semantic values are indisputably truth-values, it is an awkward thing to say 
that the latter are the bearers of sentences, or indeed that sentences have bearers of any 
kind. 
So in Gg Frege retracted from the healthy doctrine of Bs that a possible content 
of judgement must always be complex. In Gg, though not in Bs, proper names are 
allowed to follow the content-stroke. The sign ‘—Cato’ represents the content that Cato 
is a name of a truth-value; the sign ‘|—Cato’ represents the false assertion that Cato is a 
name of the True. Frege’s mature doctrine is committed to a highly implausible account 
of assertion as an intentional act.16 But it could have been easily avoided by recognizing 
the distinctive logical roles of proper names and sentences, and by devising appropriate 
notations for objectual identity and propositional identity. Frege lacked the insight that 
had led him to distinguish between first- and second-level functions and the names 
thereof. 
Predicate extraction is constrained in three ways. First, not every pattern that a 
sentence may instantiate is a relevant pattern for predicate extraction. ‘Catξ’ is not a 
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predicate shared by ‘Cato killed Cato’ and ‘Cat is mammal’. This shows that the 
relevant kind of complexity is not of the typographical kind. It is presupposed by 
predicate extraction that one knows the language: which are the smallest meaningful 
bits of language that circumscribe the different parsings of the same sentence. Second, 
not every grammatically relevant pattern is logically relevant. ‘ξ is wise’ and ‘ξ has the 
property of being wise’ are to count as the same predicate.17 Finally, predicate 
extraction also presupposes knowledge of the category to which an expression may 
belong; and so an insight into level-distinctions is required in its application. 
 
0.2 Linguistic functions 
 
Peter Geach has interpreted Frege’s function-names as being themselves functions of a 
linguistic sort. 
 
The function 2.ξ2+ ξ is a numerical function; i.e. it takes numbers as arguments, and its 
value for a number as argument is again a number. But the values and arguments of a 
function need not be restricted to being numbers. A kind of non-numerical function that 
it will be specially useful to consider is a linguistic function (as we may call it); a 
function that takes names as arguments, and whose value for a name as argument is 
again a (complex) name.18 
 
A linguistic function is therefore a function from names to names (in Frege’s 
extended sense of a name), just as, say, a concept is a function from objects to truth-
values, and numerical functions in general functions from numbers to numbers. A 
function from numerals to numerals would of course be a linguistic function. Whether 
there are linguistic functions is not the point, since they can simply be so defined: the 
question is rather whether function-names are such functions, and whether Frege 
thought so too. 
According to Geach, “it seems right to say” that what represents in language the 
function 2.ξ2+ ξ is the linguistic function whose values for the numerals ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘7’ 
are respectively the complex names ‘2.22+2’, ‘2.32+3’ and ‘2.72+7’. This amounts to 
identifying the name of the function 2.ξ2+ ξ with the common pattern instantiated by the 
complex names 
 
2.22+2 
2.32+3 
2.72+7. 
 
Now a pattern instantiated by a sentence is a pattern according to which the 
sentence may be conceived as having been constructed. A linguistic function is 
therefore a rule for the construction of expressions. A function-name indicates such a 
rule by serving as a “stencil” for forming expressions. Geach cites as an example of the 
predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ the rule: 
 
The name x is written just before, and the name z just after some token of the word 
‘killed’.19 
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At this junction, one is met by “a certain linguistic awkwardness, of some 
philosophical interest.”20 We want to call the expression ‘2.ξ2+ ξ’ the linguistic function 
that represents 2.ξ2+ ξ. But the quoted words do not actually occur in the expressions in 
which the linguistic function is said to occur, e.g. the complex names ‘2.22+2’, ‘2.32+3’ 
and ‘2.72+7’. Likewise, we speak of the predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ as occurring in ‘John 
killed Mary’ and in ‘Mary killed John’, but again what we quote does not figure in these 
sentences. The reason is simple enough. As Frege himself notes, 
 
[…] when we say ‘the function 1 + ξ – ξ’, the letter ‘ξ’ is not part of the function-sign; 
for the proper name ‘1 + 3 – 3’ is composed of the function-name and the proper name 
‘3’, and the letter ‘ξ’ does not occur in it at all.21 
 
Geach concludes that, “As Frege would put it, by a kind of linguistic necessity 
we cannot quite say what we are trying to say.”  
 
The actual expression ‘ξ killed ζ’ is neither a function nor a predicate: it serves however 
to identify a two-place predicate shared by many sentences, and this is the same thing as 
identifying a function yielding such sentences as ‘John killed Mary’ and ‘Mary killed 
John’ as its values when proper names are supplied as its arguments.22 
 
Alex Oliver has criticized Geach for here revealing too narrow an account of 
quotation.23 According to Geach, the phrase ‘the predicate “ξ killed ζ”’ denotes, not a 
linguistic function, which would be the intended predicate, but an actual expression, 
which is not. Instead, the intended linguistic function is indicated, or identified, as 
Geach says, by such an expression as ‘ξ killed ζ’. But then we can denote the linguistic 
function directly by the roundabout phrase ‘the linguistic function, or two-place 
predicate, indicated by the actual expression “ξ killed ζ”’. The circumlocution is, 
however, completely superfluous. Oliver compares Geach’s position to that of logicians 
who often devise different styles of quotation marks to avoid ambiguity as to what they 
are quoting: type or token expressions, schemata, non-linguistic items such as concepts, 
etc. Oliver cites the Kneales with approval, for whom “Quotation marks were made for 
man, not man for quotation marks.”24 We can avoid the ambiguities in more relaxed 
terms, for instance by the use of an auxiliary prefix, as in ‘the printed token “loves”’, 
‘the phonological type “loves”’, ‘the lexeme “loves”’, etc.25 So if the phrase ‘the 
predicate “ξ killed ζ”’ does not denote a linguistic function, we might as well use ‘the 
linguistic function “ξ killed ζ”’, which does. 
Oliver’s critique would already sound unfair to someone as Geach, who, 
concerning the King James Bible, wrote: 
 
‘God said “Let there be light”’ does not mean that God used English, and only a 
philosopher would argue that this is a mistranslation unless the original consisted of a 
quoted English sentence standing in a Hebrew context.26 
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But it would nevertheless be a good objection if the phrase ‘the linguistic 
function “ξ killed ζ”’ did refer to the intended linguistic function – but it doesn’t, and so 
it isn’t. That, precisely, is the linguistic awkwardness. 
What we have here, as Geach says, is a reduplication of Frege’s paradox of the 
concept horse on the linguistic level.27 The problem is not one about quotation at all. 
What is in question is how to refer to linguistic functions, which of course is only an 
instance of how is it possible to refer to functions in general. 
For someone who did not believe that predicates were linguistic functions, or 
that functions were unsaturated, or that one could only refer to functions by function 
names, as Oliver legitimately might, there would surely be no question as to whether 
either ‘the predicate “ξ killed ζ”’ or ‘the linguistic function “ξ killed ζ”’ could be used 
to refer to their intended meanings: they would. But the “linguistic awkwardness” 
recognized by Geach is not a premise in his argument for the conclusion that predicates 
are linguistic functions: it is a consequence of the latter. 
Oliver has also claimed that both Frege and Geach were rather hasty to conclude 
that Frege’s Greek consonants were not part of his function signs only because they did 
not figure in the expressions in which the function signs were said to occur. True, ‘ξ’ 
figures in ‘ξ killed ζ’ but not in ‘Mary killed John’. But it all comes down to what it 
means for an expression to occur in another.28 
As Oliver points out, what it means for the schema ‘Fx’ to occur in the sentence 
‘Fa’ is that ‘Fa’ is just the result of substituting a term, in this case ‘a’, for ‘x’ in ‘Fx’.29 
Therefore, at least in the case of schemata, a proper part of an expression may not be a 
proper part of the sentence in which the expression occurs. 
Geach’s argument appears to be (i) the predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ occurs in ‘Mary 
killed John’; but (ii) the actual expression, or “the actual bit of print” ‘ξ killed ζ’, does 
not; because (iii) ‘ξ’ is a part of the expression but not of the sentence; therefore, (iv) 
the predicate is not the actual expression, but is only indicated by it. 
Now one can conceive of ‘ξ killed ζ’ as a schema. But then premise (ii) is false. 
The schema, which according to Oliver is an actual expression, does occur in ‘Mary 
killed John’. ‘To occur’ does not necessarily mean ‘to be an integral part of’: Geach and 
Frege simply miss the relevant sense. 
It is not immediately clear what to make of this objection of Oliver’s. I suspect 
that Geach would simply reply that, in the exact measure in which a schema is said to 
occur in a sentence, it is not an actual expression, pace Oliver. In other words, a 
schema, in the sense described, is a linguistic function. So it is false that (ii) is false. 
Oliver himself implies that the notion of a linguistic function only generalizes 
the notion of a schema when he distinguishes both. 
 
Instead of using an ‘x’ in a schema, others might use a ‘y’ or dots or lines or circled 
numerals or Greek consonants […]. The choice is plainly arbitrary, but it prompts a 
search for a sense of pattern according to which these trivially different schemata all 
depict the same pattern. Our sense of pattern gives us what we want, since the same 
linguistic function may be described in terms of substitution of a term for e.g. the letter 
‘x’ in ‘Fx’ or the dots ‘…’ in ‘F…’. Of course, it may also be described without making 
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any reference to a schema, e.g. the result of attaching the term … to the expression 
‘F’.30 
 
This relates to a point Oliver later makes when he considers objections against the view 
that predicates may be plain expressions. Oliver says that 
 
Nothing changes if expressions are individuated more finely, by building grammatical 
rules into their identity conditions. It would still be true that both kinds of predicate may 
be construed as expressions.31 
 
He had previously characterized plain expressions as type expressions with a 
certain grammar, that “dictates that [the predicate] occurs only once in an atomic 
sentence”. Oliver writes that 
 
The grammatical rule governing the predicate ‘F’ invokes a general method of 
constructing sentences, namely predication of a one-place predicate […]. This method 
of construction may be identified with the linguistic function that maps two arguments – 
a one-place predicate Φ and a term α – to a single value – the sentence Φα.32 
 
What is more, a plain expression cannot be an expression simpliciter, but must 
essentially involve its grammar: 
 
a predicate needs to be distinguished from its homophones and homographs, which may 
not obey the same rules of combination. In other words […] a simple predicate cannot 
be an expression simpliciter, but only an expression coupled with a grammatical rule.33 
 
The implication would be that predicates do not become linguistic functions, 
even when grammatical rules are “built in their identity conditions”. But when Oliver 
compared the linguistic function that dictates the behaviour of a plain expression with a 
linguistic function in general, he had said the following: 
 
The linguistic function f is related to, but distinct from, the linguistic function that I 
earlier identified with the predication construction. The latter takes two arguments, e.g. 
it maps ‘F’ and ‘a’ to ‘Fa’, whereas f takes just one, e.g. it maps ‘a’ to ‘Fa’. In effect, 
the expression ‘F’ has been absorbed into the function f.34 
 
So a linguistic function seems to be as much a generalization of “expressions 
simpliciter plus rules” as it is of a schema. This makes both Oliver’s plain expressions 
and schemata particular cases of linguistic functions alike. The reason that the same 
linguistic function may be alternatively specified is precisely that the notion of a 
linguistic function is more general than that of a grammatical rule. 
The function-name of the function whose “value for every argument coincides 
with the argument itself” – that is, identity – is simply ‘ξ’.35 According to Oliver’s 
definitions, it could not count as a plain expression, since it has “no separable bit of 
print that anybody might take as playing [the] role of a functor.”36 But it could count as 
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a limiting case of both schemata and linguistic functions. So the latter are more general 
than plain expressions. Oliver comments thus on a similar case (discussed by Harold 
Noonan, that of the function-name ‘ξζ’): 
 
It is true that ‘24’ contains no expression standing for the function involved. It features 
only an arrangement of the terms ‘2’ and ‘4’. But from the facts about this particular 
case it hardly follows that no functor, actual or possible, can be construed as an 
expression. When an ‘auxiliary’ expression does happen to be present, as in ‘2 raised to 
the power 4’, it is a serviceable candidate for the relevant functor. Again, that there is a 
possible language in which no functor is an expression […] is compatible with the fact 
that in our language expressions comprise one kind of candidate for many functors. As 
for functors, so for predicates.37 
 
I cannot see the point of Oliver’s comment. It does follow from the fact that ‘ξζ’ 
may be a function-name that, in general, predicates need not be construed as expression. 
If it is not the case that a predicate is construed as an expression in every possible 
language in which it occurs, then the predicate is not essentially an expression: it is one 
only contingently. Given that there are (arguably) no contingent identities, it follows 
that predicates are not expressions, since they are not essentially expressions.38 
I conjecture that Oliver doesn’t see that the notion of a linguistic function just is 
a generalization of plain expressions and schemata to the point of covering even such 
cases as ‘ξζ’ and ‘ξ’. Interestingly enough, it is the fact that linguistic functions 
generalize in another sense the traditional notion of a predicate that will be our initial 
focus in the first chapter. 
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1 Are there alternative analyses? 
 
I approach the question of whether there are alternative analyses from the point of view 
of Ramsey’s problem, that is, of whether there may be alternative analyses. I explain 
what is it about linguistic functions that makes them fit to dispel Ramsey’s concern. 
However, I agree with Dummett that analysis is unique in his sense. I reject the 
typical objections to Dummett’s account, and argue, with Peter Sullivan, that Geach’s 
functional model can not only accommodate, but actually imply Dummett’s distinction 
between analysis and decomposition. In any case, it is again the notion of a linguistic 
function that explains why there may be alternative decompositions. 
 
1.1 Ramsey’s problem 
 
It is worth quoting in full an observation of Ramsey’s about the naïve theory of 
universals according to which each constituent of a sentence stands for a certain extra-
linguistic entity: proper names for particulars, predicates for universals. 
 
In order to make things clearer let us take a simpler case, a proposition of the form 
‘aRb’; then this theory will hold that there are three closely related propositions; one 
asserts that the relation R holds between the terms a and b, the second asserts the 
possession by a of the complex property of “having R to b”, while the third asserts that 
b has the complex property that a has R to it. These must be three different propositions 
because they have different sets of constituents, and yet they are not three propositions, 
but one proposition, for they all say the same thing, namely that a has R to b. So the 
theory of complex universals is responsible for an incomprehensible trinity, as senseless 
as that of theology.39 
 
Ramsey’s problem is thus that of conceiving how it is possible for a single sentence to 
have alternative analyses, each showing that it says different things. Or, what is the 
same thing, how can a single sentence be correlated with alternative sets of constituents. 
In a rather synthetic passage, Geach remarks that 
 
If a proposition were analysable into a predicate and one or more subjects – these being 
actual expressions, and constituents of the proposition – then one might well expect that 
[…] the analysis will be unique.40 
 
Now, what counts as a constituent is relative to the kind of analysis in question. 
A subject-predicate analysis of ‘aRb’ would identify ‘a’ as subject and ‘Rb’ as 
predicate. This would be the kind of representation demanded by the, by Frege’s time 
traditional, Aristotelian syllogistic. Any sentence that occurs in a syllogism must be of 
the subject-predicate form, and include a quantifier and a copula. If a sentence such as 
‘Cato killed Brutus’ were to occur in a syllogism, it would have to be artificially 
regimented for instance as ‘Cato is the killer of Brutus’. The predicate ‘the killer of 
Brutus’ would be treated as a single term, so that its logical complexity could not be 
recognized. ‘Something is the killer of Brutus’ could perhaps be said to follow from 
‘Cato is the killer of Brutus’, but not ‘Cato is the killer of someone’. As Michael Potter 
has said, in syllogistic the logical connection between a killer and its victim cannot be 
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recognized.41 Subject-predicate analysis is therefore both incredibly restrictive and 
many a time artificial.42 
A relational analysis of ‘aRb’ would identify as its constituents the relata ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ and the relation-word ‘R’. This basically corresponds to the grammatical 
analysis of a sentence of this form, which would in general identify as grammatical 
constituents a nominative, a verb, and an accusative: ‘a’, ‘R’ and ‘b’, respectively. 
Now ‘aRb’ can certainly be analysed in either of these alternative ways: but each 
method assigns a unique set of constituents to the sentence. The subject-predicate 
account does not recognize the relational predicate ‘ξRζ’, and the relational account 
recognizes neither of the monadic predicates ‘aRξ’ nor ‘ξRb’. 
Geach sometimes seems to imply that the difference between grammatical and 
logical predicates is that only the former have typographical criteria of identity, or that, 
which amounts to little more than that, that only the latter are linguistic functions. But 
this cannot be right: if grammatical predicates are predicates at all, they must be 
linguistic functions in Geach’s sense.43 Perhaps what Geach means is merely that 
grammatical predicates were traditionally conceived as typographically identifiable. 
The difference between traditional predicates and Fregean function-names is that 
function-names are more general: indeed as general as possible.44 Traditional and 
grammatical predicates are only particular cases of linguistic functions, whereas 
function-names are just linguistic functions. 
This is why Frege’s singular method of analysis in terms of argument and 
function has no difficulty recognizing a sentence as instantiating more than one pattern. 
In the subject-predicate account, the sentence ‘aRb’ is the value of the function ‘ξRb’ 
for ‘a’ as argument, and of no other; the relational account represents ‘aRb’ as the value 
of the function ‘ξRζ’ for ‘a’ and ‘b’ as arguments, and of no other. Fregean analysis is 
able to represent a single sentence as the value of different functions: not only of ‘ξRb’ 
and ‘ξRζ’, but also of ‘aRξ’ for ‘b’ as argument, of ‘aΦb’ for ‘ξRζ’ as argument, etc. 
Frege’s method is more powerful, then, because it explores the full generality of 
the notion of a linguistic function. As a consequence it is able to identify every possible 
pattern according to which a sentence may be constructed. A sentence such as ‘aRb’ 
may be conceived as having been constructed from the concatenation of either ‘a’ with 
‘Rb’, ‘aR’ with ‘b’, ‘a’ with ‘R’ and then with ‘b’, etc. 
As Geach says, the same thing may be the value of different functions.45 Geach 
illustrates the idea with a simple example from arithmetic. 16 may be the value of the 
function ξ2 for the argument 4, but it may also be the value of the function 2ξ for the 
argument 8. There is no mystery at all in the fact that the same number may be 
represented as the value of (indefinitely many) different functions, because just that is 
part of our understanding of what the relation between a function and its value for some 
argument amounts to. The relation between value and function is one-many. So if we 
conceive a predicate as a linguistic function, we should have no trouble understanding 
why a single sentence may be the value of different linguistic functions. 
Now Geach says that 
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If we indeed could not analyse one and the same proposition in different ways, then, as 
Frege remarked, logic would simply be crippled.46 
 
Correctly so, because it is the fact that ‘aRb’ may be alternatively analysed in Frege’s 
way that allows us to recognize that it shares common patterns with ‘aRa’, ‘bRb’, ‘bRa’, 
‘aFa’, etc, so that the logical connections between each of them can be represented in a 
perspicuous manner. 
Thus Geach remarks that 
 
Ramsey’s difficulty is only specious. The resolution of the difficulty points up the 
advantage of Frege’s apparatus over the old subject-predicate account.47 
 
In general, to analyse a sentence is to show that it follows a pattern of 
construction shared by other sentences. A constituent of a sentence just is one of the 
items used in its construction. Earlier accounts recognized only one pattern of 
construction: the concatenation of a name with a concept-word, and the concatenation 
of a relation-word with its relata. Geach’s notion of a linguistic function generalizes the 
notion of a pattern of construction to encompass any legitimate formation rule. 
Construing Frege’s function signs as linguistic functions allows us to explain why is it 
that a sentence may be alternatively analysed in Frege’s way. That different predicates 
may be extracted from a single sentence just means that it may be conceived as having 
been constructed in different ways. Each sentence may be correlated with alternative 
sets of constituents because different items are used in each such construction. It is 
therefore the greater generality of the notion of a function name, framed in terms of the 
notion of a linguistic function, which explains the intelligibility of alternatively 
analysing sentences. 
 
1.2 Dummett on analysis and decomposition 
 
There must be, however, something amiss with Geach’s description of what would have 
been Frege’s solution to Ramsey’s problem. 
According to Geach, to analyse a sentence is to represent it as the value of a 
linguistic function. But Geach takes this to be equivalent to exhibiting it as instantiating 
some one of the patterns obtained by predicate extraction. 
Now the function-name ‘ξRζ’ does occur in ‘aRb’: it is indeed one of the 
patterns discernible within the sentence. But ‘ξRζ’ has unrelated argument-places. As 
we have seen, for Frege, such predicates can only be extracted from expressions which 
already have “replaceable parts”. That is, the relation-word ‘ξRζ’ cannot be extracted 
from ‘aRb’, but only from either of the predicates ‘ξRb’ or ‘aRξ’. It would seem, then, 
that ‘aRb’ is the value of a linguistic function that cannot be immediately extracted from 
it. Therefore, not every pattern that a sentence may instantiate corresponds to a 
function-argument analysis of the sentence: some such patterns must correspond to 
function-argument analysis of other predicates that occur in the same sentence. 
Ay, there’s the rub. If to analyse a sentence is to exhibit it as a value for some 
pattern that it may instantiate, then it cannot be just a matter of applying Frege’s method 
to it. Contrapositively, if to analyse a sentence is just to analyse it in terms of predicate 
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extraction, then it cannot be to exhibit it as instantiating just any possible pattern that it 
does instantiate. 
In other words, most sentences are the values of more linguistic functions than 
those that can be extracted from them. Geach’s general conception of analysis cannot 
therefore be entirely right; it must at best be incomplete. 
This is at bottom the essence of Dummett’s critique of Geach’s account. 
Ironically, Dummett could not have presented it in such straightforward terms. 
Dummett writes: 
 
An exact account of decomposition is arrived at as follows. […] The simplest type of 
decomposition is into a proper name and a (one-place) predicate or functor. This is 
effected by the removal from the sentence or complex term of one or more (not 
necessarily all) occurrences of a proper name […]. The most immediate generalization 
is to the case when the incomplete expression that is left has two or more argument-
places, and so forms an n-ary relational expression or functor. When n=2, we have two 
cases. The first is that in which we remove one or more occurrences of each of two 
distinct proper names […]. The second case is that in which we remove, say, m 
occurrences of some one proper name, regarding k of them as to be filled by a proper 
name, the same for each of them, and the remaining m – k  by another proper name, 
perhaps a distinct one.48 
 
Dummett is right to observe that if we overlook the second case, “we shall have 
disallowed the legitimate decomposition of ‘Brutus killed Brutus’ into ‘Brutus’, ‘ξ 
killed ζ’ and ‘Brutus’.” What he fails to notice is what both Geach and Bermúdez also 
had. The latter is no single decomposition. There is no “generalization” of 
decomposition: there is only the “simplest type”. Predicate extraction applies to both 
possible and “impossible” contents of judgement, i.e. to proper- and function-names 
alike. The two cases distinguished by Dummett in his generalization of decomposition 
are, as we have seen, described by Frege as two distinct applications of the operation of 
predicate extraction. Again, relation-words with unrelated argument-places can only be 
extracted from concept-words. 
It is nevertheless enlightening to consider how the objection may be presented in 
Dummett’s terms. Dummett’s distinctions between simple and complex predicates, 
constituents and components, and analysis and decomposition, may indeed be fruitfully 
adopted. My exposition of Dummett’s account is, however, reconstructive at critical 
points. 
 
1.2.1 Simple and complex predicates 
 
A predicate occurs in a sentence if it can be extracted from it in the sense of Bs, or if it 
can be extracted from a predicate extracted from it, and so on. A simple predicate is a 
predicate whose occurrence in a sentence implies the occurrence of no other determinate 
predicate but itself. A complex predicate is a predicate whose occurrence implies the 
occurrence of at least another determinate predicate. I restrict these definitions to 
predicates of the same level.49 
Thus ‘ξ killed Brutus’ is a complex predicate since any sentence in which it 
occurs is a sentence in which the relation-word ‘ξ killed ζ’ also occurs, as the latter can 
be extracted from the former. The predicate ‘ξ killed ξ’ is also complex since any 
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sentence in which it occurs is a sentence in which ‘ξ killed ζ’ also occurs. For instance, 
‘Brutus killed Brutus’ mentions both ‘ξ killed ξ’ and ‘ξ killed Brutus’, and again ‘ξ 
killed ζ’ can be extracted from the latter. A sentence that expresses the concept of 
suicide thereby expresses the concept of murder, though not conversely. ‘ξ killed ζ’ is 
simple because although any sentence in which it occurs will involve some complex 
predicate, we cannot tell in advance which. In general, relation-words with related 
argument-places are complex predicates are relation-words with unrelated argument-
places are simple predicates. 
Hence simple predicates define the expressive resources of a language, whereas 
complex predicates add nothing to them.50 The distinction does not quite coincide with 
basic vs. defined non-logical vocabulary: ‘ξ killed ξ’ could be among the basic 
vocabulary in place of ‘ξ killed ζ’, but the latter would still be expressed by any 
sentence which involved the former. In any case, complex predicates are formed from 
sentences which result from combinations of simple predicates, names and operators. 
 
1.2.2 Decomposition and analysis 
 
Dummett terms Frege’s procedure of function-argument analysis, or predicate 
extraction, decomposition. 
In the simplest cases, a single decomposition of a sentence may be sufficient to 
uncover the simple predicates it involves. For instance, the simple predicate ‘ξ is wise’ 
can be extracted from ‘Plato is wise’. But in the vast majority of cases, as Frege was 
well aware, it may be impossible to arrive at simple predicates by a single 
decomposition. The simplest such case would be that in which a sentence involves a 
relation-word with unrelated argument-places. The predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ does occur in 
‘Brutus killed Caesar’, but a decomposition of the latter yields only either one of the 
concept-words ‘ξ killed Caesar’ or ‘Brutus killed ξ’, which are both complex. 
Decomposition is therefore generally inappropriate to uncover simple predicates. 
On the other hand, the identification of complex predicates is particularly useful for the 
discovery of fruitful concepts, and for exhibiting the validity of inference. 
Decomposition is thus primarily designed to aid concept-formation, and to explain the 
fruitfulness of deductive reasoning.51 
In order to arrive at simple predicates it is many a time necessary to establish a 
series of successive decompositions, beginning with sentences, then moving to their 
subcomponents, which may be either sentences or complex predicates. Analysis is the 
series of decompositions which ends when only simple predicates are left. 
At the last stage of analysis there can be found only names, simple predicates 
and operators. In turn, these are the items that are present at any stage of the 
construction of the sentence.52 Thus analysis is the inverse process of construction. To 
analyse a sentence is to follow the order of its construction in reverse steps. The 
representation of a sentence in its fully analysed form reveals what Dummett calls (with 
no temporal connotation) its constructional history.53 
Just as analysis has a constructive converse procedure, so does decomposition; 
we could call the converse of the latter ‘saturation’. What distinguishes analysis and 
decomposition is therefore not the fact that one has a constructive counterpart while the 
                                                 
50
 Sullivan 2010: 108. 
51
 Dummett 1981: 290-1. 
52
 See next section. 
53
 Dummett 1973: 34-5. 
 26
other does not, pace Dummett. The difference lies rather in that analysis essentially 
proceeds in stages, and it is only in virtue of this feature that it is able to fulfil what 
decomposition in most cases cannot. 
Analysis is complete only when the stage is reached in which no complex 
predicates are left, whereas a single decomposition is exhausted at each stage of 
analysis. Conversely, construction is completed only after its last step; on the other 
hand, each step of construction consists in a single operation of saturation. 
 
1.2.3 Components and constituents 
 
If a predicate occurs in a sentence at all, it is one of its components. Components that 
occur in some step of the construction of a sentence are its constituents. Components 
that occur at every such step are the ultimate constituents of sentences. 
Conversely, any predicate revealed at some stage of analysis is a constituent of 
the sentence. Constituents left at its last stage are ultimate. Only simple predicates may 
therefore be ultimate constituents. Complex predicates may be constituents but never 
ultimate, since they must “disappear” at later stages of analysis. 
Note that to say that a predicate occurs at every step of the construction of a 
sentence is to say that it can be obtained at any such step by either analysis or 
decomposition. 
Both ‘ξ killed Caesar’ and ‘Brutus killed ξ’ are constituents of ‘Brutus killed 
Caesar’. The latter can be constructed from the saturation of the first predicate by 
‘Brutus’ or from that of the second by ‘Caesar’. Conversely, the extraction of either ‘ξ 
killed Caesar’ or ‘Brutus killed ξ’ corresponds to the first stage of the analysis of the 
sentence. But the first step of its construction involves only ‘ξ killed ζ’ and, say, 
‘Caesar’. So the complex predicate ‘ξ killed Caesar’ is not present at every step of 
construction; it is therefore not an ultimate constituent of the sentence. On the other 
hand the simple predicate ‘ξ killed ζ’ occurs in every such step, including the first, and 
so it is an ultimate constituent of ‘Brutus killed Caesar’. 
Since simple predicates must be ultimate constituents, they cannot be merely 
components. On the contrary, some complex predicates may be components without 
being constituents. The predicate ‘ξ killed ξ’ is a component but not a constituent of 
‘Brutus killed Brutus’, since, although it may be extracted from the sentence, it appears 
at no stage of its analysis. Decomposition is never arbitrary. In particular, the 
decomposition that corresponds to the first stage of the analysis of a sentence must 
always be applied with an eye at uncovering simple predicates. ‘ξ killed ζ’ is also a 
component of ‘Brutus killed Brutus’. Therefore the extraction of ‘ξ killed ξ’ cannot be 
the first – or indeed any – step of the analysis of the sentence, since it would preclude 
the extraction of ‘ξ killed ζ’. And so ‘ξ killed ξ’ is a component, but not a constituent, 
let alone an ultimate constituent, of ‘Brutus killed Brutus’. 
Dummett is keen to show how his distinctions come out in the explanation of the 
structure of quantified sentences. Sentence (2) below follows from (1) by universal 
instantiation. 
 
(1) If anyone killed Brutus, he was an honourable man. 
(2) If Brutus killed Brutus, Brutus was an honourable man. 
 
In order to recognize the validity of the inference it is useful to exhibit both 
sentences as instantiating a common pattern. 
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If anyone killed Brutus, he was an honourable man. 
If Brutus killed Brutus, Brutus was an honourable man. 
 
This amounts to showing that the complex predicate ‘If ξ killed Brutus, ξ was an 
honourable man’ is a component of both sentences. 
Now, the last step of the construction of (1) is the universal closure of ‘If ξ 
killed Brutus, ξ was an honourable man’. This means that the complex predicate is also 
a constituent of (1): it is required by the first stage of its analysis. 
On the other hand, the analysis of (2) does not involve such decomposition. It 
rather relies on the identification of another pattern, ‘If ξ, then ζ’. The last two steps of 
the construction of (2) are the saturation of the argument-places of the operator ‘If ξ, 
then ζ’ by ‘Brutus killed Brutus’ and ‘Brutus was an honourable man’ respectively. 
Thus the complex predicate ‘If ξ killed Brutus, ξ was an honourable man’ is a 
component but not a constituent of (2). 
But the complex predicate is not an ultimate constituent of (1) either. The next 
stage of the analysis of (1) would involve recognizing that ‘If ξ killed Brutus, ξ was an 
honourable man’ had itself been extracted from a sentence such as (2). Note that the 
complex predicate could not have been formed from the saturation of ‘If ξ, then ζ’ by ‘ξ 
killed Brutus’ and ‘ξ was an honourable man’ since ‘If ξ, then ζ’ takes only complete 
expressions (in this case sentences) as arguments. From the third stage on, the analysis 
of (1) would thus be similar to the analysis of any of its instances. Once (1) were 
completely analysed, we could see that it had been constructed from the simple 
predicates ‘ξ killed ζ’, ‘ξ was honourable’ and ‘ξ was a man’, the name ‘Brutus’, the 
propositional connectives ‘If ξ, then ζ’, ‘ξ and ζ’ and the universal quantifier. 
 
1.2.4 The uniqueness of analysis 
 
Our initial objection to Geach’s account of Ramsey’s problem may be stated in 
Dummettian terms thus: not every component of a sentence is available by a single 
decomposition; in particular, most ultimate constituents are not. 
Geach was right to include ‘ξRζ’ among the components of ‘aRb’, as the former 
occurs in the latter. He was also right in that it is always possible to analyse a sentence 
in the sense of Bs in more than one way, i.e. that decomposition is never unique. 
Where Geach erred was when he implied that ‘ξRζ’ could be extracted from 
‘aRb’. Not every component may be immediately extracted from a sentence. In 
particular, relation-words with unrelated argument-places cannot. We can only arrive at 
‘ξRζ’ via an analysis of ‘aRb’ in two stages, the first of which consists in the 
decomposition of ‘aRb’ into, say, ‘ξRb’, and the second in the extraction of ‘ξRζ’ from 
the complex predicate. 
In general, to arrive at simple predicates, we need analysis rather than 
decomposition. That is, we need to apply a series of successive decompositions, first to 
sentences, then to complex predicates, until only simple predicates are left. The simplest 
such case is that in which a sentence involves a relation-word with unrelated argument-
places. 
Now, any component is either a constituent, or it is not. If it is not, a fortiori it is 
not an ultimate constituent. If it is, then it is either a simple or a complex predicate. If a 
constituent is a complex predicate, then it can be constructed from ultimate constituents, 
and so is not among ultimate constituents. If a constituent is a simple predicate, then by 
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definition it implies the occurrence of no other determinate predicate. And so for each 
sentence, there may be only one formula that represents its constructional history. 
In general, unlike decomposition, analysis is unique because the ultimate 
constituents of a sentence must always form a unique set. 
Another way to state that analysis is unique is to say that decomposition 
presupposes analysis. That is to say that (i) any complex predicate that constitutes a 
sentence can be constructed from the simple predicates that ultimately constitute the 
sentence; and (ii) any complex predicate that merely composes a sentence implies the 
occurrence of some simple predicate that ultimately constitutes it. 
In other words, analysis, or the set of ultimate constituents of a sentence, 
circumscribes all the possible decompositions that a sentence may legitimately be 
subject to, and all the possible decompositions that its components may be subject to. In 
turn, this is only an alternative way of expressing that predicate extraction is constrained 
by the smallest significant idioms of sentences. 
However, Dummett seems to have underestimated the extent to which analysis 
also implies decomposition. He focused on the fact that the analysis of quantified 
sentences necessarily involved the recognition of a complex predicate. But in fact each 
stage of analysis consists in a decomposition of some sentence or complex predicate: 
the final stage, indeed, in a decomposition from which result only simple predicates. 
Dummett was strangely led to the claim that every predicate arrived at by 
decomposition should be complex; contrapositively, that decomposition did not apply to 
simple predicates. Dummett developed what, from a Fregean point of view, is quite an 
unorthodox doctrine of simple predicates. 
 
1.2.5 Dummett’s doctrine of simple predicates 
 
The fundamental distinction between simple and complex predicates is that all and only 
simple predicates can be among the ultimate constituents of sentences. But Dummett 
introduces a further distinction between the two classes. 
As Geach put it, Dummett’s further distinction “is not a matter of number of 
words, but of quotability.”54 Like a proper name and unlike a complex predicate, a 
simple predicate “constitutes a word that is physically capable of being detached from 
the sentence.”55 In a word, simple predicates do not belong to the category of 
incomplete expressions. 
 
Simple predicates are selbständig in the way that complex ones are not: they are merely 
words or strings of words which can quite straightforwardly be written down. In one 
sense, of course, they are incomplete – they do not constitute a sentence, a “complete 
utterance”: but, in that sense, proper names are equally incomplete.56 
 
On the other hand, it is complex predicates that “form the prototype for Frege’s 
general notion of an ‘incomplete’ expression:” 
 
Such expressions are said by him to contain gaps, and, further, to be unselbständig: they 
cannot subsist – they cannot stand up, one might say – on their own. If one considers 
complex predicates formed by the omission of more than one occurrence of the same 
proper name from a sentence, the purport of this is immediately clear.57 
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Complex predicates are not mere sequences of signs occurring in sentences, but rather 
sequences “standing in a certain uniform relation to terms occurring in those sentences.” 
They are recognized as a common feature of the various sentences in which they occur. 
That is what explains that they are not quotable bits of language, and can only be 
indicated in isolation by the use of Greek letters, which represent how they are related to 
other terms in the sentences from which they are extracted. In turn, this is why we are 
compelled to regard a complex predicate as formed from a sentence rather than as built 
up from its components.58 
We can sum up the difference between complex and simple predicates thus: 
simple and complex predicates alike have relational properties (determined by their 
grammar), but only the latter have them essentially. Simple predicates can be 
straightforwardly identifiable by typographical criteria alone, since the relations they 
bear to other terms are not essential to them; but complex predicates are essentially 
incomplete expressions. Thus Dummett writes that 
 
We might say that, in the case of simple predicates, the slots are external to them, 
whereas in the case of complex predicates, they are internal. That is, we can know what 
linguistic entity, considered just as a sequence of phonemes or of printed letters, a 
simple predicate is, without knowing anything about the slot it carries with it: the slot 
consists merely in the predicate’s being subject to a certain rule about how it can be put 
together with a term to form a sentence. But the complex predicate cannot be so much 
as recognized unless we know what slots it carries: they are integral to its very being.59 
 
Dummett’s insistence that only complex predicates are incomplete expressions 
proper leads him to a sort of paradox. Since he ties incompleteness to decomposition, 
and decomposition to complex predicates, he is led to believe that there is no sense to 
attach to a simple predicate’s being extracted from a sentence, and, by the same token, 
no way in which a complex predicate may be obtained if not by predicate extraction. A 
“complex predicate is formed, not directly out of its constituent expressions, but from a 
sentence in which it occurs.”60 
Now, the predicate ‘ξ snores’ can be extracted from a sentence such as ‘Herbert 
snores’, by the omission of the name ‘Herbert’. But then it must be a complex predicate; 
for Dummett, indeed a degenerate one. Let ‘… snores’ be the simple predicate from 
which ‘Herbert snores’ is built. Then a certain redundancy occurs: ‘Herbert snores’ 
involves both ‘ξ snores’ and ‘… snores’. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that, strictly speaking, if ‘ξ snores’ is treated as a 
complex predicate, on all fours with, say, ‘If anyone snores, then ξ snores’, we do need 
to recognize the separate existence of the simple predicate ‘... snores’ as well: for, 
precisely because the “complex” predicate ‘ξ snores’ has to be regarded as formed 
from such a sentence as ‘Herbert snores’, it cannot itself be one of the ingredients from 
which ‘Herbert snores’ was formed, and thus cannot be that whose sense, on Frege's 
own account, contributes to composing the sense of ‘Herbert snores’.61 
 
Dummett concludes somewhat arbitrarily that if there is to be any economy, it is 
the complex predicate ‘ξ snores’ that should be dispensed with, since ‘Everyone snores’ 
may be regarded as a special case in which a quantifier is attached to the simple 
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predicate ‘… snores’. A similar problem would also arise as regards not decomposition 
but saturation, for any complex predicate that could be conceived as having been 
constructed from simple predicates. 
Geach does not hesitate to condemn this doctrine of Dummett’s as both “false 
and unFregean”.62 Indeed, for Geach as for Frege, every predicate would be complex in 
this new sense. One thing is to suppose that simple predicates are more easily 
recognizable, another to think that their “relational properties” are “extrinsic” to them. 
Dummett’s view entails that the predicate in ‘John killed Mary’ is the bare word 
‘killed’. But it is only the relation that obtains between ‘killed’ and ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ in 
‘John killed Mary’ that allows the latter to be distinguished from ‘Mary killed John’. If 
the relation were not essential to the predicate, the sentences would be 
indistinguishable: but they aren’t, and so it is. The expression ‘ξ killed ζ’ codifies the 
linguistic relation, or rule: The name ξ is written just before, and the name ζ just after 
some token of the word ‘killed’. “The point is so obvious and so trite as not to need 
illustration.”63 It is essential to the predicate that it involves its formation rule, even 
though the latter might not be given by word order. 
Even someone like Alex Oliver, for whom the fact that predicates involved 
essentially their formation rules would not turn them into linguistic functions, claims 
that Dummett’s simple predicates cannot be expressions simpliciter. It is true that 
‘killed’ occurs in ‘Brutus killed Brutus’ and ‘Brutus killed Caesar’, as does ‘ξ killed ζ’, 
whereas ‘ξ killed ξ’ occurs only in the former sentence despite the fact that both have 
all parts in common.64 But it does not follow that ‘ξ killed ζ’ just is the bare word 
‘killed’. What distinguishes ‘ξ killed ξ’ from ‘ξ killed ζ’ is precisely that the argument-
places of the first must be filled by the same proper name, while those of the second 
may be filled by the same or by different ones. The fact that complex and simple 
predicates serve different explanatory roles does not entail that they have different 
natures.65 
Prima facie, simple and complex predicates alike can be both extracted from 
sentences and construct them. In fact, as we have seen, for a predicate to be extracted 
from a sentence just means for Geach that the sentence may be conceived as having 
been constructed through it. Dummett seems to have inexplicably neglected that 
decomposition has as much a constructive converse procedure as analysis. I take it that 
this may have been one of the motives, or one of the consequences, of Dummett’s 
unfortunate choice of presenting his case against Geach’s account of analysis in a way 
which may have in the end caused some harm along with some good. 
 
1.2.6 The A and the B theses 
 
Dummett finds a conflict between two sets of doctrines which he accurately attributed 
to Frege: 
 
A1 A thought may be analysed in different ways. 
A2 A thought is not built up out of its component concepts; rather, the constituents 
of the thought are arrived at by analysis of it. 
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B1 The senses of the parts of a sentence are parts of the thought expressed by the 
whole. 
B2 A thought is built up out of its constituents, which correspond, by and large, to 
the parts of the sentence expressing it.66 
 
According to Dummett, each set of theses exemplifies a particular conception of 
the relation that a thought, or a sentence, may bear to its parts. The A theses correspond 
to a decompositional model of the relation between sentences and their constituents, 
while the B theses correspond to a compositional or constructional one. 
Frege did state the A and the B theses, both in print and in private 
correspondence, over a significantly overlapping period of time. Dummett is right to 
observe that the A theses are characteristic of his earlier period. As early as 1882, in a 
letter to colleague Anton Marty, Frege wrote: 
 
Now I do not believe that concept formation can precede judgement because this would 
presuppose the independent existence of concepts, but I think of a concept as having 
arisen by decomposition from a judgeable content. I do not believe that for any 
judgeable content there is only one way in which it can be decomposed, or that one of 
these possible ways can always claim objective pre-eminence.67 
 
The A theses survive the bifurcation of the notion of conceptual content into 
those of sense and reference. 
 
[…] a thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, 
appears as subject or predicate.68 
 
We must notice, however, that one and the same thought can be split up in different 
ways and so can be seen as put together out of parts in different ways.69 
 
So I do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgement; I 
come by the parts of a thought by analysing the thought.70 
 
On the other hand, the B theses are typical of Frege’s more mature period. 
 
It is remarkable what language can achieve. With a few sounds and combinations of 
sounds it is capable of expressing a huge number of thoughts, and, in particular, 
thoughts which have not hitherto been grasped or expressed by any man. How can it 
achieve so much? By virtue of the fact that thoughts have parts out of which they are 
built up. And these parts, these building blocks, correspond to groups of sounds, out of 
which the sentence expressing the thought is built up, so that the construction of the 
sentence out of parts of a sentence corresponds to the construction of a thought out of 
parts of a thought. And as we take a thought to be the sense of a sentence, so we may 
call a part of a thought the sense of that part of the sentence which corresponds to it.71 
 
The same view would be repeated almost ipsis verbis in “Compound Thoughts”: 
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It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it can express an 
incalculable number of thoughts, so that even if a thought has been grasped by an 
inhabitant of the Earth for the very first time, a form of words can be found in which it 
will be understood by someone else to whom it is entirely new. This would not be 
possible, if we could not distinguish parts in the thought corresponding to the parts of a 
sentence, so that the structure of the sentence can serve as a picture of the structure of 
the thought.72 
 
And in a letter to Jourdain from 1914, Frege had also written that: 
 
The possibility of our understanding propositions which we have never heard before 
rests evidently on this, that we construct the sense of a proposition out of parts that 
correspond to the words. If we find the same word in two propositions, e.g., ‘Etna’, then 
we also recognize something common to the corresponding thoughts, something 
corresponding to this word. Without this, language in the proper sense would be 
impossible.73 
 
Dummett reconstructs Geach’s account of Ramsey’s problem as basically 
consisting in the rejection of the B theses. On the one hand, Geach did deny that 
analysis were unique; on the other Geach argued that Frege’s use of the part-whole 
vocabulary was a mere metaphor.74 Dummett points out that even if Geach’s account 
were a “satisfactorily Fregean” solution to Ramsey’s difficulty, it would not be a 
satisfactory solution of the exegetical problem of the apparent conflict between the A 
and the B theses, since it simply jettisons the latter. According to Dummett, Geach’s 
view would entail ascribing to Frege a sufficient amount of confusion for him to fail to 
recognize “a plain contradiction when it stared him in the face”.75 
Dummett solves the apparent conflict by claiming that each model relates to a 
different kind of analysis. He associates the A theses with decomposition and the B 
theses with analysis. Since decomposition is never unique, it satisfies A1; since it aims 
at discovering components, it satisfies A2. On the other hand, analysis aims at 
uncovering ultimate constituents, which is to say that it is the converse of construction, 
and so satisfies B2. Ironically, Dummett himself seems to have been aware that, while 
the A theses apparently imply that analysis is not unique, the B theses do not imply that 
analysis is unique. Rather, the compositional model only “suggests that the thought is 
capable of a unique analysis into its ultimate constituents.”76 
The reason, of course, is that there is no contradiction between the A and the B 
theses at all. As Dejnožka put it, “composition and decomposition are distinct only in 
reason”.77 Dejnožka actually cites a remarkable passage of Frege’s to this effect. 
 
The mental activities leading to the formulation of a definition may be of two kinds: 
analytic or synthetic. This is similar to the activities of the chemist, who either analyses 
a given substance into its elements or lets given elements combine to form a new 
substance. In both cases, we come to know the composition of a substance.78 
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So while it is true that Geach rejected the terminology of the B theses, he would 
have been right to claim, merely on the basis of the A and the B theses, that analysis is 
not unique, even if there were some contradiction as Dummett contended. The 
uniqueness of analysis has therefore nothing to do with the A and the B theses. 
It seems extraordinary that Dummett did not see that decomposition and 
saturation are the converse of each other, just as analysis is the converse of construction. 
Thus decomposition is as much committed to the B theses as analysis. Besides, since 
the A theses relate to predicate extraction, as Dummett notes correctly, both sets of 
doctrines could be accommodated solely by decomposition without any threat of 
inconsistency. 
The key to sorting out Dummett’s confusion lies, I believe, in his interpretation 
of the principle of the priority of judgement over concepts, expressed by A2. Dummett 
gives the principle a psychologistic reading, so to say. 
Dummett denied that the priority of judgement applied to simple predicates 
solely on the ground that they are the ultimate constituents of sentences.79 If simple 
predicates are among ultimate constituents, they are necessary and sufficient for 
understanding a sentence. But how could that be if they did not precede the sentences 
they construct? 
The priority of judgement has indeed been given ontological and epistemic 
readings. But in essence, it is as much a methodological principle as Frege’s context 
principle: never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of 
a sentence.80 
My diagnosis is that Dummett was here oblivious of his own salutary distinction 
between the order of recognition and the order of explanation. 
 
Frege’s account, if it is to be reduced to a slogan, could be expressed in this way: that in 
the order of explanation the sense of a sentence is primary, but in the order of 
recognition the sense of a word is primary. Frege was unwaveringly insistent that the 
sense of a sentence – or of any complex expression – is made up out of the senses of its 
constituent words. […] But, when we come to give any general explanation of what it is 
for sentences and words to have a sense, that is, of what it is for us to grasp their sense, 
then the order of priority is reversed.81 
 
This distinction allowed Dummett to hold on to the context principle for simple 
and complex predicates alike. Oddly enough, he explicitly distinguished the priority of 
judgment from the context principle precisely because the former could not apply to 
simple predicates. Why he did so is to me as yet baffling; the reason may be related to 
an ambiguity in what Dummett meant by linguistic understanding. For this reason, I 
have deliberately abstained from framing Dummett’s account of analysis in terms of 
sense. This approach is authorized by Dummett himself, who stresses that it can be 
explained without invoking the notion of sense.82 In any case, this is not the place to 
discuss Dummett’s theory of understanding. 
An immediate consequence of the rejection of the priority of judgement for 
simple predicates is that they cannot be obtained by predicate extraction, which 
Dummett equates with that principle. This is the origin of the paradoxical reasoning that 
Dummett had followed to conclude that ‘Herbert snores’ should include both a simple 
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predicate and a degenerate complex one. There is no need for such a multiplication of 
entities: the sentence includes only a simple predicate, because simple predicates too 
can be extracted from sentences. 
In the end, there is no reason to suppose that simple predicates are “less 
incomplete” then complex ones. Not only do simple predicates involve their formation 
rules essentially: they are identified as patterns within sentences just as well. 
By the same token, since decomposition is but the converse of saturation, not 
only can simple predicates be saturated by names to form sentences, but so can complex 
ones. It is thus not true in general that complex predicates cannot be conceived as 
serving to construct sentences, neither that their incompleteness is tied to the fact that 
they must be regarded as extractable from sentences. 
However, nothing of the above counts against Dummett’s explanation of the 
difference between analysis and decomposition, which relies on the distinction between 
constituents and components. What is essential is that analysis proceeds in stages – 
indeed, in stages of successive decompositions, first of sentences, then of complex 
predicates, until only simple predicates are left. It is beguiling that Dummett could not 
have stated matters in this way, since, for him, simple predicates could not be obtained 
by decomposition. 
Gregory Currie was therefore completely off when he mounted a critique of 
Dummett’s account of the uniqueness of analysis on the basis of the latter’s muddied 
doctrine of simple predicates, although Dummett is certainly to blame for inviting the 
confusion.83 
Currie finds a ground to ascribe to Frege the notion of a simple predicate as a 
predicate not further analysable in the following passage: 
 
And so instead of putting a judgement together out of an individual as subject and an 
already previously formed concept as predicate, we do the opposite and arrive at a 
concept by splitting up the content of possible judgement. Of course, if the expression 
of the content of possible judgement is to be analysable in this way, it must already be 
itself articulated. We may infer from this that at least the properties and relations which 
are not further analysable must have their own simple designations.84 
 
Currie goes on to assert, quite rightly of course, that Dummett’s conception of 
simple predicates as self-standing expressions is nowhere to be found in Frege. But 
ironically, the above is perhaps the best text in which to look for evidence that Frege 
thought that analysis were unique in Dummett’s sense. What Frege implies here is 
basically that decomposition presupposes analysis: the possibility of “splitting up the 
content of possible judgement” presupposes that the content is “already itself 
articulated”. The permissible decompositions of a sentence, and the permissible 
decompositions of any of the complex predicates that occur in it, are circumscribed by 
its structure, i.e. its constructional history as exhibited by analysis. The properties and 
relations “not further analysable”, i.e. the ultimate constituents, “must have their own 
simple designations”, i.e. be simple predicates. 
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1.3 Objections to Dummett’s interpretation 
 
Objections to Dummett’s interpretation come in two kinds. The first concerns the 
rejection of Dummett’s textual grounds for attributing his account of analysis to Frege. 
The second consists in presenting counter-examples to the uniqueness of analysis, that 
is, instances of sentences about which Frege would not have said that they had unique 
analyses. 
 
1.3.1 Textual evidence 
 
According to Dummett, the distinction between components and constituents was 
already clearly implicit in Bs.85 
 
We attach no importance to the various ways that the same conceptual content may be 
regarded as a function of this or that argument, so long as function and argument are 
completely determinate. But if the argument becomes indeterminate, as in the 
judgement: ‘whatever arbitrary positive integer you may take as argument for “being 
representable as the sum of four squares”, the proposition always remains true’, then the 
distinction between function and argument becomes significant as regards the content. 
Conversely, the argument may be determinate and the function indeterminate. In both 
cases, in view of the contrast determinate-indeterminate or more and less determinate, 
the whole proposition splits up into function and argument as regards its own content, 
not just as regards our way of looking at it.86 
 
The “conceptual contents” whose arguments are “completely determinate” are 
the sentences which do not involve bound variables, i.e. that do not express generality. 
The ways in which such sentences split up into argument and function regard only our 
way of looking at it. Dummett would interpret this as meaning that any complex 
predicate arrived at by decomposition of a non-quantified sentence is a component, not 
a constituent of the sentence. Dummett glosses a complex predicate’s not concerning a 
sentence’s own content as its being a mere component of the sentence: its identification 
is not necessary during the construction of the sentence, and so it does not appear in its 
analysis. And indeed the complex predicate ‘If ξ is a positive integer, then ξ can be 
represented as the sum of four squares’ occurs in ‘If 20 is a positive integer, then it can 
be represented as the sum of four squares’, but not as its constituent. 
On the other hand, decompositions of quantified sentences – those which 
involve bound variables, i.e. arguments which become “indeterminate” – do regard their 
own content. This would mean, according to Dummett, that complex predicates that 
result from decompositions of quantified sentences are essential to their analysis, and to 
their construction. Therefore, such decompositions do regard the content of quantified 
sentences, and not merely our way of looking at them. The complex predicate ‘If ξ is a 
positive integer, then ξ can be represented as the sum of four squares’ occurs in ‘Every 
positive integer can be represented as the sum of four squares’ as its constituent. 
Currie has argued that, although Dummett’s reading is consistent with Frege’s 
text, it ignores the context of the passage.87 
The quotation above immediately follows a warning of Frege’s against “a 
fallacy that ordinary language easily leads to”: that of adhering too closely to its 
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grammar for the purpose of logical analysis. Frege suggests a comparison between two 
sentences, ‘The number 20 can be represented as the sum of four squares’ and ‘Every 
positive integer can be represented as the sum of four squares’. The first sentence can be 
decomposed into the argument ‘The number 20’ and the function ‘ξ can be represented 
as the sum of four squares’. Due to the grammatical similarity between both sentences, 
one could be led to decompose the second sentence into the argument ‘Every positive 
integer’ and the function ‘ξ can be represented as the sum of four squares’. Alas, the 
analogy is misleading. 
 
We may see that this view is mistaken if we observe that ‘the number 2’ and ‘every 
positive integer’ are not concepts of the same rank. What is asserted of the number 20 
cannot be asserted in the same sense of [the concept] ‘every positive integer’; of course 
it may in certain circumstances be assertible of every positive integer. The expression 
‘every positive integer’ just by itself, unlike ‘the number 20’, gives no complete idea; it 
gets a sense only through the context of the sentence.88 
 
Currie thus reads the passage as entailing only that the grammatical subjects of 
quantified sentences are not singular terms. The reason that Frege does not attach 
particular importance to the alternative decomposition of a non-quantified sentence is 
that the content of such sentences will be such that any apparently permissible 
decomposition will in fact be permissible. On the other hand, in quantified sentences, 
our regarding one part or another as the function or as the argument is constrained by 
the content of the sentence being such that some parts of it cannot be regarded as 
singular terms, or logical subjects. Currie concludes that in the light of such a simple 
explanation, Dummett’s reading seems “overly ingenious”. 
However, Currie’s and Dummett’s readings are related in an obvious way. It is 
precisely because ‘Every ξ’ is not a proper name that the predicate to which it attaches, 
simple or complex, must be a constituent rather than a component. It is not clear, then, 
that both readings constitute a real alternative after all. 
In any case, there is a further problem with Dummett’s reading. Dummett’s 
account applies equally well to sentences which do not involve generality. But Currie 
had already noticed that Frege does not make the same point concerning ‘Cato killed 
Cato’.89 As Sullivan notes, the passage implies that “Frege never himself applied the 
notion of an intrinsic or inhaltlich articulation to elementary propositions.”90 The 
implication would be that the distinction between components and constituents did not 
apply to them. 
There is actually a way to rescue Dummett’s interpretation. There is another 
sense in which the analyses of elementary and quantified sentences differ. The analysis 
of a sentence such as ‘Cato killed Cato’ may begin by one of two decompositions. But 
there is no alternative in the case of quantified sentences, which must always begin with 
a determinate decomposition. So perhaps the contrast between elementary and 
quantified sentences is not that the distinction between components and constituents that 
does not apply to the former, but rather that there may be alternative ways to begin the 
analysis of an elementary relational sentence. 
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Only the case of monadic simple predication fails to fit Dummett’s description. 
The analysis of ‘Socrates is wise’ has a unique stage, and a fortiori a unique first step. It 
would still have to be argued, then, that the context restricts Frege’s remarks to more 
complex cases. 
In any case, the distinction between constituents and components follows from 
the distinctions between simple and complex predicates, and between analysis and 
decomposition. But as we have seen, there are good reasons for attributing to Frege the 
views that (i) simple predicates are not further analysable; (ii) to arrive at simple 
predicates we may have to proceed by stages of decompositions; and (iii) that predicate 
extraction presupposes the uniqueness of analytical structure. In the light of all this, 
only prejudice could make us think of Dummett’s account as a revision rather than as an 
explanation of Frege’s thought. 
 
1.3.2 Counter-examples to the uniqueness of analysis 
 
In order to support the view that “an ideal symbolic notation would have a unique form 
of expression for each thought”,91 Dummett cites an excerpt from a letter to Husserl, in 
which Frege states that equipollent, i.e. synonymous, sentences have but one 
transcription into his concept-script. 
 
All that would be needed would be a single standard proposition for each system of 
equipollent propositions, and any thought could be communicated by such a standard 
proposition.92 
 
Currie rightly observes that this “is not sufficient to show that Frege wanted a 
language in which Thoughts are paired uniquely with sentences.”93 Again he invites 
Frege’s reader to consider the context that surrounds the passage above. Frege is 
explaining to Husserl that not every aspect of the content of an expression should be 
taken into account in logic: in short, he is reasserting his distinction between sense and 
tone. Two equipollent sentences may still differ in tone, but they will nevertheless 
correspond to a single “standard proposition”, or “sentence in normal form”, since 
Frege’s concept-script is insensitive to such differences.94 Sentences with different tones 
but identical sense will be paired with a unique sentence of the concept-script; but it 
does not follow that each sentence of the concept-script will be paired uniquely with a 
thought. 
This time, though, it has been Currie himself that missed the context of 
Dummett’s quotation, for Dummett is in fact making precisely that very point. Dummett 
invokes the passage in order to remark, as Frege had, that differences of tone might be 
useful to indicate a preferred decomposition of a sentence that will in general have a 
unique transcription into the concept-script. Currie’s critique is therefore unfair: 
Dummett is claiming that differences in tone are not an objection to the uniqueness of 
analysis, not that the irrelevance of tone to logic entails it. 
Of course that if thought is linguistic sense, the “unique pairing” of sentences of 
the concept-script with thoughts follows from their unique pairing with synonymous 
                                                 
91
 Dummett 1981: 279. 
92
 Frege 1906d: 67. Dummett’s translation reads: “One would need to have for every system of 
equipollent sentences only a single sentence in normal form (Normalsatz), and could communicate every 
thought by means of these sentences in normal form.” 
93
 Currie 1985: 294. 
94
 For more on sense and tone, see section 1.3.3.3 below. 
 38
sentences. Let us say that thought is linguistic sense if and only if there is a bijection 
from the sentences of the concept-script to thoughts. 
Currie avers that there are two kinds of cases that fall under Frege’s principle 
that the same thought may be analysed in different ways. The first is that in which a 
single thought is expressed by different sentences of the concept-script. Currie states as 
an instance of this Frege’s Basic Law V; any instance of logical abstraction (such as 
Frege’s numerical equivalence) would do: 
 
The value-range of f is identical to the value-range of g. 
All and only fs are gs. 
 
In symbols: 
 
έ f (ε) = ά g (α) 
(∀x) (f (x) ≡ g (x)) 
 
The second kind of cases corresponds to the alternative decompositions that a 
sentence may have in Dummett sense, i.e. that different predicates may be extracted 
from a sentence.95 
Currie goes on to argue that Frege could not have intended thoughts to be paired 
uniquely with sentences of the concept-script due to the equipollence between ‘The 
value-range of f is identical to the value-range of g’ and ‘All and only fs are gs’. 
 
There are also reasons for thinking that Frege would not seriously have wanted to 
extrude from even an ideal language all but one sentence for each Thought. Recall his 
claim that the two sides of Basic Law V have the same sense. No language would be 
ideal in which that principle could not be expressed. 
This concludes my argument for (a').96 
 
(Currie’s thesis (a') is “There is no warrant for assuming that Fregean analysis is 
unique, and hence no conflict between A1 and the B theses which the 
analysis/decomposition distinction could be used to resolve.”97) 
It is true that it is not clear that Basic Law V and like principles pass any of 
Frege’s criteria of synonymy. It is also true that probably Frege should not have claimed 
that the two sides of such principles were synonymous, on pain of the equivalences’ 
loosing their explanatory power.98 It is nonetheless clear that Frege would accept that 
different sentences of the concept-script could be mapped onto a single thought. 
However, this only counts against Dummett’s view that in general thought is 
linguistic sense. On the other hand, it does not even count against the view that, in most 
cases, thought is linguistic sense. It may just be that thoughts of a peculiar sort, namely 
those that involve reference to abstract entities, may be expressed by non-synonymous, 
differently structured sentences. 
Possibly, that thought is linguistic sense is an unargued premise, or, better, a 
presupposition of Dummett’s entire approach to Frege. That is fair enough; although 
Dummett’s is obviously not an absurd hypothesis, given that Frege does state that a 
thought is the sense of a sentence. 
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What does not follow, pace Currie, is that analysis is not unique, at least if by 
‘analysis’ one means the procedure described by Dummett: the series of decompositions 
in Frege’s sense of predicate extraction. The sentences ‘The value-range of f is identical 
to the value-range of g’ and ‘All and only fs are gs’ are not alternative analyses of the 
same thought, in this sense of analysis. If they arise from the same thought by “object-
formation”, to borrow Michael Beaney’s term, rather than by “concept-formation”, that 
is an altogether different procedure, that does not in the least correspond to the method 
of function-argument analysis as presented by Frege in Bs §9, i.e. Dummett’s 
decomposition. Note that each side of an equivalence such as ‘έ f (ε) = ά g (α) ≡ (∀x) (f 
(x) ≡ g (x))’ has a unique analysis in Dummett’s sense. 
So the question is not even that thoughts may have alternative analyses while 
sentences (or the senses of sentences) may not: to analyse a thought in the sense of Bs 
§9 just is to analyse a sentence. And again, Frege’s procedure presupposes that a unique 
set of constituents circumscribes all possible decompositions of the sentence. 
The same holds, of course, of any putative counter-examples to the uniqueness 
of analysis. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Frege came to hold that the pair in each of the following 
columns expressed the same thought.99 
 
A v B  A & B  A v A  A & A  ~~A 
B v A  B & A  A  A  A 
 
There is a significant asymmetry between the first two pairs and the other three. 
The members of each of the former are mere notational variations of one another. As 
both Geach and Dummett suggest, perhaps a notation could be devised in which the 
symmetrical connectives of the propositional calculus had no alternative representations 
so that there would be no difference between ‘A v B’ and ‘B v A’, and none also 
between ‘A & B’ and ‘B & A’.100 Dummett suggests in this connection a distinction 
between essential structure and form of representation, such that different forms of 
representation could express the same essential structure. Different notations could thus 
express the same essential structure. It can thus be said that Frege’s, Peano’s and polish 
notation provide alternative forms of representation of the essential structures of the 
same sentences. ‘A v B’ and ‘B v A’, and ‘A & B’ and ‘B & A’, differ in this respect. 
The other pairs are trickier. They definitely have different structures. Besides, it 
follows by transitivity (if equipollence be transitive) that ‘A’, ‘A v A’, ‘A & A’ and 
‘~~A’ all express the same thought. Many are inclined to think of this as a “slip of the 
pen” on Frege’s part perhaps due to the false analogy between the first two columns 
above, on the one side, and the latter three on the other. 
But however it may be, it would not be the uniqueness of analysis that were in 
question, but again whether there were a bijection between sentences of the concept-
script and thoughts. 
Bermúdez has argued that Frege’s views on truth entail that differently 
structured sentences can express one and the same thought.101 Frege did indeed say that 
the sentences ‘I smell the scent of violets’ and ‘It is true that I smell the scent of violets’ 
express the same sense, while ‘It is true that ξ’ is not senseless.102 
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It is not clear whether Frege would derive Bermúdez conclusion. After all, both 
sentences have the same transcription into the concept-script. In Bs, Frege had already 
held that the truth-predicate contributed not to content, but to assertion. He would have 
represented the proposition that p as ‘—p’ and the proposition that p is true as ‘|— p’.103 
But he was clear from “On Sense and Reference” on that ‘ξ is true’ is idle even as 
regards assertion.104 Indeed, in the sentence ‘if p is true, then q’, ‘p’ occurs as much 
unasserted as it does in ‘if p, then q’.105 It is rather more likely that Frege would have 
retracted the equipollence between ‘I smell the scent of violets’ and ‘It is true that I 
smell the scent of violets’ had he ever come to suppose that the sentences had 
alternative transcriptions into some concept-script. In any case, Bermúdez is right to 
conclude not against the uniqueness of analysis, but only against the unique pairing of 
thoughts and sentences of the concept-script, and by implication that thought is not in 
general linguistic sense. 
 
1.3.3 Converse relational sentences 
 
Amongst the pairs of sentences which bear only differences of tone to one other, Frege 
counts the following: 
 
The Greeks defeated the Persians. 
The Persians were defeated by the Greeks.106 
 
Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide. 
Carbon dioxide is heavier than hydrogen.107 
 
M gave document A to N. 
N received document A from N.108 
 
These are what may be called converse relational sentences. Frege thus seems to 
be committed to the view that, for any sentence that may be formalized as ‘aRb’, there 
is an equipollent one that may be formalized as ‘bR-1a’, where ξR-1ζ is the converse of 
ξRζ, and ξRζ is not symmetrical. 
Converse relations are the same if and only if they are symmetrical. Hence ξR-1ζ 
and ξRζ are different relations: they are different sets of ordered pairs. In Fregean terms, 
they have different value-ranges: they map different ordered pairs onto truth-values. The 
relation-words ‘ξR-1ζ’and ‘ξRζ’ thus have different referents, from which it follows that 
they have different senses.109 
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Now, if ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ express the same thought, then there is no bijection 
from sentences of the concept-script to thoughts. The thought expressed by a sentence 
cannot be its (linguistic) sense. 
 
1.3.3.1 A misdescription 
 
The case is sometimes expressed in a slightly different way, as if ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ 
corresponded to alternative function-argument decompositions of the same sentence. 
Beaney in particular suggests such a formulation of the matter when he writes, 
commenting on Frege’s Bs §9, that 
 
A relational proposition such as ‘Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide’ can be 
analysed not only into an argument and a one-place function (in two different ways) but 
also into two arguments and a two-place function. Indeed, it might be suggested that 
this latter analysis is the most basic analysis, since it identifies all the fundamental 
objects. But even here there are two possible analyses, since what is important is not 
just the objects identified but also the order in which they are represented in a 
proposition, reflecting the precise relation (i.e., two-place function) involved.110 
 
Now, if the passage is not ambiguous and by the word ‘analyses’ in the italicised 
clause Beaney means the procedure described by Frege in Bs §9, then what Beaney 
claims is strictly mistaken, for two reasons. 
First, as we have seen, “the most basic analysis” of ‘Hydrogen is lighter than 
carbon dioxide’ must correspond to an analysis in Dummett’s sense, i.e. to a 
decomposition, not of the sentence, but only of one of its constituent complex 
predicates. From ‘Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide’ we can only extract the 
concept-words ‘Hydrogen is lighter than ξ’ and ‘ξ is lighter than carbon dioxide’; and 
only from either the relation-word ‘ξ is lighter than ζ’. 
Now, none of these predicates occurs in ‘Carbon dioxide is heavier than 
hydrogen’. From the latter sentence one can only arrive at ‘Carbon dioxide is heavier 
than ξ’, ‘ξ is heavier that hydrogen’ and ‘ξ is heavier than ζ’. 
The relation-words ‘ξ is lighter than ζ’ and ‘ξ is heavier than ζ’ are obviously 
distinct. As Geach would say, they are themselves functions, linguistic functions: in fact 
converse non-symmetrical linguistic relations, which map different sets of ordered pairs 
of proper names onto different sentences. 
The concept-words ‘Hydrogen is lighter than ξ’ and ‘ξ is heavier that hydrogen’ 
are also different linguistic functions: their values differ even for the same arguments. A 
peculiar thing happens here, though. Although the predicates are different, they have the 
same referent. The value-range of the function that maps every thing that is such that 
hydrogen is lighter than it onto the True, and everything else onto the False, is the same 
as the value-range of the function that maps every thing that is heavier than hydrogen 
onto the True, and everything else onto the False. The concepts denoted by ‘Hydrogen 
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is lighter than ξ’ and ‘ξ is heavier that hydrogen’ are thus co-extensive, even necessarily 
so, and so not two but one. 
Now, strictures about Kerry’s paradox aside, in order to refer to the concept 
denoted by both predicates, we can construct a definite description from each with the 
help of a term-forming operator such as ‘the concept of being (such that) ξ’; say: 
 
‘the concept of being such that hydrogen is lighter than it’; 
‘the concept of being heavier that hydrogen’. 
 
As a matter of linguistic necessity, the definite description constructed from 
‘Hydrogen is lighter than ξ’ is grammatically more complex than the one formed from 
‘ξ is heavier that hydrogen’, although this complexity has no logical import. As a 
consequence, in order to avoid the circumlocution, one often chooses to refer to the 
concept through the definite description ‘the concept of being heavier that hydrogen’. 
And so we have it that, for entirely pragmatic reasons, one may be tempted to use the 
simpler, more natural phrase, even in contexts where only the more complex one would 
be legitimate. Frege, for one, does seem to fall into this trap when, concerning the 
alternative decompositions of ‘Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide’, he writes that 
 
In the manner of treatment just indicated, ‘hydrogen’ was the argument and ‘being 
lighter than carbon dioxide’ the function; but we can equally look at the same 
conceptual content in such a way that ‘carbon dioxide’ is the argument and ‘being 
heavier than hydrogen’ is the function.111 
 
Here Frege had of course not yet drawn his distinction between sense and 
reference. But even if he could be in some sense justified in claiming that the function 
‘being heavier than hydrogen’ could be extracted from ‘Hydrogen is lighter than carbon 
dioxide’, it would have been nevertheless wrong for him to say that the predicate ‘ξ is 
heavier than hydrogen’ could. Rather, Frege should have said that the second 
decomposition of the sentence involved the predicate ‘ξ is such that hydrogen is lighter 
than it’ instead. 
We can summarize the point in general terms: ‘bR-1a’ does not correspond to 
any possible function-argument decomposition of ‘aRb’ because: 
 
(1) we can arrive at the relation-word ‘ξRζ’ from ‘aRb’ and at ‘ξR-1ζ’ from ‘bR-
1
a’, but in order to pass from ‘ξRζ’ to ‘ξR-1ζ’ we would need, besides predicate 
extraction, the definition of the converse of a relation; 
 
(2) we can extract from ‘aRb’ a function-name of the concept that is also 
denoted by the concept-word ‘ξR-1a’ in turn extracted from ‘bR-1a’, namely the 
predicate ‘aRξ’, but not the concept-word ‘ξR-1a’ itself. 
 
Quite simply put, there is no function-argument analysis of any of the sentences 
‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ such that one corresponds to a decomposition of the other. That ‘aRb’ 
and ‘bR-1a’ are equipollent does not imply that there are alternative function-argument 
decompositions even at the fundamental level of analysis. What it does imply, as we 
have seen, is that a single thought may correspond to different sentences of the concept-
script. The implication is that it is not alternative decompositions that ground the 
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equipollence, but rather conversely, that the equipollence would ground the alternative 
representations of the thought if it were true. To be fair to Beaney, this is all that he 
appears to imply when he writes that “If we formalize the proposition as ‘aRb’ […] then 
given the equivalence […] above, we can also formalize it as ‘bR-1a’ […]”.112 But even 
here he should have written ‘thought’ instead of ‘proposition’, since by the latter he 
means roughly the same as Geach. Indeed Beaney tells us that he uses 
 
the word ‘proposition’ in this paper in (roughly) the sense in which Frege uses the word 
‘Satz’. It means more than just ‘sentence’, understood as a mere linguistic expression, 
but as something like ‘sentence with a content’.113 
 
In any case, the point is a relevant one to stress, since, as I believe, its neglect 
may have led to a certain amount of confusion as to what is at stake in these cases. 
 
1.3.3.2 Sullivan on converse relations 
 
Peter Sullivan has tried to meet the challenge on Dummett’s behalf, claiming there to be 
no inconsistency in accepting that (i) ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ express the same thought, (ii) 
‘ξRζ’ and ‘ξR-1ζ’ have different senses, and yet (iii) analysis is unique. 
Sullivan agrees that converse relations are the same only if they are symmetrical. 
He explicitly opposes Frege’s view on the matter to Russell’s, for whom, at least for 
some time, converse relations were in general identical.114 Sullivan also agrees that for 
instance ‘heavier’ and ‘lighter’ are not synonyms.115 But then he argues, in what may 
seem a somewhat desperate fashion, that this 
 
[…] is plainly not a good question. For Frege, a relation is ‘incomplete’, which means 
(at least) that to mention a relation is to speak of one thing’s standing in the relation to 
another. So the only sensible question to ask in this case is whether our proposition 
speaks of something’s being heavier than another, or of something’s being lighter than 
another. And the only sensible answer to that question is that the proposition does both, 
simultaneously. To introduce into Frege’s language a symbol allowing us to say that 
something x is heavier than something y is automatically to introduce a symbol allowing 
us to say of y that x is heavier than it, i.e. that y is lighter than x. So we do not have to 
choose whether our single content involves heavier or lighter as constituent: for it to 
include the one is for it to include the other.116 
 
It would be tempting to interpret the quoted passage as claiming there to be no 
two constituents after all, especially when Sullivan suggests that to introduce a symbol 
for one of the relations is thereby to introduce a symbol for the other. But this would 
have the absurd consequence that two expressions with different referents had the same 
sense in the same context, something that Sullivan could have hardly intended. 
What Sullivan appears to be claiming is that converse relation-words express 
each other’s senses. Indeed, he says that “What the above claims to be “the same” are 
rather what it is for a sentence to express a relation and what it is for it to express the 
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converse of that relation.”117 It would thus seem that a sentence that expresses that aRb 
expresses both the sense of ‘ξRζ’ and that of ‘ξR-1ζ’, not because the latter are 
synonymous, but because “what it is to express the one is what it is to express the 
other”; and likewise for a sentence that expresses that bR-1a. 
Sullivan’s effort fails for two reasons. The first is that it is prima facie 
implausible, and that it has an air of an ad hoc solution. The idea that converse relation-
words may not be synonymous while expressing each other’s senses has no intuitive 
appeal beyond the resolution of the tension under scrutiny. 
The second reason is instructive in that it shows that the question of whether 
there are alternative analyses has perhaps not been sufficiently distinguished from the 
question of whether there is a bijection between thoughts and sentences of the concept-
script. 
Sullivan’s solution provides a possible explanation of why converse relational 
sentences may express the same thought, while at the same time maintaining that each 
thought may be paired with a unique set of constituents. The thought that aRb is 
mapped onto the senses of ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘ξRζ’ and ‘ξR-1ζ’. In some sense of analysis, 
therefore, we can perhaps say that the thought has a unique analysis, i.e. corresponds to 
a unique set of constituents. 
However, it still remains the case that a single thought may be expressed by 
different sentences of the concept-script. We have seen that to say that ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-
1
a’ correspond to alternative decompositions of the same sentence is at the very least 
misleading. What was at stake was rather that if the equipollence held, thoughts could 
not be paired uniquely with sentences, even if in Sullivan’s case that might not imply 
that thought was not linguistic sense after all. But Sullivan’s answer does not touch the 
latter question at all. 
The result is that, on Sullivan’s view, each thought expressible as ‘aRb’ is 
overdetermined by its constituents. Presumably, the senses of ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘ξRζ’ would be 
sufficient to express the thought that aRb, but we are told that the sense of ‘ξR-1ζ’ is 
also expressed by ‘aRb’. 
Apparently Russell once dealt with the question by simply claiming that because 
‘heavier’ and ‘lighter’ are different constituents, ‘A is heavier than B’ and ‘B is lighter 
than A’ must express different, though (necessarily) equivalent, propositions.118 To 
argue thus in this connection would be obviously question begging. However, there is 
no need to argue at all. Frege’s claiming that ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ are equipollent rests on a 
rather trivial blunder. To see why, we may begin by considering what Frege said 
concerning the difference between sense and tone, and the examples he chose to 
illustrate it.119 
 
1.3.3.3 Sense and tone 
 
Frege’s distinctions between sense and reference, thought and assertion and sense and 
tone, had already been drawn, in an intuitive fashion and more or less confusedly, in 
Begriffsschrift. The distinction between sense and reference is by far the most confused, 
and appears under the guise of “different ways of determining a content” during Frege’s 
                                                 
117
 Sullivan 2010: 99, note 13. 
118
 Sullivan 2010: 99, note 12. Sullivan does not attribute the same view to Frege, but merely suggests 
that he would have no difficulties in addressing the same problem. 
119
 ‘Tone’ is Dummett’s term. Frege uses alternatively ‘illumination’, ‘atmosphere’, ‘mood’, ‘poetic 
scent’, ‘shadowing’, ‘colouring’, ‘intonation’ and ‘rhythm’. I do not know if have been exhaustive. 
 45
discussion of “equality of content”, i.e. identity.120 On the other hand, it is remarkable 
how clearly Frege distinguishes conceptual content from judgement,121 and content 
from conceptual content,122 thus anticipating almost exactly his later distinctions 
between thought and assertion, and tone and sense respectively. 
As Dummett suggests, tone is quite an heterogeneous category, and is more 
easily defined negatively as comprising “disparate components” of meaning “associated 
only by belonging neither to force nor to sense.” Tone does not determine the kind of 
linguistic act effected, and so is not a force-indicator; it cannot affect the truth-value of 
what is expressed, and so does not belong to sense.123 
Perhaps it can be said with some confidence that for Frege the two main 
purposes of tone are to help communication and, as Dummett says, to define the style of 
discourse.124 Frege implies at least as much when he claims that tone covers those 
aspects of language that serve “to aid the hearer’s understanding, for instance 
emphasizing part of a sentence by stress or word-order”125, and those that are meant “to 
act on the feelings and mood of the hearer, or to arouse his imagination”.126 Dummett 
illuminatingly points to a feature of dictionaries that may be said to indicate the tone of 
an expression, when, along with a description of its meaning, a word is characterized as 
e.g. “archaic”, “vulgar”, etc. It is thus not uncalled for to say generally that differences 
of tone are rhetorical differences.127 Accordingly Frege intends that his concept-script, 
meant to depict only what is essential to the representation of inference, be insensitive 
to subtleties of tone.128 
Other than the difference between the active and the passive voices, and 
converse relational sentences in general,129 Frege uncontroversially lists as possibly 
inducing mere differences in tone (i) word-order, and (ii) the replacement of synonyms 
by synonyms (for instance with different etymologies).130 Perhaps more disputable 
examples include (iii) the difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’, (iv) that between ‘still’ 
and ‘already’, and (v) the inclusion or omission of adverbs such as ‘fortunately’ and 
‘regrettably’.131 
In any event, Frege is perfectly clear that all these distinctions are alike in being 
of “such kind as not to be expressed in our symbolism”,132 as Frege says concerning the 
difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’. The distinction between active and passive is 
therefore quite anomalous amongst these. 
When Frege asserted that ‘The Greeks defeated the Persians’ and ‘The Persians 
were defeated by the Greeks’ had the same conceptual content, he did so in connection 
with his repudiation of the logical significance of the grammatical distinction between 
subject and predicate. 
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A distinction of subject and predicate finds no place in my way of representing a 
judgement. In order to justify this, let me observe that there are two ways in which the 
content of two judgments may differ; it may, or it may not, be the case that all 
inferences that can be drawn from the first judgment when combined with certain other 
ones can always also be drawn from the second when combined with the same other 
judgments. The two propositions ‘the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea’ and ‘the 
Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea’ differ in the former way; even if a 
slight difference of sense is discernible, the agreement in sense is preponderant. Now I 
call the part of the content that is the same in both the conceptual content. Only this has 
significance for our symbolic language; we need therefore make no distinction between 
propositions that have the same conceptual content.133 
 
The context makes it clear that what Frege means in this passage is that his 
concept-script is insensitive to the distinction between subject and predicate, and in 
general to “All such aspects of language” that are “merely result of the reciprocal action 
of speaker and hearer”. In all this Frege believes to be following “absolutely the 
example of the formalized language of mathematics”, in which “subject and predicate 
can be distinguished only by doing violence to the thought.” 
Now it is all too clear that Frege does also believe that the transformation from 
active into passive belongs to this category of linguistic distinctions, i.e. tone. He makes 
the point as explicitly as it could be expected: 
 
The speaker usually intends the subject to be taken as the principal argument; the next 
in importance often appears as the object. Language has the liberty of arbitrarily 
presenting one or another part of the proposition as the principal argument by a choice 
between inflexions and words, e.g. between 
active and passive, 
‘heavier’ and ‘lighter’, 
‘give’ and ‘receive’; 
but this liberty is restricted by lack of words.134 
 
Alas, Frege’s belief is mistaken. Frege suggests that there is a convention 
according to which a speaker may draw the attention of his hearer to what he intends to 
be the “principal argument” of a sentence (that is, in relation to a possible 
decomposition of a sentence, what he would take to be the replaceable part). To bring 
the intended argument into subject-place could be one such device. 
Consider the sentences: 
 
(a) The Greeks defeated the Persians. 
(b) The Persians are such that the Greeks defeated them. 
 
According to Frege’s convention, (a) exhibits ‘The Greeks’ as the argument of 
the function ‘ξ defeated the Persians’; (b) ‘The Persians’ as that of the function ‘the 
Greeks defeated ξ’. The pair (a)/(b) thus satisfies Frege’s description of the convention. 
Sentence (c) below differs from (a) merely as to word-order. 
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(c) The Persians (acus.) the Greeks (nom.) defeated. 
 
(c) shows that it is not even necessary to switch subject and predicate in order to 
focus the attention of the reader on the intended argument: a simple permutation of 
word-order, common in highly inflected languages, is sufficient. Plausibly, here, too, 
the intended argument is ‘The Persians’ for the function ‘the Greeks defeated ξ’. The 
difference between (c) and (b) is that ‘The Persians’ is the grammatical subject of (b) 
but not of (c); it is part of the grammatical predicate of both (a) and (c). 
Now both predicates ‘ξ defeated the Persians’ and ‘the Greeks defeated ξ’ 
correspond to possible decompositions of (a): they may be obtained from it by predicate 
extraction. Thus (b) and (c) differ from (a) only in tone, as does, for the sake of 
completeness, (d) below. 
 
(d) The Greeks vanquished the Persians. 
 
(c) differs from (a) by word-order, (d) by substitution of synonyms, and (b) by 
permutation of grammatical subject and predicate. 
On the other hand, not only does (e) not differ from (a) merely in what matters 
tone: (e) does not satisfy the description of Frege’s convention. 
 
(e) The Persians were defeated by the Greeks. 
 
That (e) differs from (a) in more than tone is shown by the fact that each has its 
own transcription into Frege’s concept-script, which is just another way of saying that 
they are not alternative decompositions of each other. If the difference were one of tone, 
Frege’s concept-script would, as he himself said, be insensitive to it. 
But besides, (e) does not fulfil what Frege says that it does in relation to (a). (e) 
presents ‘The Persians’ as argument, not for the function ‘the Greeks defeated ξ’ as (b) 
and (c) do, but for the function ‘ξ were defeated by the Greeks’. Now, unlike the 
former, the latter function does not occur in (a). Hence (e) does not present as “principle 
argument” an argument for a function that corresponds to a possible decomposition of 
(a). 
It is thus not the pair (a)/(e) but the pairs (a)/(b) and (a)/(c), in particular the first, 
that fit Frege’s own description of the role he attributes to the conversion between the 
active and the passive voices. The grammatical distinction between the active and the 
passive voices does entail a logical one. Such is not a device that merely switches 
subject and predicate without affecting sense, but is indeed one of the devices of natural 
language to produce the converse of a relation. And as we have seen, since converse 
relations have alternative transcriptions into the concept script, they do not differ merely 
in tone. 
 
1.3.3.4 Even good Frege nods at times 
 
I conjecture that Frege (i) mistook (e) for (b), and that he therefore (ii) was unwittingly 
unaware that (a) and (e) had alternative transcriptions. The upshot is that Frege did not 
intend the implications of the claim that sentences of the forms ‘aRb’ and ‘bR-1a’ are 
equipollent. 
Mistaking (e) for (b) was no more than an instance of the temptation described 
in section 1.3.3.1 above, to which we have already seen that Frege did eventually 
succumb. (e) presents ‘The Persians’ as an argument for the function ‘ξ were defeated 
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by the Greeks’; (b) presents ‘The Persians’ as an argument for the function ‘The Greeks 
defeated the ξ’. Now, regardless of the fact that ‘ξ were defeated by the Greeks’ and 
‘The Greeks defeated the ξ’ denote the same concept, they are distinct predicates. It is 
just that, for the reasons indicated above, it is more natural to say that the Persians were 
defeated by the Greeks rather than that the Persians are such that the Greeks defeated 
them. 
It may seem too elementary a blunder for a genius such as Frege not to notice 
that sentences such as (a) and (e) would have alternative transcriptions into the concept-
script. That nevertheless seems to have been the case, especially when we consider 
Frege’s further comparisons with the grammatical distinction between active and 
passive. 
The following excerpt is one of those passages that have often been quoted to 
support the view that analysis is not unique, or that thoughts are not intrinsically 
structured. Levine cites it as evidence that Frege did not have “to assume the burden of 
showing how” sentences such as ‘M gave document A to N’ and ‘N received document 
A from M’ “express the same thought with the same ultimate simple constituents.” 
which is supposed to explain why he did not hold the view that “Each propositional 
content admits of a unique ultimate analysis into simple constituents.” 
 
a thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears as 
subject or predicate. The thought itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as 
the subject. […] Language has means of presenting now one, now another, part of the 
thought as the subject; one of the most familiar is the distinction of active and passive 
forms. It is thus not impossible that one way of analysing a given thought should make 
it appear as a singular judgement; another, as a particular judgement; and a third, as a 
universal judgement.135 
 
Incidentally, Frege does not say that the though itself does not yet determine 
what is to be regarded as the argument; he says ‘the subject’. In the light of what has 
been said before and of what is about to follow, it is clear that what Frege here means is 
that language has the means to present now one part of a sentence as the intended 
replaceable part (i.e. as the argument of the intended decomposition), now the other, as 
subject. Now, as we have seen, the distinction of active and passive is not one such 
means. That Frege believed that the conversion between active and passive did not 
entail an alternative transcription of a sentence is shown by the text that surrounds 
Levine’s quotation. Thus Levine’s conclusion is not without a bit of irony: Frege indeed 
felt no need to explain why ‘M gave document A to N’ and ‘N received document A 
from M’ differed, though not because he thought that they expressed different 
constituents yet the same thought, but because he did not see that they expressed 
different constituents at all. 
Frege invokes the distinction of active and passive as a device that merely 
switches subject and predicate, or better, nominative and accusative. But his examples 
of sentences that suffer such a transformation are the following: 
 
There is at least one square root of 4. 
The concept square root of 4 is realized. 
The number 4 has the property that there is something of which it is the 
square.136 
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All three sentences have the same transcription into Frege’s concept-script – but 
it is in relation to these that he claims that the difference between active and passive as 
no logical significance. Now, for reasons that concern Kerry’s paradox, this is actually 
true of all those sentences that are such that their passive voice presents as subject a 
definite description that (apparently) refers to a function. As Frege tells us, though, 
whereas “An equation is reversible; an object’s falling under a concept is an irreversible 
relation.” 137 There is a plethora of relations that are strictly inexpressible in Frege’s 
concept-script, and that rather belong to, as it were, the formation rules of his system. 
One such relation is precisely that of falling under a concept. So there are indeed cases 
of active and passive distinctions to which Frege’s concept-script is insensitive. As he 
says: 
 
‘to be Φ is a property of Γ’ 
 
is just another way of saying: 
 
‘Γ falls under the concept of a Φ’.138 
 
Both are transcribed as ‘Φ(Γ)’. Note that the active/passive distinction would 
already fail to have no logical significance if the sentences were instead ‘Γ belongs to 
the extension of the concept Φ’ and ‘the extension of the concept Φ has Γ as its 
member’. Since membership is a relation between objects (between objects and 
extensions of concepts, which are objects), it may be “reversible”; and with the help of 
Frege’s notation for value-ranges perhaps the latter pair of sentences could have 
alternative representations. 
Frege thus appears to have unwittingly generalized to all cases of active and 
passive, such as (a) and (e) above, a peculiar feature of only a few sentences, namely 
those that mention relations which are not expressible within his script. But in general, 
the distinction of active and passive does induce a logical distinction. It is not merely a 
rule for switching nominative and accusative, as is that used to form (b) from (a). It is 
the very device that language has of producing the converse of a relational sentence, 
when there is such a converse. For the reasons given so far, either Frege did not realize 
such a trivial fact, or, in the cases in which he may have, there was indeed no real 
relation neither its converse. 
On Frege’s behalf, it should be said that he might not have been the only 
philosopher of language to commit the same oversight. On one occasion, Dummett 
himself cites the transformation of active into passive as an example of tone 
distinctions.139 But the instance he chooses is precisely the difference between ‘There is 
at least one square root of 4’ and ‘The number 4 has the property that there is something 
of which it is the square’. Dummett does not suggest any kind of restriction. On the 
other hand, in other places in which he distinguishes tone from sense he does not 
mention the active and passive. I have not found a pronouncement of Geach’s on the 
matter. 
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1.3.3.5 Frege’s criteria of equipollence 
 
Another reason that may have no doubt reinforced Frege’s blunder was of course the 
fact that pairs of converse relational sentences are sanctioned by any of Frege’s criteria 
of identity of content. 
Peter Sullivan has formulated the criterion of identity of conceptual content that 
Frege expressed in Bs §3 in the following terms: 
 
φ and ψ have the same conceptual content iff  
Γ, φ entail χ iff Γ, ψ entail χ. 
 
Here χ is the set of consequences that can be drawn from φ and ψ when 
“combined with certain other judgements”, or premises added, Γ. As Sullivan himself 
notes, and as Dummett and others also had, this is too weak a criterion for Frege’s 
purposes. If the notion of consequence involved is classical, the criterion qualifies as 
alike in content every pair of necessarily equivalent sentences, such as all arithmetical 
statements, something that Frege did certainly not intend.140 
In any case, as I have noted above, Frege’s criterion is introduced as means to 
justify the logical insignificance of the distinction between subject and predicate. The 
criterion thus entails not only that (a) and (e) have the same conceptual content, but also 
that (a) and (b) do. This is of course compatible with my claim that Frege confounded 
(e) and (b). 
Frege expressed his better-known criterion of identity of sense only in 
unpublished writings. 
 
Now two sentences A and B can stand in such a relation that anyone who recognizes the 
content of A as true must thereby also recognize the content of B as true and, 
conversely, that anyone who accepts the content of B must straightway accept that of A. 
(Equipollence). It is here being assumed that there is no difficulty in grasping the 
content of A and B.141 
 
Michael Dummett has expressed it roughly thus: 
 
φ and ψ express the same sense iff 
necessarily, ∀S if S understands both, then 
S recognizes immediately that φ and ψ  have the same truth-value. 
 
The requirement of immediacy is essential to rule out the possibility of 
inference, in which case the criterion would sanction many pairs of sentences that could 
be easily derived from each other, again something that Frege would not intend.142 
This criterion certainly sanctions any of the sentences (a) to (e) as synonymous. 
However, there are good reasons, and independent ones too, to think that the condition 
mentioned in the criterion is only necessary, not sufficient, for synonymy. Frege’s 
criterion would thus be best exploited as a criterion of non-synonymy: 
 
 
                                                 
140
 Sullivan 2004: 684. 
141
 Frege: 1906c: 197. 
142
 Christopher Peacocke has endorsed a similar principle, which he called ‘Frege’s Principle’, claiming it 
to be “indisputable”. Compare Dummett 1991a: 168-76 with Peacocke 1988. 
 51
φ and ψ express different senses if 
possibly, ∃S, S understands φ and ψ, but 
S does not recognize immediately that they have the same truth-value. 
 
Besides, as Dummett says commenting on Peacocke’s “Frege’s Principle”, 
“Frege surely revealed a sure instinct by employing his principle only to negative effect, 
to demonstrate non-synonymy.”143 
With Frege’s weaker criterion of non-synonymy, the only one he ever explicitly 
applied, it is possible consistently to deny that ‘The Greeks defeated the Persians’ and 
‘The Persians were defeated by the Greeks’ are equipollent sentences. It is not enough 
to claim the consistency of such a claim, though: one should positively motivate it. But 
such a motivation is indeed forthcoming. As a matter of fact, one may wish to describe 
the relation between these sentences as (in some sense) saying the same thing, while (in 
some sense) in a different way. The matter could be put, for instance, using 
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between fact and complex: the circumstance of the 
Greeks having defeated the Persians is a complex which instantiates (at least) two facts, 
that the Greeks defeated the Persians, and that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks. 
It is as if both facts were two alternative descriptions of the same state of affairs. 
Bob Hale has defined a notion of a state of affairs intended to capture a weak 
notion of sense appropriate to characterize Frege’s metaphor of content recarving in Gl 
§64.144 Hale’s definition uses in turn Crispin Wright definition of compact entailment. 
There are plenty of reasons to suppose that Hale’s notion of state of affairs is unable to 
fulfil its intended purpose. However, that should not blind us to the fact that under 
Hale’s definition, all contingent logically equivalent sentences come out as alike in 
content. That means that Hale’s notion appears to capture the coarser notion of content 
that Frege might have had in mind when he implied that ‘A’, ‘AvA’, ‘A&A’ and ‘~~A’ 
all expressed the same thought.145 So too our converse relational sentences come out as 
equipollent under Hale’s notion. 
 
1.4 Amending Geach’s account 
 
Dummett has claimed that “To talk about expressions and their structure, we need the 
notions of part and whole, not those of function and value.” 
 
Given only the value of a function for some argument, it is not possible to recover the 
function or the argument. For this reason, it is inappropriate to regard either the 
argument or the function as a constituent or part of the value, since we naturally 
suppose that anything is uniquely analysable into its ultimate constituents, and that the 
parts of a thing may be discerned by scrutiny of it.146 
 
Similar remarks would apply to the realm of sense, although that is not our primary 
focus for the moment. For instance Geach proposed to interpret Frege’s talk of parts and 
wholes in relation to thoughts as an unfortunate means of expression, based on two 
contentions. The first was that “we really talk only figuratively when we transfer the 
relation of whole and part to thoughts”; the second, that Frege had already once been 
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lured by his own metaphor in the case of truth-values to an absurd conclusion.147 From 
the exegetical point of view, Dummett takes the fact that Frege never withdrew the 
thesis that thoughts have parts, as he did in the case of truth-values, as evidence that he 
must have taken the metaphor more seriously than Geach would have expected him to. 
It is true that “Dummett’s appeal to Frege’s authority is here selective”148, and that 
Frege did unequivocally state that some parts of thoughts must be themselves 
incomplete. However, from the logical point of view, there is indeed a reason for 
supposing there to be an asymmetry between both cases. 
The problem has been exposed by Peter Sullivan in the form of a dilemma for 
the functional model of sentential complexity.149 The functional model was originally 
proposed to deal with questions of logical unity. But where the model definitely 
succeeds, there is in a sense no problem of logical complexity at all. Conversely, where 
complexity is apparent, the model has no real explanatory power. 
What we have here is a sort of incommensurability between two types of 
complexity: Sullivan calls them respectively complexity of constitution and complexity 
of designation.150 In the numerical case, we do not think of the representation of a 
number as the value of a function for an argument as an analysis of that number. We do 
not mean to say that a number is in any sense complex or articulated. We have rather 
provided a means of specifying the number, and thus have only complexity of 
designation. Likewise, when we say that a truth-value may be the value of a concept for 
an object, we do not mean to assert that the truth-value is thereby being analysed. That 
is why the analogy works so smoothly in the case of reference and Frege’s explanation 
of the mode of composition of the semantic values of the components of sentences in 
functional terms is so satisfactory. This way of understanding the relation between 
truth-values, concepts and objects is precisely what makes it quite absurd to speak of 
truth-values as in any way complex themselves. 
On the other hand, the kind of complexity which calls for explanation in the case 
of sentences (and perhaps of senses) is closer to complexity of constitution. Sentences 
are articulated, and since they map thoughts, the latter appear to be so too. The problem 
is that appealing to the functional model in such cases risks “throwing away the baby 
with the water.” Accepting an explanation of sentential unity in functional terms 
requires us to turn a blind eye to the fact that what prompted the question of unity in the 
first place was a perplexity about complexity of constitution, not designation. 
Consider Ramsey’s problem again. In order to explain how the same sentence 
could have alternative analyses, Geach argued that there is a way of understanding the 
combination of the constituents of sentences which allows for the required multiplicity. 
Indeed, if we regard a sentence as the value of a linguistic function, nothing stands in 
the way of our conceiving there to be different functions for that very same value. True: 
but no less true is the fact that we are not inclined to think of the representation of 
something as the value of a function as an analysis of it at all. As in the numerical case, 
we are no longer inclined to think of linguistic functions and arguments as constituents 
of articulated sentences. We have stepped away from the conceptual framework in 
which it would be meaningful to speak of an analysis of a sentence, as intended. 
So even if Geach had good reasons to claim that to speak of parts and wholes in 
relation to sentences and especially thoughts were at best a metaphor and at worst a 
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misleading one, it would not be as yet entirely clear that to speak of functions and 
arguments in that connection is no less felicitous either. 
The point becomes more intuitive as soon as one pursues one strand of the 
analogy between numerical and linguistic functions. 
Just as any number can be represented by an arbitrarily defined numerical 
function, so may any sentence be conceived as the value of an arbitrarily defined 
linguistic function. Geach’s functional model imposes no restrictions upon the form that 
the function whose value the sentence is may take. It is thus forced to recognize many 
representations of a sentence in terms of function and argument as possible analyses of 
it which we would intuitively not declare as such. 
On a natural conception of analysis, one would expect an analysis of a sentence 
to reveal what is involved in understanding it. Now a simple way to formulate 
Dummett’s objection is to say that the doctrine that to analyse a sentence is to represent 
it as the value of a function overgenerates. It fails to provide a reasonable account of 
what it is to understand a sentence because it allows that, for each sentence, there may 
be many function-argument representations that are unintended analyses of it. Since to 
grasp a thought is to understand the sentence whose sense it is, the functional model 
cannot provide an account of what is involved in grasping a thought either. And so 
Frege’s dictum that “We can regard a sentence as a mapping of a thought” would be 
contradicted.151 
Geach’s model thus appears to entail that we are (i) left with no means to 
provide an explanation of what it is to grasp a thought, and (ii) bound to be able to grasp 
a thought in advance of understanding any sentence that expresses it. These difficulties, 
Dummett says, are each the side of a single coin: the first relates to “the needs of 
philosophers of language or thought”; the second, to the abilities of language-users and 
thinkers.152 
The model provides no interesting or philosophical explanation of what it is to 
grasp a thought because it is unable to show what is distinctive about those functions 
which do correspond to legitimate analyses of a sentence, as opposed to those which 
may be correlated to a sentence as a matter of arbitrary stipulation. The relation between 
the analysis of a sentence and a thought thus becomes purely extrinsic. 
As a result, the supposedly intrinsic connection between the sense of a sentence 
and the expression of a thought is severed. The senses of the linguistic functions which 
would correspond to correct analyses are no longer more related to the thought then any 
other functions whatever, regardless of whether or not they provide an analysis of the 
sentence. We must therefore be capable of “grasping a thought in advance of any 
sentence that expresses it,” 153 because any sentence could in principle express it. 
So on the one hand, an arbitrary combination of linguistic functions and 
arguments could express the same thought, as long as they yielded the same value. On 
the other, our access to a thought could not be mediated through language, since sense 
becomes irrelevant to the expression of thought. 
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As Dummett says, the analogy between linguistic and numerical functions does 
come at a heavy price:154 it divorces linguistic understanding from the expression of 
thoughts, by treating the philosophy of language as irrelevant for the philosophy of 
thought.155 “Geach, of course, intends no such large consequences.”156 
Incidentally this family of objections is rather unfair to Geach. It rests on an 
uncharitable reading, or indeed on a misunderstanding, of what a linguistic function is. 
 
Observe that although 105=2.72+7, the numeral ‘105’, unlike ‘2.72+7’, is not a value of 
the linguistic function in question; so in writing down ‘2.72+7’ we are mentioning the 
numerical function 2.ξ2+ ξ, but in writing down ‘105’ we are not.157 
 
Here Geach is quite explicit that there are constraints as to what may be the 
value of a linguistic function. But there should be no need to be so told. 
As Sullivan put it, there are indeed many functions which may yield the value 
‘Socrates is wise’ for the argument ‘Socrates’. But that is not quite Geach’s doctrine. 
An accurate way to express it would be rather to say that ‘Socrates is wise’ is the value 
for the argument ‘Socrates’ of that function whose value for any name a as argument is 
the sentence [a is wise]. Hence, being determined the base sentence and the range of 
sentences resulting from it by admissible substitutions, to use Dummett’s terms, the set 
of possible linguistic functions is implicitly circumscribed. 
A linguistic function is a pattern discernible along sentences. That is to say that 
it gives a rule for constructing sentences from expressions. The predicate in ‘Socrates is 
wise’ is not ‘is wise’ but the pattern name-followed-by-‘is wise’. Other sentences may 
be constructed following this pattern; for instance ‘Plato is wise’. What this means is 
that a linguistic function provides a description of a rule to construct a sentence. As 
Sullivan says, this is not a retraction from his claim that functional complexity “is a 
complexity of designation rather than constitution”: 
 
For this does not imply that we may not designate something through a description of 
its intrinsic constitution. It is not universally true that “we must be able to identify the 
value of a function in advance of knowing that it is the value of that function”. For our 
grasp of the function may be given by principles for constructing its value from any 
given argument.158 
 
The conceptual difficulty pointed out above is merely apparent. True: a sentence 
is articulated; true, a number is not analysed by its representation as the value of a 
function; but the constituency of a sentence may be provided in functional terms. 
Dummett tells us of another sense in which Geach’s conception of analysis 
could be said to be too broad. Even if the account were able to determine the predicates 
that are sufficient for understanding, it could not specify those amongst the latter the 
grasp of whose senses is also necessary for understanding. 
Consider the thought that the Earth spins. While grasping the sense of the 
predicate ‘ξ spins’ is required to understand the thought, presumably grasping that of 
the second-level predicate ‘The Earth Φ’ is not. Rather, understanding the latter 
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intuitively depends upon a previous grasp of the sense of ‘The Earth spins’. But the 
sentence is the value for either of the linguistic functions: both predicates are, on 
Geach’s account, on an equal footing. The model is blind to their relative priority in 
understanding. 
This is fair enough. But we have seen that Geach’s interest lay primarily in 
decomposition, not analysis. In any case his account of analysis can be easily modified 
so as to cope with Dummett’s distinction. 
To analyse a sentence was for Geach to represent it as the value of a linguistic 
function. This was deficient because it was insensitive to the distinction between simple 
and complex predicates, and applied best only to decomposition. But Dummett’s 
distinction between analysis and decomposition can indeed be interpreted in Geach’s 
functional terms: 
To decompose a sentence is to represent it as the value of a linguistic function 
extractable from it. To analyse a sentence is to represent it as the value of a composite 
linguistic function of non-composite linguistic functions. (Complex predicates being 
composite linguistic functions; and simple predicates non-composite linguistic 
functions.) We do not need to replace the terms ‘function’ and ‘argument’ by ‘part’ and 
‘whole’, pace Dummett. 
Indeed, Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition, rather than 
a repudiation of Geach’s general conception of analysis, only entails a generalization of 
the account. 
 
Summary 
 
Since the notion of a linguistic function generalizes that of a predicate, Geach’s doctrine 
of linguistic functions explains how there may be alternative decompositions of a single 
sentence. 
However, I have otherwise concluded with Dummett that analysis is unique. In a 
word, decomposition presupposes analysis: predicate extraction is circumscribed by the 
ultimate constituents of sentences. 
Most or all of the objections typically raised against Dummett’s views often 
miss the target. They concern not the uniqueness of analysis, but rather whether thought 
is to be generally construed as linguistic sense, or analogously, whether there is a 
bijection between thoughts and the sentences of Frege’s concept-script. 
On the other hand, some of Dummett’s critiques of Geach’s conception of 
analysis are, as we have seen, by large unjustified. Geach’s account may be amended in 
the simple manner just described. 
Since Frege undoubtedly stands by the possibility of alternatively decomposing 
a sentence, there is so far every reason to suppose that he would have adhered to 
Geach’s doctrine of linguistic functions “if it had been put to him”, as Geach says. 
But there is a further role for Geach’s doctrine to play. Since the uniqueness of 
analysis does not entail the completeness of simple predicates, pace Dummett, and since 
we can accommodate the uniqueness of analytical structure within Geach’s functional 
model, as Sullivan suggests, even simple predicates may be thought to be linguistic 
functions. In the next chapter we will see why they should be so conceived. 
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2 Are predicates functions? 
 
I introduce the problem of sentential unity, and explain Geach’s Fregean solution to it, 
again in terms of his notion of a linguistic function. If predicates are functions as Geach 
contends, then they must be unsaturated. I show that Frege’s characterization of his 
function signs invites such an understanding of them. 
At the same time, if predicates are unsaturated, then there must be a linguistic 
version of Kerry’s paradox. Indeed, Geach claims that Frege foresaw it. Oliver 
disagrees, and concludes that predicates are not unsaturated, and hence not linguistic 
functions. I explain why Oliver’s conclusion may be a little too quick. 
 
2.1 The problem of sentential unity 
 
“A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without 
nouns.”159 Why this is so, is the problem of sentential unity. 
A sentence is a sequence of words, but not a list of proper names. In order for a 
sequence of words to be a sentence, i.e. to express a thought, one of the words has to be 
a verb. It is an obvious point to make that ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ is a sentence while, 
say, ‘Cato Brutus Caesar’ is not because the latter lacks a predicate. The question is in 
virtue of what is a word a predicate rather than a proper name: in this case, what makes 
‘killed’ not a proper name. 
To say that ‘Brutus’ is a proper name because is denotes an object while ‘killed’ 
is a verb because is denotes a concept (or an action, as Plato would say), would still not 
answer the question, which would reappear under the guise, What makes a word denote 
a concept rather than an object? Thus the problem of sentential unity has also been 
termed the problem of the expressiveness of the proposition.160 
Again, it would be spurious to appeal to grammatical rules in this connection. It 
could be argued that a sequence of words is a sentence if it is well formed. Whether a 
word may occur as a verb or as a noun, is dictated by its grammar, or rules of 
combination. But then a similar question could be asked concerning the relation 
between grammar and words. What features does grammar endow a word with in order 
for it to be a verb rather than a name, i.e. to denote an object rather than a concept? The 
problem could indeed be expressed in Kantian terms, as concerning the conditions of 
the possibility of syntax. 
In Fregean terms, the question is, In virtue of what is an expression a function-
name, i.e. a sign for a function, rather than a proper name, i.e. a sign for an object? Peter 
Geach finds in Frege’s writings a definitive answer to the problem of sentential unity 
based on the notion of a linguistic function. Function-names denote functions and 
proper names objects, because they are themselves functions and objects respectively. 
According to Geach linguistic functions are what symbolize numerical or other 
functions.161 A concept-word must therefore be a linguistic function. In ‘Raleigh 
smokes’, the two words have “different modes of significance.” ‘Raleigh’ denotes a 
man by being its name; but ‘smokes’ denotes a concept, if anything, not by being a 
“bare word”, but by the fact that ‘Raleigh smokes’ instantiates the pattern name-
followed-by-‘smokes’.162 In general, the occurrence of a predicate is not the presence of 
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a “quotable part of a sentence”, but the fact that the sentence shares a pattern with other 
sentences. Geach’s wording does indeed suggest expressing the point in Wittgenstein’s 
terms. It is not the complex of signs ‘Fa’ that is expressive, but it is rather the fact about 
this complex that F can be applied to different names, or that ‘Fa’ shares the pattern 
‘Fξ’ with ‘Fb’, ‘Fc’, etc, that symbolizes that a is F. 
The fact about a sentence that it instantiates a certain pattern corresponds to a 
rule of formation. The difference between ‘John killed Mary’ and ‘Mary killed John’ – 
namely, who killed who – could not be appreciated if the predicate were just the bare 
expression ‘killed’.163 In languages such as English, it is a fact about word order that 
indicates what the predicate is. We know what is the nominative and what the 
accusative from the fact that the nominative is written before ‘killed’, which in turn 
precedes the accusative. But a different grammatical rule could be used for the purpose 
of indicating that “the first killed the second”: instead of word order, declensions for 
each case could be used. What is essential is that the mode of composition of the 
sentence be able to express the direction of the relation. 
In general, what syntax must be able to do, regardless of the particular rules it 
chooses for the purpose, is to show the mode of “combination into a whole” of the 
referents of expressions. The grammar of a proper name allows it to stand for an object 
only because it makes it be to a predicate what an object is to a function: an argument. 
The grammar for a concept-word allows it to stand for a concept by making it behave to 
proper names as concepts to objects, i.e. by being itself a function. Proper names and 
objects alike behave like arguments, and only thereby can the former stand for the latter; 
function-names and functions alike behave like functions and only thereby can the 
former stand for the latter. The role of names is to complete predicates to form 
sentences, and the role of predicates is to be completed by names to form sentences. 
When syntax describes the behaviour of a predicate, what it does is to show that it is 
unsaturated as a function is: indeed it is a linguistic function. 
Now, this is possible only because the notions of object and function are 
themselves modelled upon their linguistic counterparts.164 It is the fact that proper 
names behave linguistically like arguments, i.e. complete expressions, that makes them 
suitable to denote objects, but only because the notion of an object is just that of the 
non-linguistic correlate of a proper name. Likewise, it is the fact that function signs 
behave linguistically like functions that makes them suitable to represent functions, but 
again only because the notion of a function is merely that of the non-linguistic correlate 
of an unsaturated expression, i.e. of an expression whose role in syntax is that of being 
completed by other expressions.165 And so that a name denotes an object follows from 
its behaviour as a linguistic argument; that a predicate denotes a concept follows from 
its behaviour as a linguistic function; that a sentence expresses what it does – an object 
falling under a concept, for instance – follows from these facts about complexes of 
signs. 
It follows, in general, that what a sign can it must denote. An expression is able 
to denote an object if its logical behaviour is that of an argument, but if it behaves like a 
proper name, then it must denote an object. A sign is a symbol for a function if it is a 
linguistic function – its role that of being completed by names; but if it behaves like a 
function, then it must denote a function. 
 
                                                 
163
 Geach 1975: 148. 
164
 See Dummett 1981: 234-48. 
165
 One should beware of the interplay here involved between the notions of reference as modelled on the 
name/bearer relation and as semantic role. See chapter 3. 
 59
2.2 Are Frege’s function signs unsaturated? 
 
Geach acknowledges that, although his explanation of the notion a function in Bs §9 fits 
only linguistic functions, “Frege never explicitly adopts the view that linguistic 
functions are what symbolizes numerical (or other) functions; but it seems likely that he 
would have adopted it if it had been put to him.” 
As we have seen, it is quite likely that Frege may have fallen victim to the 
confusion between use and mention in Bs. But Frege certainly suggests the doctrine of 
linguistic functions when he (i) says that function-names are themselves unsaturated; 
(ii) explains the notion of a function in terms of the notion of an incomplete expression; 
(iii) claims that an expression becomes unsaturated when it is employed as a predicate. 
Concerning an expression such as ‘(2 + 3x2)x’, Frege writes that 
 
The essence of the function lies in the part of the expression that is there over and above 
the ‘x’. The expression for a function is in need of completion, unsaturated. The letter 
‘x’ serves only to hold places open for a numeral that is to complete the expression, and 
in this way renders recognizable the particular type of need for completion that 
constitutes the specific nature of the function designated above. Hereafter the letter ‘ξ’ 
will be used for this purpose instead of ‘x’.166 
 
Although Frege is explicit in calling a function-name “unsaturated”, it could be 
thought that he meant only that an adequate sign for a function should include an 
indication of its argument-places, in order to remind us that the function, not the 
function-sign, is unsaturated. But a passage from “What is a Function?” connects the 
unsaturatedness of a function-sign to its capacity to symbolize a function. 
 
‘sin’ requires completion with a numeral, which, however, does not form part of the 
designation of the function: This holds good in general; the sign for a function is 
‘unsaturated’; it needs to be completed with a numeral, which we then call the 
argument-sign. [...] A functional sign cannot occur on one side of an equation by itself, 
but only when completed by a sign that designates or indicates a number. Now what 
does such a complex stand for consisting of a functional sign and a numeral, e.g. ‘sin 1’, 
‘√1’, ‘log 1’? A number each time. We thus get numerical signs composed of two 
dissimilar parts, an ‘unsaturated’ part being completed by the other one.167 
 
As Frege himself notes, we write ‘sin(   ) or ‘sin ξ’ “only for the exceptional 
case where we want to symbolize a function in isolation. In ‘sin 2’, ‘sin’ by itself 
already symbolizes the function.”168 Indeed, “To use a function sign in isolation is to 
contradict the nature of a function, which consists in its unsaturatedness.”169 It would 
appear, then, that what symbolizes in ‘sin’ is not its occurrence as a bare expression, but 
the fact that it occurs in certain relations to other signs. Whether something is a proper 
name or a predicate depends on their possible substitutions in the representation of 
inference. 
Shortly after, Frege introduces the notion of a function as the non-linguistic 
correlate of an unsaturated expression. 
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The peculiarity of functional signs, which we here called ‘unsaturatedness’, naturally 
has something answering to it in the functions themselves. They too may be called 
‘unsaturated’, and in this way we mark them out as fundamentally different from 
numbers.170 
 
Frege invariably explains the unsaturatedness of a function in terms of the 
incompleteness of his function-signs.171 Frege’s notions of object and function are 
indeed modelled upon the behaviour of proper names and function-signs. And just as 
unsaturatedness is transferred from symbol to referent, so is it transferred from sense to 
sign: 
 
As a mere thing, of course, the group of letters ‘and’ is no more unsaturated than any 
other thing. It may be called unsaturated in respect of its employment as a symbol 
meant to express a sense, for here it can have the intended sense only when situated 
between two sentences: its purpose as a symbol requires completion by a preceding and 
a succeeding sentence. It is really in the realm of sense that unsaturatedness is found, 
and it is transferred from there to the symbol.172 
 
A function-sign is expressive only because its employment as a symbol endows 
it with unsaturatedness, which is only to say that the behaviour of predicates is that of 
being completed by proper names. And so a predicate is a linguistic function. It is on 
this very basis that a notion of an objective unsaturated “entity” becomes intelligible: a 
function just is the incomplete referent of an incomplete expression. It behaves to 
objects as predicates to names. 
A simple corollary of the view that all and only linguistic arguments denote 
objects and all and only linguistic functions denote functions is of course Kerry’s 
paradox, or the paradox of the concept horse. 
 
2.3 Kerry’s paradox 
 
The sentence ‘The concept horse is easily attained’ is prima facie true and a fortiori 
meaningful. Benno Kerry presented this sentence as a counter-example to Frege’s 
doctrine that the distinction between concept and object is absolute, that is, that nothing 
can be both an object and a concept, not even in different contexts. 
If the sentence is true it is because the concept horse is easily attained, that is, 
the concept horse falls under the concept concept easily attained. But then the former 
must be one of the objects that falls under the latter. Thus the concept horse is an object. 
Therefore at least some concepts are at least sometimes objects. 
The conclusion follows only if ‘ξ is easily attained’ stands for a first-level 
concept, i.e. that ‘the concept horse’ stands for an object. Perhaps surprisingly, Frege 
agrees. He rather resists the conclusion by denying that the words ‘the concept horse’ 
ever stand for a concept at all. The concept horse may fall under concept easily attained 
precisely because it is an object. The concept horse is not a concept, i.e. it is not the case 
that the concept horse is a concept. This is Kerry’s paradox.173 
The three distinctive features of Frege’s philosophical logic that contribute to 
generate the paradox are that 
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(1) all and only proper names denote objects; 
(2) no concept may be an object; and 
(3) the definite article introduces a proper name. 
 
So in the sentence ‘The concept horse is a concept’, 
 
(4) ‘The concept horse’ must be a (non-empty) proper name, 
 
which is entailed by the fact that 
 
(5) ‘The concept ξ’ is a term-forming operator;174 
 
finally, 
 
(6) ‘ξ is a concept’ must be the name of a first-level concept. 
 
Note, further, that if (6) is the case, the concept denoted by ‘ξ is a concept’ maps 
every object onto the False, so that ‘The concept horse is not a concept’ is not only true, 
but necessarily so. 
 
2.3.1 Frege’s solution 
 
It seems extraordinary that Frege so much as accepted Kerry’s formulation of his 
paradox. By the time he wrote “On Concept and Object” Frege had already drawn the 
distinction between first- and second-level concepts.175 Clause (6) above is obviously 
false. If ‘ξ is a concept’ were a function-name at all it would have to be the name of a 
second-level concept. Frege’s reason for thinking otherwise was that 
 
the words ‘the concept square root of 4’ have an essentially different behaviour, 
as regards possible substitutions, from the words ‘square root of 4’ in our 
original sentence; i.e. the [reference] of the two phrases is essentially 
different.176 
 
And so it was only the fact that Frege adhered to (4) that led him to endorse the 
paradoxical view. Remarkably, Frege never had second thoughts concerning his 
criterion for a complex expression to be a proper name, i.e. (3). Therefore, in order to 
reject (4) Frege would have to disqualify ‘the concept horse’ as a well-formed 
expression in the first place. This he eventually did. 
 
Indeed we should really outlaw the expression ‘the meaning of the concept-word A’, 
because the definite article before ‘meaning’ points to an object and belies the 
predicative nature of a concept. It would be better to confine ourselves to saying ‘what 
the concept word A means’, for this at any rate is to be used predicatively: ‘Jesus is, 
what the concept word “man” means’ in the sense of ‘Jesus is a man’.177 
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Both ‘the referent of the concept-word “man”’ and ‘the concept man’ point to an 
object: since they are introduced by the definite article, they cannot perform their 
intended predicative role. Therefore, they cannot stand for a concept, and a fortiori 
cannot stand for the concept man. But an expression such as ‘what the concept-word “ ” 
stands for’ can stand for a concept since it can occur predicatively, even if not quite 
idiomatically. Geach summarizes Frege’s way out of Kerry’s paradox well. 
 
The result of inserting an English expression in the blank between the quotes in the 
context: ‘what “   ” stands for’, will stand for, bedeuten, whatever that very English 
expression stands for […].178 
 
Thus ‘what “man” stands for’ will stand for the concept man since it has that 
essentially predicative behaviour that ‘the concept man’ lacks: the former is a predicate 
while the latter a proper name. The sentence ‘Jesus is what “man” stands for’ (namely, a 
man) is perhaps not quite idiomatic, but it nevertheless involves no logical error. 
Note that the sentence ‘What “man” stands for is a concept’ must now be ruled 
out as ill-formed. If it were well-formed, ‘What “man” stands for’ would have to be a 
proper name, which is it not, since ‘ξ is a concept’ would be a first-level predicate, 
which it cannot be. 
Indeed, as Dummett writes, one of the reasons for construing ‘ξ is a concept’ as 
the name of a first-level function lies in an illegitimate analogy between expressions 
formed from the context ‘what “   ” stands for’ out of concept-words, and expressions 
formed from the same context out of proper names.179 The phrase ‘what “Mount 
Everest” stands for’ stands for what ‘Mount Everest’ stands for, i.e. Mount Everest. The 
former is a singular term precisely because it is completely interchangeable with the 
latter. So we can equally well say that Mount Everest is the highest peak in the world, or 
that what ‘Mount Everest’ stands for is the highest peak in the world. 
By analogy, it might be tempting to think of ‘what “ξ is a horse” stands for’ as a 
singular term too. But as soon as we apply the test of interchangeability salva 
congruitate, we can see that the analogy would have led us astray. For ‘what “ξ is a 
horse” stands for’ is completely interchangeable with ‘ξ is a horse’ precisely because it 
is not a singular term: both may behave predicatively, and so do. But only if ‘what “ξ is 
a horse” stands for’ were a singular term could ‘ξ is a concept’ be a first-level predicate 
and ‘What “horse” stands for is a concept’ well-formed. Since ‘What “horse” stands for 
is a concept’ is ill-formed, so is its negation, ‘What “horse” stands for is not a concept’. 
Kerry’s paradox can thus be declared nonsense, since (4), (5) and (6) above are 
false. 
There must be, however, a means to say of a particular concept that it is a 
concept. What is needed is the name of a function whose argument-place should always 
be filled by first-level predicates, that is, a second-level substitute for ‘ξ is a concept’. 
As Dummett suggests, 
 
we can construct an expression of natural language which represents a second-level 
predicate, by containing a gap intended to be filled by a predicative expression, and 
which, when the gap is thus filled, will always yield a true sentence. A particularly 
suitable expression would be ‘… is something which everything either is or is not’: the 
gap is intended to be filled by a predicative expression, and the resulting sentence will 
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then say that the generalized law of excluded middle holds for the corresponding 
concept.180 
 
Indeed the second-level concept 
 
(∀x) [Φ(x) ∨ ¬ Φ(x)] 
 
maps every concept onto the True, and so ‘Φ is what everything either is or is not’ is a 
suitable replacement for ‘ξ is a concept’. 
Thus instead of saying agrammatically ‘The concept horse is a concept’ or 
‘What “ξ is a horse” stands for is a concept’, we can legitimately say ‘What “ξ is a 
horse” stands for is something which everything either is or is not’; symbolically, 
 
(∀x) [Horse(x) ∨ ¬ Horse(x)]. 
 
Note that if we now tried to state the negation of ‘What “ξ is a horse” stands for 
is something which everything either is or is not’ we would not arrive at a version of the 
paradoxical ‘The concept horse is not a concept’. In its stead, we would have rather 
‘(∃x) [¬Horse(x) ∧ Horse(x)]’, that is ‘Something is both a horse and not’, which is an 
outright, non-paradoxical contradiction. 
The same holds of course of relations and functions in general. 
Now, as Geach says, “Frege thus escapes checkmate at this move: but at the next 
move there will be a check not so easily escaped.”181 To adapt Geach’s example, we 
could wish and try, in full accordance with Frege’s doctrine, to assert, say, that Brutus is 
not a concept, but an object. But if we say that what ‘Brutus’ stands for is not what ‘ξ 
killed Caesar’ stands for, what we get is at best the negation of ‘Brutus killed Caesar’; 
never, as perhaps intended, that Brutus is not the concept killed Caesar. A sentence such 
as ‘What “Brutus” stands for is not identical with what “killed Caesar” stands for’ is 
nonsense, as it is equivalent to ‘Brutus is not identical with killed Caesar’. 
Indeed the predicate ‘Φ is what everything either is or is not’ is not entirely 
analogous with ‘ξ is a concept’. The latter would be true of every concept if it were not 
a pseudo-predicate; but it would also be false of every object. But since ‘Φ is what 
everything either is or is not’ is second-level, it cannot apply to objects at all. Any 
attempt to say of a particular object that it is not a concept is therefore doomed to fail, 
since, in general, no name of a second-level function has argument-places of the 
appropriate type. ‘Jesus is not a concept’ is the negation of ‘Jesus is a concept’; so in 
order for the former to be (necessarily) true the latter would have to be (necessarily) 
false. But ‘Jesus is a concept’ is not contradictory but ill-formed. The proper name 
‘Jesus’ cannot occupy the argument-place of ‘Φ is what everything either is or is not’. 
We can perhaps render ‘Jesus is what everything either is or is not’ as 
 
(∀x) [Jesus=x ∨ ¬ Jesus=x] 
 
but what this means is not that Jesus is a concept, but that the concept being identical 
with Jesus is a concept. It is the concept-word ‘ξ=Jesus’, not the proper name ‘Jesus’, 
that fits the argument-place. 
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By the same token, we cannot say of a concept that it is not an object. To assert 
that man is not an object is to deny that man is an object. But again ‘What “ξ is a man” 
stands for is an object’ is not contradictory but ill-formed. The concept ξ is an object 
maps every object onto the true. It is therefore a first-level concept; a suitable name for 
it might perhaps be the complex predicate ‘∃x x = ξ’. But such predicate contains no 
argument-place for concept-words; the argument of a first-level concept cannot be a 
concept. If we inserted ‘man’ into the argument place of ‘ξ is an object’, what we would 
be doing would be to substitute the concept-word ‘ζ = ξ’ with ‘ξ is a man’, and get 
 
∃x Man(x). 
 
But what the latter means is that the concept man is not empty, not that the concept man 
is an object. ‘Man is an object’ should therefore be glossed as ‘Some object is a man’. 
The phenomenon is of course general. As Geach observes, any attempt to state 
category-differences in a well-constructed symbolism such as Frege’s must fail.182 
Frege acknowledges as much: 
 
In the proposition ‘Something is an object’, the word ‘something’ takes an argument 
place of the first kind and stands for a proper name. Thus whatever we put in place of 
‘something’, we always get a true proposition; for a function name cannot take the place 
of ‘something’. […] Just as in language we cannot properly speaking say of a function 
that it is not an object, so we cannot use language to say of an object […] that it is not a 
function.183 
 
So, in a sense, if not Kerry’s paradox, then the inexpressibility of some thoughts 
must be, as Frege said, shifted but not avoided. 
 
2.3.2 “On Concept and Object”, footnote 8 
 
Now if Geach’s doctrine that predicates are not “quotable bits of language” but 
linguistic functions is right, then there is a more straightforward sense in which Kerry’s 
paradox can only be shifted. Whenever it is a concept-word that fills the blank in the 
context 
 
What ‘   ’ stands for, 
 
then it is not quite the expression that is enclosed within the quotation marks that stands 
for a concept as intended, but rather the function that is indicated by it. We can as little 
refer to incomplete expressions as we can refer to unsaturated entities, since incomplete 
expressions are themselves unsaturated. Indeed ‘ξ is a horse’ and ‘ξ is a man’ are no 
less functions – linguistic functions – than their referents. Therefore the same “linguistic 
awkwardness” is necessarily present in Frege’s own solution to Kerry’s paradox. 
Geach suspects that Frege foresaw the “reduplication on the linguistic level of 
[his] difficulties about the concept man.”184 In a note to “On Concept and Object”, 
Frege wrote, concerning the sentence ‘The concept horse is not a concept’, that 
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A similar thing happens when we say as regards the sentence ‘this rose is red’: The 
grammatical predicate ‘is red’ belongs to the subject ‘this rose’. Here the words, ‘The 
grammatical predicate “is red”’ are not a grammatical predicate but a subject. By the 
very act of explicitly calling it a predicate, we deprive it of this property.185 
 
For a seeming reconstruction of Kerry’s paradox on the linguistic level, suppose 
that the ‘the predicate “ξ is red”’ is a non-empty proper name, which it must be by 
Frege’s criterion. Suppose also that ‘ξ is a predicate’ stands for a first-level concept that 
maps any proper name onto the False. Therefore, ‘the predicate “ξ is red” is a predicate’ 
must be false, which entails that ‘the predicate “ξ is red” is not a predicate’ must be 
true. 
Now in reality this argument is mere sophistry, as it rests on a confusion 
between use and mention. Unlike ‘ξ is a concept’, ‘ξ is a predicate’ operates on proper 
names, not on their referents. Therefore, the suitable candidate for filling its argument-
place is not the predicate ‘ξ is red’, but the phrase ‘the predicate “ξ is red”’. Hence the 
conclusion of the argument should rather be that the sentence ‘“the predicate ‘ξ is red’” 
is not a predicate’ is true, which it is. 
Thus has Dummett accurately observed that Frege’s footnote is ambiguous 
between claiming that the predicate ‘ξ is red’ is not a predicate – which is 
straightforwardly false –, and claiming that ‘the predicate “ξ is red”’ is not a predicate, 
which is straightforwardly true.186 But either way, there is no paradox whatsoever. The 
formal mode should have presented no difficulties for Frege. 
 
There is no more paradox in the fact that the expression ‘the grammatical predicate “is 
red’” is not a grammatical predicate than there is in the fact that the phrase ‘the city of 
Berlin’ is not a city. In the material mode of speech Frege was forced into such at least 
superficially contradictory expressions as ‘The concept horse is not a concept’ […], but 
when we are talking about expressions, then we have no motive for denying the obvious 
fact that the predicate ‘is a horse’ is a predicate, nor for affirming the obvious falsehood 
that the phrase ‘the predicate “is a horse”’ is a predicate.187 
 
Accordingly, Geach too admitted that Frege “slightly muddied the water” in his 
footnote.188 It is irrelevant that the phrase ‘the grammatical predicate “is red”’ is a 
grammatical subject. What is relevant is that ‘is red’ is in this context not identifiable as 
a logical predicate, i.e. as a linguistic function, because here it can only occur as a 
logical subject, i.e. as a proper name. In other words, in the context ‘the predicate “ξ is 
red”’, the predicate lacks the essentially predicative behaviour that allows it to stand for 
a concept. 
More precisely, the term-forming operator ‘the predicate ξ’ must be construed as 
a function that takes predicates as arguments and yields their proper names (by Frege’s 
criterion) as values. Now, if predicates were objects (which they would be if they were 
bare expressions), then the arguments of ‘the predicate ξ’ would be objects that could be 
non-problematically denoted by its values. But suppose that predicates are linguistic 
functions. Then the values of ‘the predicate ξ’ cannot refer to them, since they must be 
proper names, and so cannot name functions. As we have seen, no functions are objects, 
and all and only proper names denote objects. 
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Geach draws an interesting general lesson from this sort of cases: “Once again 
we see the futility of trying to escape Frege’s difficulties by semantic ascent, by talking 
about words instead of the objects and concepts signified.”189 Geach had written that 
 
Language, after all, is not something set over against the whole world, like the Divine 
Mind; languages are part of the world, linguistic facts and structures are facts and 
structures in the world. This sets a limit to the usefulness of semantic ascent in solving 
philosophical problems. We cannot solve the problem of universals by talking about the 
word ‘pig’ instead of Jones’s pigs; for there is exactly the same problem about the 
relation of the word ‘pig’ to its tokens as there is about the relation of The Pig to Jones’s 
pigs.190 
 
The inability to refer to the concept horse cannot be resolved by talking about 
the predicate ‘ξ is a horse’, because the predicate is itself a linguistic function, and it 
was the attempt to talk about functions that generated the paradox in the first place. 
Alex Oliver disagrees with both Geach’s and Dummett’s readings of Frege’s 
footnote. The footnote occurs in the following text: 
 
It must indeed by recognized that here we are confronted by an awkwardness of 
language, which I admit cannot be avoided, if we say that the concept horse is not a 
concept,* whereas, e.g., the city of Berlin is a city, and the volcano Vesuvius is a 
volcano. Language is here in a predicament that justifies the departure from custom. 
The peculiarity of our case is indicated by Kerry himself, by means of the quotation-
marks around ‘horse’; I use italics to the same end. There was no reason to mark out the 
words ‘Berlin’ and ‘Vesuvius’ in a similar way. In logical discussions one quite often 
needs to say something about a concept, and to express this in the form usual for such 
predications – viz. to make what is said about the concept into the content of the 
grammatical predicate. Consequently, one would expect that what is meant by the 
grammatical subject would be the concept; but the concept as such cannot play this part, 
in view of its predicative nature; it must first be converted into an object, or, more 
precisely, an object must go proxy for it. We designate this object by prefixing the 
words ‘the concept’; e.g.: ‘The concept man is not empty’.191 
 
Oliver suggests that Frege is not comparing the sentences ‘The concept horse is 
not a concept’ and ‘“the predicate ‘is red’” is not a predicate’ on the one hand, with 
‘The city of Berlin is a city’ and ‘The volcano Vesuvius is a volcano’ on the other. 
Rather, he is comparing the proper names ‘the concept horse’ and ‘the grammatical 
predicate “is red”’ with ‘the city of Berlin’ and ‘the volcano Vesuvius’.192 
The relevant feature of the comparison is that while the term-forming operators 
‘the city of …’ and ‘the volcano …’ produce definite descriptions that stand for the 
exact same referents as their arguments, such is not the case with ‘the concept …’ and 
‘the predicate …’. The definite description ‘the city of Berlin’ stands for what ‘Berlin’ 
stands for; and ‘the volcano Vesuvius’ for what ‘Vesuvius’ stands for. But the definite 
description ‘the concept horse’ stands, not for what ‘ξ is a horse’ does, which is a 
concept, but for an object; while ‘the grammatical predicate “is red”’ stands, not for 
what ‘ξ is red’ does, but for the predicate ‘ξ is red’ itself. 
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This “shift” from what the arguments stand for to what the corresponding 
definite descriptions stand for is marked by the use of italics in the word ‘horse’ and of 
quotation marks around ‘is red’. But as Frege says, there is no need to mark out the 
words ‘Berlin’ or ‘Vesuvius’ in the same way, since no such shift occurs. 
Therefore, under Oliver’s reading, it is not the case that by using the phrase ‘the 
predicate “ξ is red”’ one thereby fails to refer to the predicate ‘ξ is red’, pace Geach. In 
this respect, ‘the predicate “ξ is red”’ differs from ‘the concept horse’. A definite 
description may refer to a predicate, though not to a concept, because only the latter is a 
Fregean function. This is fine for Oliver, since, according to him, Fregean predicates are 
merely plain expressions with empty places, not linguistic functions, and so Fregean 
objects. 
If such is Frege’s intended contrast, then the footnote should be read simply as 
an attempt to make the case of ‘the concept horse’ more palatable, by contrasting it with 
a more familiar case in which something similar already happens. When Frege says that 
“by the very act of calling it a predicate, we deprive it of this property” he means to 
assert neither that the predicate ‘ξ is red’ is not a predicate, nor that ‘the predicate “ξ is 
red”’ is not a predicate. He just means that the concept-word ‘ξ is red’, which ordinarily 
stands for a concept, now becomes part of the proper name ‘the predicate “ξ is red”’, 
which stands for the concept-word itself. 
As we have seen, the features that generate the paradox are (i) the absolute 
distinction between function and object; (ii) the absolute distinction between proper and 
function-names; (iii) Frege’s criterion that the definite article introduces a proper name. 
Frege achieves his strategy by holding on to (ii) and (iii), claiming that on the linguistic 
case, something similar already happens as regards these. What is peculiar about the 
non-linguistic case is that, besides, we cannot really refer to what we intend to. 
To summarize, on Geach’s reading of the footnote, the “similarity” noted by 
Frege between the concept horse and the predicate ‘ξ is red’ is that both are functions, 
and cannot therefore be denoted by proper names. On Dummett’s reading, Frege does 
note a similarity, but an incorrect one, since neither ‘the predicate “ξ is red” is not a 
predicate’ nor ‘“the predicate ‘ξ is red’” is not a predicate’ are at all paradoxical. 
According to Oliver, Frege notes only that definite descriptions constructed out of the 
term-forming operator ‘the predicate …’ do not stand for the referents of the concept-
words that fill its argument place. Such is the case also with ‘the concept …’, but only 
the latter leads to a paradoxical result, since only concepts, not their signs, are functions. 
 
2.3.3 Could function signs be objects? 
 
Oliver finds confirmation for his view that concept-words are for Frege Fregean objects 
in a letter from Frege to Russell. 
Russell had expressed a “philosophical difficulty” with Frege’s view that “a 
function name can never take the place of a proper name”: according to Russell, that 
view is self-contradictory, 
 
For ‘ξ can never take the place of a proper name’ is a false proposition if ξ is a proper 
name, but otherwise it is not a proposition at all.193 
 
Frege’s answer to Russell implies that function names are objects, because they 
can be denoted by proper names. 
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According to Frege, Russell’s conclusion that ‘ξ can never take the place of a 
proper name’ is not a proposition at all if ξ is not a proper name involves a confusion 
between use and mention. In the quoted sentence, ‘ξ’ ranges over linguistic items: 
proper- and function names. If ξ is a proper name, the sentence is indeed always false, 
since proper names can take the place of proper names. But if ξ is a function name, the 
sentence is not only meaningful, but true. It would be meaningless only if ξ were 
replaced with what the concept-word stood for. As Frege writes, “it is correct to say: If 
‘ξ’ is not a proper name, then ‘ξ can never take the place of a proper name’ is not a 
proposition.” That is, if ‘ξ’ is not a proper name, then ξ is a function, and ‘ξ can never 
take the place of a proper name’ must be meaningless because it involves a first-level 
predicate. 
 
Here ‘“(  ). 3 + 4”’ – with two sets of quotation marks – takes the place of ‘ξ’. While    
‘(  ). 3 + 4’ is a function name, ‘“(  ). 3 + 4”’ is a proper name, and its meaning is the 
function name ‘(  ). 3 + 4’. […] Here we find ourselves in a situation where the nature 
of language forces us to make use of imprecise expressions. The proposition ‘A is a 
function’ is such an expression: it is always imprecise; for ‘A’ stands for a proper name. 
The concept of a function must be a second-level concept, whereas in language it 
always appears as a first-level concept. […] Instead of using the imprecise expression ‘ξ 
is a function’, we can say: ‘“(  ). 3 + 4” is a function name’.194 
 
Thus Frege explicitly recognized not only that concept-words could be denoted 
by proper names, but also that ‘ξ is function-name’ stands for a first-level concept. It 
follows from either, singly, that predicates are objects, as Oliver contended. 
There is, however, a strong reason to resist such a conclusion. 
First, though, it should be stressed once again that to solve Kerry’s paradox via 
semantic ascent is only a partial solution of the paradox anyway. We can choose to say 
that ‘ξ is a man’ is a concept-word instead of ‘the concept man is a concept’, just as we 
can say that ‘Jesus’ is a proper name. But although we can say that ‘Jesus’ stands for 
something, we strictly cannot say that ‘ξ is a man’ stands for something, 
 
for a function name cannot take the place of ‘something’. […] We cannot properly say 
of a concept name that it means something; but we can say that it is not meaningless. It 
is clear that function signs or concept names are indispensable. But if we admit this, we 
must also admit that there are some that are not meaningless, even though, strictly 
speaking, the expression ‘the meaning of a function name’ must not be used.195 
 
This amounts to the observation that there cannot be a single relation of 
denotation. The relation that obtains between proper names and their bearers is a 
relation between objects. But the relation that obtains between function names and what 
they stand for must either be a unequal-level function if function names are objects, or a 
second-level relation between functions if function names are functions. And the same 
holds for third-level functions and their names. As a consequence, thoughts such as that 
no proper name stands for what a concept-word stands for are as inexpressible as that no 
object is a concept. 
It is true that the doctrine of linguistic functions would entail a linguistic version 
of Kerry’s paradox if it were true. The textual evidence does appear to count against 
Geach’s supposition that Frege foresaw the reduplication of the paradox on the 
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linguistic level. Oliver appears to discharge the modus tollens and conclude that Frege 
did not endorse the view that predicates are linguistic functions. But this move is 
actually reckless. It appears to neglect that it is not only that the doctrine of linguistic 
functions entails the linguistic version of Kerry’s paradox: it is also that doctrine that 
entails Kerry’s paradox in the first place. It is the fact that predicates are functions that 
explains why all and only proper names denote objects and all and only function names 
stand for functions. Without the doctrine of linguistic functions, both Frege’s criterion 
that the definite article introduces an expression that must stand for an object, and his 
insistence that proper names cannot denote functions are left completely unaccounted 
for. 
 
Summary 
 
Geach’s doctrine of linguistic functions provides a solution to the problem of sentential 
unity. Now, from the standpoint of Fregean exegesis, that proves, of course, nothing. 
Perhaps Frege had no solution to the problem at all, or had only a mediocre one. As 
Oliver notes, if he is right that Frege’s function-names are merely “plain expressions 
with empty places”, ‘incompleteness’ simply meaning different things when applied 
now to referents, now to expressions, then there is no role for the notion of saturation to 
play in the solution to the problem of sentential unity.196 
Kerry’s paradox is generated by the fact that proper names cannot denote 
functions. Since this is entailed by the doctrine of linguistic functions, the latter can be 
conceived as explaining or justifying the paradox. 
If predicates are linguistic functions, then they are unsaturated, and so Kerry’s 
paradox is reduplicated on the level of language. It is likely that Oliver is right when, 
against Geach, he argues that Frege did not foresee this phenomenon. However, the 
sensible conclusion to draw is not that predicates cannot be linguistic functions for 
Frege, but that Frege did not recognize the full consequences of such a doctrine, 
namely, (i) that predicates cannot be named by proper names; (ii) that Kerry’s paradox 
reappears on the linguistic level. Otherwise, we are left with no explanation of why 
Frege would have been led to consider the paradox in the first place. I am led to believe 
that Oliver neglected that the doctrine of linguistic functions entails Kerry’s paradox. 
 
                                                 
196
 Oliver 2010: 145-7. 
 
 71
3 Are the senses of predicates functions? 
 
I present the problem of the unity of thought by analogy with the problem that generates 
Bradley’s regress, i.e. the unity of object and concept. The reason is simple enough. 
Geach’s solution to the first reproduces Frege’s solution to the second. 
I agree with Dummett that Geach’s view that the senses of predicates are 
functions from senses to senses leads to intolerable results. I resist Dummett’s 
conclusion that the senses of incomplete expressions must therefore be objects. I 
introduce Dejnožka’s reasons for believing that, for Frege, senses are neither objects nor 
functions. Unlike Dejnožka, I conclude that the problem of the unity of thought is either 
redundant or inexistent. 
 
3.1 Bradley’s regress 
 
A famous argument due to F. H. Bradley purports to show that either universals and 
relations are unreal, or analysis is deceptive. 
Consider a simple sentence of the form ‘Fa’. ‘Fa’ says that a is F. We naturally 
analyse the thought that Fa into the object a and the property F: we say that a has F. 
Now, if analysis is not deceptive, a and F are distinct entities: neither is eliminable nor 
somehow reducible to the other. But if a and F are distinct, then some relation other 
then identity must hold between them in virtue of which they relate to form the complex 
state of affairs that Fa. Let this relation be R. R could be for instance the relation of 
instantiation, so that ‘a has R to F’ reads ‘a instantiates F’ or ‘a falls under F’. 
Now the same question may of course be asked concerning the complex aRF: is 
R something different from a and F? If it is not, then R is not really an extra entity, and 
the complex aRF reduces to Fa; if it is, there must be some relation R' in virtue of 
which R holds between a and F so that the new complex may be formed. R' may be a 
third-place relation of instantiation. Again, the question may be repeated, a new relation 
R'' introduced, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, since to suppose that properties or 
universals are real leads to an infinite regress – “Bradley’s regress” –, one should 
conclude that they do not really exist, but must ultimately reduce to objects. 
A similar reasoning concerning sentences of the form aRb would show that 
relations are unreal, and in general that in sentences of any form only the objects 
mentioned are real. 
On the other hand, of course, one could think that it is analysis that is deceptive, 
and that the distinction between properties or relations and objects is, so to speak, a 
distinction only in thought. In reality, the proposition that Fa constitutes an indivisible 
whole only to be set apart by us beasts without judgement, and whose unity is an 
entirely internal affair. Thence Bradley’s absolute idealist conclusion according to 
which it is not possible to analyse a thought without somehow transforming or 
falsifying it. Bradley’s regress would haunt Moore and Russell for years, and greatly 
exercise Wittgenstein. 
Frege’s doctrine of unsaturation addresses the problem exposed by Bradley’s 
regress. Frege writes: 
 
Take the proposition ‘Two is a prime number’. […] the two parts of the proposition are 
[…] essentially different; and it is important to realize that this difference cuts very deep 
and must not be blurred. The first constituent, ‘two’, is a proper name of a certain 
number; it designates an object, a whole that no longer requires completion. The 
predicative constituent ‘is a prime number’, on the other hand, does require completion 
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and does not designate an object. I also call the first constituent saturated; the second, 
unsaturated. To this difference in the signs there of course corresponds an analogous 
one in the realm of [reference]: to the proper name there corresponds the object; to the 
predicative part, something I call a concept. This is not supposed to be a definition; for 
the decomposition into a saturated and an unsaturated part must be considered a 
logically primitive phenomenon which must simply be accepted and cannot be reduced 
to something simpler. I am well aware that expressions like ‘saturated’ and 
‘unsaturated’ are metaphorical and only serve to indicate what is meant – whereby one 
must always count on the co-operative understanding of the reader. Nevertheless, it may 
perhaps be made a little clearer why these parts must be different. An object, e.g. the 
number 2, cannot logically adhere to another object, e.g. Julius Caesar, without some 
means of connection. This, in turn, cannot be an object but rather must be unsaturated. 
A logical connection into a whole can come about only through this, that an 
unsaturated part is saturated or completed by one or more parts.197 
 
Frege expresses the problem of the unity of a complex such as Fa as the 
impossibility that two “complete” constituents may combine to form a whole. If the 
constituents of the complex Fa hold together at all, then one of them must be 
“unsaturated”. Frege has no need to require there to be a further relation between F and 
a. What “binds” them together is the (already) essentially predicative nature of the 
concept, or property, F. 
What is curious about Frege’s solution is that, like Bradley, he opts for holism; 
unlike Bradley, Frege retains the reliability of analysis. Functions, of which concepts 
and relations are a species, are not objects: if they are entities at all, they are not of the 
same rank as complete entities. Functions are essentially unsaturated: a metaphorical 
way to say that their nature is that of merely serving as links between objects. The fact 
that functions by themselves require completion is what explains that to ask for a further 
explanation of why a and F do not hold aloof of each other is in a sense to pose a 
spurious question.198 
 
3.2 The unity of thought 
 
Bradley’s regress concerns the Fregean realm of reference. But Frege expresses the 
problem of unity also in connection with the realm of sense: 
 
[…] not all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be “unsaturated”, 
or predicative; otherwise they would not hold together. For example, the sense of the 
phrase ‘the number 2’ does not hold together with that of the expression ‘the concept 
prime number’ without a link. We apply such a link in the sentence ‘the number 2 falls 
under the concept prime number’; it is contained in the words ‘falls under’, which need 
to be completed in two ways – by a subject and an accusative; and only because their 
sense is thus ‘unsaturated’ are they capable of serving as a link. Only when they have 
been supplemented in this twofold respect do we get a complete sense, a thought.199 
 
Even more explicitly, Frege writes: 
 
The complete part of a sentence I call a proper name, the unsaturated part a concept-
name. To the unsaturated part of the sentence there corresponds an unsaturated part of 
the thought and to the complete part of the sentence a complete part of the thought, and 
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we can also speak here of saturating the unsaturated part of the thought with a complete 
part.200 
 
The unity of the whole [compound thought] comes about through the fact that the 
thought saturates the unsaturated part or, as we can also say, completes the part needing 
completion.201 
 
Although Geach is not concerned “to defend Frege’s doctrine that senses are 
identifiable objects”,202 he suggests what might have been the latter’s solution to the 
problem of the unity of thought. The solution is simple enough, and merely reproduces 
Frege’s solution to Bradley’s regress on the realm of reference. The sense of a proper 
name is able to combine with the sense of a predicate to form a thought only because 
the latter is unsaturated, i.e. itself a function from senses to senses.203 
If Geach is right, then, a thought is to be identified with the value of a certain 
function – a sense-function204 or a thought-function205 – for a certain argument. A 
sense-function is the (incomplete) sense of a predicate, and takes (complete) senses of 
proper names as arguments and yields (complete) senses of sentences (thoughts) as 
values. Compound thoughts are the values of sense-functions from thoughts to thoughts. 
In this case, it is the senses of propositional connectives that are the sense-functions. 
Geach is aware that Frege’s talk of thoughts as having parts is an obstacle to his 
proposal, simply because neither arguments nor functions are parts of values of 
functions. However, for Geach the question is whether Frege should here “be imitated 
or only charitably expounded (as Aquinas says concerning the Fathers)”.206 Frege did 
stress that to apply the part-whole relation to thought is really only a metaphor: 
 
To be sure, we really talk figuratively when we transfer the relation of whole and part to 
thoughts; yet the analogy is so ready to hand and so generally appropriate that we are 
hardly even bothered by the hitches which occur from time to time.207 
 
Besides, Frege had already been misled by the same metaphor to the absurd 
conclusion that truth-values were wholes whose parts were concepts and objects, 
precisely on the ground that the former are values of concepts for objects as arguments: 
 
One might also say that judgements are distinctions of parts within truth-values.208 
 
Fortunately Frege came to retract from this bizarre doctrine: 
 
[…] corresponding to the whole-part relation of a thought and its parts we have, by and 
large, the same relation for the sentence and its parts. Things are different in the domain 
of [reference]. We cannot say that Sweden is a part of the capital of Sweden. The same 
object can be the [referent] of different expressions, and any one of them can have a 
sense different from any other.209 
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So just as Frege came to recognize explicitly that concepts and objects are not 
parts of truth-values, perhaps he should have – even if he actually did not – paid closer 
attention to the “hitches that occurred from time to time”, and come to the conclusion 
that the metaphor of parts and wholes was just as unfortunate in the case of senses as it 
was in the case of reference. 
In any case, nothing apparently stands in the way of our transferring to the realm 
of sense the model of functional combination that we find in the realm of reference. 
Geach’s overall account thus preserves a near perfect parallelism between language, 
senses, and references.210 On the level of reference we have functions (concepts or 
relations) from objects to truth-values; on the level of language we have linguistic 
functions from names to sentences; and on the level sense, sense-functions from name-
senses – to use Sullivan’s term211 – to thoughts. This picture accords well enough with 
Frege’s saying that “We can regard a sentence as a mapping of a thought”.212 
 
3.3 Dummett’s objections to Geach’s account 
 
In order to understand Dummett’s critique of Geach’s thesis that the senses of 
incomplete expressions are themselves incomplete, it is necessary to mention, if only 
superficially, at least some features of Frege’s theories of sense and reference. 
 
3.3.1 The theory of reference 
 
Frege’s theory of reference is a queer one. A reader caught off guard might simply 
jettison the idea that predicates refer to concepts and sentences to truth-values as typical 
philosophical superstition. This reaction is prompted by conceiving reference on the 
model of the relation that obtains between a proper name and its bearer. But it has long 
been Dummett’s contention, which I here take for granted, that Frege’s general notion 
of reference is best understood in terms of the notion of semantic role.213 
The semantic value of an expression is that which it contributes to the 
determination of the truth-value of a sentence. It basically corresponds to what 
expressions are assigned in an interpretation, in the sense of formal semantics: objects 
are assigned to names, sets to predicates and truth-values to sentences.214 The only 
difference between the modern account and Frege’s is that, for Frege, a set would be, 
not the semantic value of a predicate, but the value-range of its referent. The referents of 
predicates, as we have seen, have a peculiar nature.215 A predicate stands for a function, 
which is unsaturated; but the value-range of a function is an object. To what logicians 
nowadays call the reference, extension, interpretation or assignment of a predicate, 
Frege called the value-range of its referent; and he reserved the term ‘extension’ to the 
value-ranges of concepts alone. 
The bearer of a proper name coincides with its semantic value. For that reason, 
the conflation between both notions of reference in the case of proper names may pass 
unnoticed. On the other hand, there is intuitively no sense in which something may be 
the bearer of a predicate. Properties and concepts in the traditional sense rather 
correspond to what for Frege is the sense of a predicate. For some time, people doubted 
                                                 
210
 Geach 1976b: 440. 
211
 Sullivan 1992: 101. 
212
 Frege 1919: 255. 
213
 See for instance Dummett 1973: chapters 5, 6 and 7, from which I draw. 
214
 Dummett 1973: 89-90. 
215
 Dummett 1973: 173. 
 75
whether predicates stood for anything, or whether a distinction between sense and 
reference applied to predicates at all. But such doubts disappear under the notion of 
reference as semantic role. Still, as Dummett says, it is the analogy with reference as 
modelled on the name/bearer relation that lends Frege’s outlook its “realist flavour”, 
and second-order quantification bears testimony to it. 
Similar doubts arise in the case of sentences, although sentences have sometimes 
been misleadingly taken to stand for, say, facts. Under the notion of reference as 
semantic role, the view that sentences stand for truth-values is again quite unperplexing. 
However, Frege did here misconstrue the relation between sentences and their referents 
as the name/bearer relation. Truth-values were for him logical objects, and sentences 
only a kind of complex proper names. 
 
3.3.2 The theory of indirect reference 
 
Frege’s theory of sense can be only superficially understood if one does not conceive of 
reference as semantic role. 
If one only thinks of reference as modelled upon the name/bearer relation, there 
is nothing particularly innovative in the fact that expressions may have a sense besides 
having a reference. That two words with different meanings may refer to the same thing 
is a common sense observation. 
It is only because the truth-values of sentences that report speech cannot be 
functions of the referents of expressions that the notion of sense becomes relevant to 
logic. That is to say that in oratio obliqua, the semantic value of an expression is not its 
ordinary reference. Frege calls the semantic value of an expression in oratio obliqua its 
indirect reference. In the case proper names, indirect reference appears to be the manner 
in which an object is presented to a speaker. To the mode of presentation of an object, 
Frege calls the sense of a proper name. The distinction between sense and reference is 
relevant only because it has a role to play in the explanation of the truth-conditions of 
sentences which involve oratio obliqua. Frege’s theory has no application to intensional 
contexts other than indirect discourse, pace Kripke. 
It is the theory of indirect reference that justifies the significance of sense to 
logic. But Dummett is certainly right to say that Frege’s theory of indirect reference 
presupposes a prior distinction between sense and reference, and so that Frege’s theory 
of sense cannot be simply reduced to his theory of indirect reference.216 
 
3.3.3 The theory of sense 
 
The theory of reference stipulates the association between expressions and their 
referents or values. It is the theory of sense that provides an account of how such 
correlation is established.217 
The sense of a word is thus a means the knowledge of which is sufficient for 
identifying a particular item as its referent. To know such a means is to grasp the sense 
of the word. The same referent may of course become associated with different words 
by different means: and so different words may have different senses and yet the same 
reference. 
The thesis that sense determines reference is in general stronger than merely that 
expressions with the same sense cannot have different referents; or contrapositively, that 
expressions with different referents must have different senses; or that sense supervenes 
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on reference. In general, the sense of an expression is a condition that something must 
satisfy in order to be recognized as its referent. 
Frege certainly held the stronger thesis concerning proper names and sentences. 
The sense of a proper name is the mode of presentation of its referent.218 A mode of 
presentation of an object is a way in which it may be identified as the referent of the 
proper name whose bearer it is. To grasp the sense of a proper name is thus to grasp a 
condition that an object must satisfy in order to be identified as the referent of the name. 
A thought is the truth-condition of a sentence, i.e. the condition that must obtain 
in order for the sentence that expresses it to be true.219 So too can the sense of a 
sentence be conceived as a condition for determining its referent, i.e. its truth-value. 
 
3.3.4 The truth-condition of sentences 
 
Frege was never as explicit about the senses of predicates. But if the semantic role of an 
expression is its referent, and if the sense of a sentence is its truth-condition, then the 
strong reading of the thesis that sense determines reference must hold for predicates too. 
To say that the sense of a sentence is its truth-condition is to say that it is the 
condition that must obtain for the sentence to be true. What satisfies this condition is the 
referent of a proper name: the thought is true if the object denoted by the proper name 
falls under the concept denoted by the predicate. But the condition that must be met is 
precisely given by the sense of the predicate: its criterion of application is the condition 
that an object must satisfy for the predicate to apply to it with truth. And so the sense of 
a predicate determines a division between objects, i.e. a mapping from objects to truth-
values, that is, a concept. It is the sense of the predicate that gives the truth-condition of 
the sentence. 
Again, the sense of ‘Fa’ is the condition that a must satisfy in order to fall under 
F. But that condition is the criterion of application of ‘F’, i.e. the sense of the predicate: 
the condition that a must satisfy in order to be mapped onto the True. And so, by being 
the condition of the truth of the sentence, the sense of the predicate determines a 
mapping from objects to truth-values, i.e. a concept. 
Now if, as Geach contends, the sense of a predicate is a function, then we are 
unable to say the condition of the truth of the sentence is the sense of the predicate. On 
Geach’s view the latter is a function from the senses of names to thoughts. Therefore, if 
the truth-condition of the sentence were the sense of the predicate, it would have to be a 
condition satisfied by the sense, not the referent, of a proper name.220 But we cannot 
specify what such a condition may be beyond vaguely claiming that it is that condition 
which yields a thought for the sense of a name as argument. 
Dummett’s diagnosis is that what is wrong with Geach’s account is that it entails 
that it is the sense, rather than the reference, of a proper name that constitutes its 
semantic role. It is as if the semantic role of proper names were, in ordinary contexts, 
their indirect reference. On Geach’s conception, the referent of a proper name is left out 
of the account once it is identified as given by the sense of the proper name, whereas in 
fact it is the reverse that is the case.221 It is the sense of the proper name that is left out 
of the account of the truth-condition of the sentence as soon as its referent is given. The 
truth-condition is then determined as a condition on the referent, not on the sense, of the 
proper name. 
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To be fair to Geach, it is not clear that he has in mind the criterion of application 
of a predicate when he speaks of its sense as unsaturated.222 However, Peter Sullivan 
has tried to answer Dummett’s challenge on Geach’s behalf under that assumption. 
According to Sullivan, there is a simple response to Dummett’s critique. 
Dummett is unable to see that to carry the sense of a name to a thought is thereby to 
carry its referent onto a truth-value, since the sense of a name determines its referent. 
Sullivan writes: 
 
It is certainly true that the sense of a predicate, conceived as a function, must “carry us 
from” the sense of a name to a thought: it must, that is, given some condition that an 
object must meet to be the referent of the name, yield the condition for a sentence 
containing the name to be true. But now what meets this description, what will carry us 
from the first to the second, is precisely a condition which the selected object may or 
may not meet.223 
 
Sullivan’s intention is clear. He asserts the identity of Geach’s sense-function 
with the condition of truth of the sentence. The problem is that it is hard to see exactly 
how that can be done. Note that Dummett had not denied the existence of a function as 
the one defined by Geach. What he objected was precisely to the identification of such a 
function with the sense of a predicate.224 The sense of a proper name does determine its 
referent; and the latter satisfies the truth-condition of the sentence if the sentence is true; 
and that truth-condition is the sense of the predicate; and once this is in order, a 
mapping from the sense of the name to the thought is determined. But it is not at all 
clear how the truth-condition can be such a mapping, and Sullivan does not go much 
further in clarifying the issue. 
In any case, what must not go unnoticed is that neither Geach nor Dummett 
advance substantive or independent arguments for his views. In particular, Dummett 
concludes that the senses of predicates must be objects only because they cannot be 
functions. In his turn, Geach does not advertise for the virtues of a doctrine according to 
which the senses of proper names are objects. He concludes that the senses of functions 
are functions only because some part of a thought must be unsaturated. 
But of course that it would not follow that the senses of predicates were objects 
(or functions) if they were not functions (or objects), if they were neither. 
 
3.4 Dejnožka on sense and object 
 
Jan Dejnožka has argued on a scholarly basis that it is not true in general that, for Frege, 
anything is either a function or an object, precisely because senses are neither objects 
nor functions. 
Dejnožka states his point primarily against Dummett. That senses are objects, 
Dummett quite simply claims, follows from the fact that they may be referred to by 
proper names and definite descriptions. Dejnožka’s strategy has a negative part and a 
positive one. First, he shows that whenever Frege states his criteria for an expression to 
denote an object, i.e. being a proper name or a definite description, the context restricts 
the domain to ordinary (or customary, or direct) reference. Second, Dejnožka shows that 
Frege opposes explicitly objects to senses. 
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3.4.1 Customary and indirect reference 
 
It is apparently to a thought that we refer by the name ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem’, and in 
general to the sense of any expression ‘A’ by a definite description formed by ‘the sense 
of ξ’, such as ‘the sense of “A”’. Frege writes that 
 
the three words ‘the concept “horse”’ do designate an object, but on that very account 
they do not designate a concept, as I am using the word. This is in full accord with the 
criterion I gave - that the singular definite article always indicates an object, whereas 
the indefinite article accompanies a concept-word.225 
 
It would appear, therefore, that, given Frege’s criterion, ‘the sense of “A”’ must 
indicate an object too. But Dejnožka notes that the context of the quoted text is perfectly 
circumscribed to the realm of “ordinary reference”, which includes objects and 
functions, and nothing else. A few lines before, Frege had made a reference to “On 
Sense and Reference” only to identify his use of the term ‘reference’ in the sentence 
‘The meaning of this word [Venus] is thus something that can never occur as a concept, 
but only as an object.’ Thus Frege appears to be opposing only concepts and objects, on 
that the use of the definite article can never indicate a concept. 
As Dejnožka observes, Frege never speaks of sense at all until much later in “On 
Concept and Object”, immediately prior to his reintroduction of the distinction between 
concept and object. 
 
A concept is the reference of a predicate; an object is something that can never be the 
whole reference of a predicate, but can be the reference of a subject.226 
 
The implication would be that the distinction between concepts and objects 
applies only to the realm of (ordinary) reference, as opposed to sense. 
Concerning the reference of ‘the sense of “A”’, Frege writes: 
 
In order to speak of the sense of an expression ‘A’ one may simply use the phrase ‘the 
sense of the expression “A”’. In indirect speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of 
another person’s remarks. It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not 
have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense. In order to 
have a short expression, we will say: In indirect speech, words are used indirectly or 
have their indirect reference. We distinguish accordingly the customary from the 
indirect reference of a word; and its customary sense from its indirect sense. The 
indirect reference of a word is accordingly its customary sense.227 
 
Dejnožka remarks that Frege’s first sentence in this passage “is not an anomalous break 
in the discussion of reported speech, that is, is not an odd shift of topic to customary 
sense and customary reference.”228 So if the definite article always indicates an object 
only when customary reference is concerned, there is no implication from that to the 
fact that ‘The sense of an expression “A”’ should refer to an object, since the latter 
concerns only indirect reference. 
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In other words, I think this sentence indicates an exception to Frege’s rule that 
expressions beginning with the singular definite article refer to objects. The exception is 
precisely for reported speech, i.e., indirect quotation, which by definition refers to 
senses, as opposed to direct quotation, which refers to names. […] Dummett is right that 
singular definite descriptions of the form ‘the F’ customarily refer to objects, because 
customarily they logically function as object names. But if I am right, Frege classifies 
‘the sense of expression “A”’ as indirect quotation, and therefore it has no customary 
reference, but only an indirect reference, which is its sense. […] By parity of reason, 
‘the thought that A’ refers to a thought as opposed to an object.229 
 
Dejnožka’s “key text” in the positive part of his argument is the following: 
 
A truth-value cannot be a part of a thought, any more than, say, the Sun can, for it is not 
a sense but an object.230 
 
According to Dejnožka, this is the only time Frege ever addresses the question 
he is posing, namely whether senses are objects: and Frege implies that they are not. 
Besides, the “category exclusion” is indeed general: 
 
[Frege] does not say, “for it is not a sense but a truth-value.” He does not say, “for it is 
not a sense but an abstract object.” He does not say, “for it is not a sense but a 
customary object,” as if senses were objects after all – indirect objects. (Senses are, of 
course, indirect references; this is what indirect reference is all about.) He says, “for it is 
not a sense but an object.” And if no objects are senses, then no senses are objects.231 
 
It could of course be replied that this was one of the “slips of Frege’s pen”: but 
that would be rather arbitrary since, as Dejnožka notes, Frege writes what he does “in 
the paper on sense and reference.” 
Dejnožka reasons similarly not only for senses, but also for forces, ideas, and 
tones. According to him, none of these are able to function really as either objects or 
functions, and so can be neither. Dejnožka claims that Frege’s “dualism” between 
objects and functions is only “the tip of the iceberg” in his “linguistic turn”. If Dejnožka 
is right, Frege’s commitment to the latter lies indeed deeper, in a tie between 
ontological categories and linguistic functions more austere than even Dummett 
supposed.232 But we do not need to pursue such matters further here. 
 
3.4.2 Unsaturated senses 
 
Dejnožka too addresses the problem of the unity of thought. Senses are neither objects 
nor functions: still, some must be complete, and some incomplete. 
We have seen that Dummett concluded that complete and incomplete senses 
alike should be objects, because everything is either an object or a function, and no 
senses are functions. According to Dejnožka, this poses Dummett a dilemma. 
One is that Dummett faces a problem similar to Kerry’s paradox on the level of 
sense. Dummett is committed to the view that the definite description ‘the sense of the 
expression “A”’ stands for something complete. But if ‘A’ is an incomplete expression, 
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its sense is incomplete. Therefore ‘the sense of the expression “A”’, if ‘A’ is an 
incomplete expression, refers to a complete sense. Hence the paradox. 
Dummett would obviously remove the first difficulty by claiming that 
incomplete senses are not really incomplete, precisely because they are objects, not 
functions. But the second problem is that then no part of any thought is really 
incomplete either, so that no solution to the unity of thought is forthcoming. 
Dejnožka concedes that Frege recognizes the need for incomplete senses, and 
claims Dummett to be aware of the fact.233 But if incomplete senses are not really 
complete since they are objects, then they are not complete at all. What is worse, the 
incompleteness of functions (on the realm of reference) is derivative upon that of 
senses. It would then seem that, on Dummett’s account, functions could not be “really” 
incomplete either. 
Admittedly, Dejnožka does not face the reappearance of the problem of the 
concept horse on the level of sense, since he denies that the phrase ‘the sense of the 
expression “A”’ must refer to an object, and so to something complete. The definite 
description may thus refer to an incomplete sense whenever ‘A’ is an incomplete 
expression.234 
But the problem is that, since Dejnožka denies that senses may be functions, he 
has no substantial account to offer of what exactly is the difference between complete 
and incomplete senses. He even asserts that it is not modes of presentation that are 
incomplete: they are rather the complete constituents of incomplete senses.235 But then 
incomplete senses just are whatever they must be in order for a thought to be unified. 
This makes Dejnožka’s doctrine devoid of any intuitive appeal. 
 
3.5 Much ado about nothing 
 
I want to argue that the problem of the unity of thought is no other than either Bradley’s 
regress, or that of sentential unity. 
Frege writes: 
 
For not all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be “unsaturated”, or 
predicative; otherwise they would not hold together.236 
 
The first sentence makes plain that at least one “part” of a thought must be 
unsaturated. Now, that thoughts have parts, we already know, is only a metaphor. 
 
For example, the sense of the phrase ‘the number 2’ does not hold together with that of 
the expression ‘the concept prime number’ without a link. We apply such a link in the 
sentence ‘the number 2 falls under the concept prime number’; it is contained in the 
words ‘falls under’, which need to be completed in two ways – by a subject and an 
accusative; and only because their sense is thus “unsaturated” are they capable of 
serving as a link. Only when they have been supplemented in this twofold respect do we 
get a complete sense, a thought. 
 
We now learn that the sense of proper names cannot be linked without the sense 
of a predicative part, for instance given by the predicate ‘falls under’. But what it means 
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for the sense of ‘falls under’ to be “thus unsaturated” is that the words need to be 
completed in two ways: by a nominative and an accusative. This is just to say that ‘falls 
under’ is a linguistic function in the sense of Geach. A thought arises only when the 
words have been completed in this manner. This means that only sentences – i.e. not 
lists of words – are able to express thoughts. Thus far, then, the problem of the unity of 
thought is no other than the problem sentential unity. To say that a part of a thought 
must be unsaturated is glossed as that any sentence that is able to express a thought 
must involve a linguistic function. 
 
I say that what such words or phrases stand for is a relation. We now get the same 
difficulty for the relation that we were trying to avoid for the concept. For the words 
‘the relation of an object to the concept it falls under’ designate not a relation but an 
object; and the three proper names ‘the number 2’, ‘the concept prime number’, ‘the 
relation of an object to a concept it falls under’, hold aloof from one another just as 
much as the first two do by themselves; however we put them together, we get no 
sentence. It is thus easy for us to see that the difficulty arising from the 
“unsaturatedness” of one part of the thought can indeed be shifted, but not avoided.237 
 
Here the difficulty that “can be shifted, but not avoided” is the difficulty 
generated by (i) the fact that ‘the relation of an object to the concept it falls under’ 
designates not a relation but an object, and (ii) three proper names can no more form a 
sentence than two can. Therefore the words ‘the “unsaturatedness” of one part of 
thought’ in Frege’s last sentence can only refer either to that which is denoted by the 
predicative part of a sentence, i.e. a concept or a relation, or to the predicative part of 
the sentence itself, or to both. In the first case, the “part” of a thought is just a function; 
on the latter, it is the binding behaviour of predicates, i.e. a linguistic function. In 
neither case is the “unsaturated part of a thought” an incomplete sense in some further 
respect. 
 
3.5.1 Referents as “parts” of thoughts 
 
Concepts can be parts of thoughts no more than objects can. Frege famously stressed the 
point about objects during his discussion with Russell concerning what could be a 
constituent of a proposition: 
 
Truth is not a component part of a thought, just as Mont Blanc with its snowfields is not 
itself a component part of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres 
high.238 
 
Russell’s answer was: 
 
I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what 
is actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high’. […] 
If we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all about 
Mont Blanc.239 
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But if, from Russell’s standpoint, Frege’s view allowed us to know too little 
about Mont Blanc, Russell’s own would imply that we knew too much. As Frege wrote 
in a draft of a letter to Jourdain: 
 
Now that part of the thought which corresponds to the name ‘Etna’ cannot be Mount 
Etna itself; it cannot be the meaning of this name. For each individual piece of frozen, 
solidified lava which is part of Mount Etna would then also be part of the thought that 
Etna is higher than Vesuvius. But it seems to me absurd that pieces of lava, even pieces 
of which I had no knowledge, should be parts of my thought.240 
 
There are two concerns implicit in Frege’s remarks.241 One is that it does not 
follow from something’s being an object of thought that we thereby know everything 
that there is to know about it. This is obviously tied to the possibility of an identity’s 
being cognitively valuable. The other is that abstract objects cannot have concrete parts, 
or indeed any parts. Wittgenstein would have expressed the point thus: 
 
The part is smaller than the whole: applied to fact and component part (constituent) that 
would yield an absurdity.242 
 
For Frege, a fact is a thought that is true.243 Facts and thoughts are, in a sense, 
abstract objects. 
 
A thought is something imperceptible: anything the senses can perceive is excluded 
from the realm of things for which the question of truth arises. […] That the Sun has 
risen is not an object emitting rays that reach my eyes; it is not a visible thing like the 
Sun itself.244 
 
That objects and concepts cannot be parts of thoughts just means that the 
relation that obtains between objects, concepts and facts is not of the mereological sort. 
Therefore none of the above counts as an objection against conceiving a thought as a 
function of objects, concepts, and their modes of presentation.245 
A thought is a function of the objects and concepts or relations mentioned by the 
sentence that expresses it because they determine the thought. But as we know from 
“On Sense and Reference”, they determine it only partially. A thought depends not only 
on the objects and concepts, but also on their modes of presentation. I emphasize the 
conjunction because people tend to think of thoughts as unrelated to the realm of 
reference for no good reason. Different modes of presentation determine different 
thoughts; but different objects and different concepts do so too. 
We could say schematically that a thought that O is C is a thought that object O, 
presented in way OW, falls under the concept C, presented in way CW. So a thought is 
a function of O, OW, C and CW. And this is a pretty straightforward, if loose, sense in 
which Os and Cs are “parts” of thoughts. Now one of these parts is indeed unsaturated: 
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C. Therefore, if one of the “parts” of the thought must be unsaturated in order for the 
thought to hold together, then concepts suffice. 
It may be useful to interpret Geach’s, Dummett’s and Sullivan’s views on the 
matter according to this scheme. 
For Geach, the “parts” of a thought were the senses of names and predicates. 
This would be wrong because it would make a thought be only a function of OW and 
CW, O and C being left out of the account. Perhaps this may partly be what Dummett’s 
critique of Geach’s account is about. In any case, we can see that Geach’s model would 
not be fine-grained enough to appreciate the difference between pairs of thoughts such 
that the first involves two thoughts that differ only as to OW and CW, and the second 
involves two thoughts that differ also as to O and C. That is, Geach’s model is blind to 
the fact that thoughts also differ when referents differ, and not only when modes of 
presentation do. 
Sullivan’s view could perhaps be interpreted as claiming that the sense of the 
predicate that denotes C and expresses CW is the function whose arguments are O, OW, 
C and CW, and whose value is the resulting thought. Now, the question is whether this 
is intrinsically plausible. I would say that it is not; besides, if I am right, such 
identification would play no explanatory role either. 
Dummett’s view thus seems to be closer to what I take to be the truth of the 
matter. His words are: 
 
The condition for the truth of the thought has to be viewed as the satisfaction by a 
particular object, given in a certain way, of a certain condition on it. The condition to be 
satisfied by the object is itself given in a particular manner, corresponding to the sense 
of the predicate: but it is a condition on the object, that is, on the referent of the proper 
name.246 
 
So while a thought that O is C is a thought that O falls under C, OW and CW are 
not left out of the account: O is presented in OW, and C in CW. Indeed, this must be 
what Dummett means when he says that the senses of names and predicates alike 
contribute to determining the thought, as much as their referents do to determining the 
truth-value of the sentence that expresses it. 
On this new picture of the relation between thought and reference, that a 
sentence serves as a picture of a thought just means that to the difference between 
complete and incomplete signs there corresponds an analogous one in the realm of 
reference. 
 
3.5.2 The senses of incomplete expressions 
 
To be fair, both Geach and Dummett sometimes write as if they did not distinguish the 
problem of the unity of thought from the problem of sentential unity. 
For instance, Geach identifies Dummett’s doctrine of simple predicates as 
complete expressions as the responsible for his inability to explain the unity of 
thought.247 But, as we have seen, what the doctrine of simple predicates cannot explain 
is sentential unity. Accordingly, Dummett has answered (correctly or not) that his 
doctrine does not entail that simple predicates are a kind of name, but then conceives his 
answer as addressing whether the senses of simple predicates are incomplete.248 
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On the other hand, Dummett is mainly right when he writes: 
 
In abandoning [Geach’s account of the senses of predicates as functions] we have no 
need to deny that the senses of incomplete expressions are themselves incomplete, and 
we should be unfaithful to Frege if we did so. We have, rather, to recognize that they 
are incomplete not after the mode of referents, but after the mode of senses. To grasp 
the sense of an expression is no more than to grasp a means of determining its referent: 
so to grasp the sense of a predicate is to grasp a means of determining a function from 
objects to truth-values. It is integral to the understanding of the predicate that we 
recognize it as a predicate, that is, as an incomplete expression standing for such a 
function. It is in this that the incompleteness of its sense consists; there is no role to be 
played by an assumption that it is itself a function.249 
 
I agree; but, first, it is not clear how to reconcile this passage with Dummett’s 
doctrine of simple predicates, since he here treats predicates indifferently as incomplete 
expressions. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of other passages in which 
Dummett implies that the level distinctions that Frege finds on the realm of reference 
are reproduced on the realm of language.) Second, there is as little point in calling the 
sense of an incomplete expression incomplete, as there is in calling it a function. We 
can of course incompletely understand an incomplete expression, or understand it 
completely, but that is obviously an altogether different matter. 
To understand a predicate involves two things. One: to grasp its criterion of 
application, that is, its sense. Two: to understand it as standing for a concept in the sense 
of chapter 2, that is, as being itself a linguistic function. There is no sense in which the 
sense of an incomplete expression is itself incomplete: no further role for the metaphor 
of unsaturation to play. 
 
Summary 
 
Frege undoubtedly recognizes the problem of the unity of object and concept. The gist 
of his solution lies in the unsaturated, or essentially incomplete character of the 
function. Frege also undeniably claims that some part of a meaningful sentence must be 
predicative. This is the problem of sentential unity, which the doctrine of incomplete 
expressions construed as linguistic functions is able to tackle. Finally, Frege writes that 
some part of a thought too must be incomplete. 
Geach has interpreted the latter as entailing that the senses of predicates must 
also be functions, sense-functions. I have agreed with Dummett that this renders 
unintelligible the explanation of the sense of a sentence as its truth-condition. No 
interpreter of Frege could ever hold on to this result. 
However, Dummett has no better reason to conclude that even the senses of 
incomplete expressions must be objects, since they cannot be functions. I am convinced 
by Dejnožka’s reasons that senses are neither functions nor objects for Frege. 
I have shown that what Frege meant by the problem of the unity of thought 
might be interpreted as the problem of sentential unity, or as the problem of the unity of 
object and concept. Indeed, there is a sense in which the referents of function names 
may be loosely said to be parts of thoughts; namely, thoughts are functions of both 
referents and their modes of presentation. 
I have thus implied that there is no necessity to attach a meaning to the phrase 
‘the incomplete sense of an incomplete expression’. But I have further suggested that to 
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insist otherwise may simply be the result of confounding ‘the sense of an incomplete 
expression’ with ‘the incomplete sense of an expression’. If anything, to grasp the sense 
of an incomplete expression simply involves understanding it as a linguistic function. 
This time I am not sure whether the view that I have been advocating should be 
seen as exegesis or as emendation of Frege’s thought. Frege did write about incomplete 
senses; but on a closer look, he may have meant no more than that predicates and 
concepts alike are functions; he can certainly be so glossed. However compelling may 
the idea that a thought must have an incomplete part which is not a referent seem to be, 
that may be only the result of the alluring power of the picture of the relations between 
language, sense and reference generated by the symmetry suggested by Geach’s model 
to hold between the three Fregean realms. Frege’s own talk of the “third realm” in an 
almost mythological tone may surely also be counter-productive to construing the 
relation between sense and reference in a way such as the one that I have put forward. 
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Conclusion 
 
In chapter 1, I concluded that Geach’s doctrine of linguistic functions could be 
attributed to Frege for two reasons. First, Frege recognized the possibility of 
alternatively decomposing a sentence. Second, the doctrine of linguistic functions, by 
generalizing the notion of a predicate, explains how that it possible. The same sentence 
may be the value of different linguistic functions, which is to say that it may be 
conceived as having been put together in more than one way. 
However, something had to be amiss with Geach’s conception of analysis. 
Sentences could be values of more linguistic functions than could be extracted from 
them by a single application of Frege’s operation. In the simplest case, a relational 
sentence may be the value of a relation-word with unrelated argument-places, but the 
latter cannot be obtained from the former. 
Dummett’s celebrated distinction between analysis and decomposition is useful 
to understand what is in question. Any component that is also an ultimate constituent of 
a sentence will in general be obtained not by a single decomposition, but only via a 
series of decompositions designed to uncover simple predicates. To such a series, we 
may call analysis. 
On the other hand, decomposition presupposes analysis. Any possible 
decomposition of a sentence is circumscribed by the set of its ultimate constituents. 
Therefore, although decomposition is plural, analysis is unique. 
The critiques that have been levelled against the uniqueness of analysis are not 
really convincing. Some rest on Dummett’s independent, if not independently 
motivated, and indeed misconceived doctrine of simple predicates. Others are directed 
against another thesis of Dummett’s, that there is a bijection between thoughts and 
sentences of the concept-script. But even if Dummett were wrong about the latter, it 
would still be the case that each sentence had a unique analysis. 
In particular, I believe I may have contributed to clarify what is at stake in the 
challenge apparently posed by the equipollence of converse relational sentences to 
Dummett’s account. Again, even in this case it would not be the uniqueness of analysis 
but whether there is a bijection between thoughts and sentences of Frege’s concept-
script that would be in question. However, I have argued that, from the point of view of 
Fregean exegesis the problem is spurious, because Frege simply did not see that 
converse relational sentences would have alternative transcriptions into his concept-
script. If he did, he would have been unlikely to assert their equipollence. 
I may have also helped clarify what are the essential insights of Dummett’s 
account of analysis. I have suggested that the association of Dummett’s doctrine with 
his A and B theses may have been counter-productive to Dummett himself. 
In this connection, some of Dummett’s criticisms of Geach’s conception of 
analysis have also been unfair. Geach’s account can be modified in a simple manner so 
as to easily cope with Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition. To 
decompose a sentence is to represent it as the value of a linguistic function obtained 
from it by predicate extraction. If the sentence is not a simple monadic predication, then 
to analyse it is to represent the sentence as the value of a composite linguistic function 
of non-composite linguistic functions, i.e. as the value of a complex predicate of simple 
predicates. What is relevant in Dummett’s account can thus be accommodated into 
Geach’s functional model. 
Since the uniqueness of analysis does not entail the completeness of simple 
predicates, even simple predicates may be thought to be linguistic functions, since 
linguistic functions are unsaturated. In connection with the Dummettian distinction 
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between analysis and decomposition, Geach’s doctrine of linguistic functions therefore 
plays a double role. 
On the one hand, it explains how alternative decomposition is possible, in the 
manner mentioned above. On the other, it explains how elementary (and other) 
sentences are expressive, i.e. how simple predicates may denote functions, and proper 
names objects. 
It was in chapter 2 that I introduced the problem of sentential unity. If predicates 
are linguistic functions, they denote functions because they behave to proper names as 
functions to objects. On the other hand, it is the fact that Fregean functions can only be 
understood as the non-linguistic correlates of incomplete expressions that makes this 
explanation plausible. Geach’s solution of the problem of sentential unity is thus highly 
Fregean in spirit. 
The way in which Frege characterizes his function-names indeed invites 
construing them as being as unsaturated as functions. Although I have not focused on 
Oliver’s interpretation of Fregean predicates, it could be argued, as he does, that calling 
function-names unsaturated is only a manner of speaking. Incomplete expressions are 
for Oliver just plain expressions with empty places. As I have remarked, this would 
leave us without an explanation of sentential unity to ascribe to Frege – but as Oliver 
says, Frege might have had none. 
But if I am right, the real ground for attributing Geach’s conception of 
predicates to Frege lies in the fact that the doctrine of linguistic functions entails 
Kerry’s paradox. True: Oliver may be right that Geach’s interpretation of footnote 8 of 
“On Concept and Object” is too fanciful; and Oliver certainly is right that Frege wrote 
that function-names could be named by proper names, which they could not were they 
unsaturated. However, I have argued, this is no sufficient ground to reject the attribution 
of the notion of predicates as linguistic functions to Frege: only that Frege did not 
follow the consequences of such an idea in detail. The reason is that, otherwise, Frege 
would have had no good reason to insist on the very feature that generates Kerry’s 
paradox. His insistence that all and only proper names denote objects would then appear 
to be only whimsical. 
In chapter 3, I claimed that Geach’s thesis of sense-functions is independent 
from the doctrine of linguistic functions. Besides, the problem of the unity of thought is 
either redundant or inexistent. 
It would be redundant if it could be interpreted either as the problem of 
sentential unity, or as the problem of the unity of object and concept, which have I tried 
to argue that it could. 
It would be inexistent if it were merely generated either by a confusion between 
‘the sense of incomplete expressions’ and ‘the incomplete sense of expressions’ or by 
the adherence to an excessively schematic conception of the relation between sense and 
reference. 
In any case, Dummett had accurately pointed out that Geach’s view that the 
senses of predicates are themselves functions is untenable. Sullivan had tried to salvage 
the latter, to my mind unsuccessfully. But to deny that the senses of predicates are 
functions does not entail that they are objects since, as Dejnožka argued, senses are 
neither. 
Geach’s Fregean functional model of sentential complexity should therefore be 
corrected in two ways. In the first place, it should incorporate Dummett’s distinction 
between analysis and decomposition, which it may quite unproblematically in the way 
described above. In the second place, it should recognize the spuriousness of extending 
the metaphor of unsaturation to the level of sense, since there is no further role for the 
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latter to play beyond that understanding incomplete expressions involves understanding 
them as incomplete expressions, i.e. linguistic functions. Other than that, both Geach’s 
functional model of sentential complexity and his attribution of the notion of a linguistic 
function, if only implicitly, to Frege, have every reason to recommend themselves. 
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